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Thesis Abstract 
The thesis argues that for Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger, the free will debate has 
been rendered intractable by a fundamental misunderstanding of the terms involved. This is 
exacerbated by a failure to identify and adopt an appropriate methodological approach to the 
problem. Both philosophers argue that this error in the free will debate is symptomatic of a 
broader misunderstanding of philosophical enquiry and the method it necessitates. For 
Heidegger, the entire history of ‘analytic/western’ ontology has been fatally misconceived as a 
result of an effort to define the being of entities in static terms. The insistence on the question 
of what a being ‘is’ obstructs any meaningful enquiry by conceding its existence at the outset 
of the investigation. Sartre’s project is founded on Heidegger’s argument, pushing it into a 
definitive claim about the nature of consciousness. He argues that as the only being for whom 
‘meaning’ is possible, consciousness is distanced from beings by ‘nothingness’ which ensures 
its ontological freedom. The thesis will argue that Sartre has misconstrued Heidegger’s work, 
making comprehension of his freedom all the more complicated. We propose that a thorough 
investigation of their projects will reveal an account of ontological freedom that does not suffer 
from the shortcomings of existentialism whilst avoiding the methodological missteps of the 
traditional discourse.  
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Introduction: The Principles in Debate 
 
The question of the nature of freedom and whether we have it has been a consistent feature of 
philosophical discourse. In his text „The Essence of Truth‟ (ET)1, Martin Heidegger offers an 
account of freedom, deeply intertwined with fundamental philosophical questions such that 
enquiring after any one will necessitate confrontation with all, indeed with truth as such. For his 
part, Jean-Paul Sartre also couches his robust account of existential freedom and responsibility in a 
broad ontology of being. He claims at the outset of „Being and Nothingness‟ (BN)2 that though, 
„modern thought has realised considerable progress‟ in overcoming embarrassing philosophical 
dualisms,
3
 the terms and parameters of that progress remain undefined. In attempting to do just that, 
Sartre provides what he argues is an account of freedom similarly unencumbered by dualism. In the 
course of this thesis, we will show how in either case a radical and compelling account of freedom 
is premised on a project to address and ask the question of being. Moreover, that doing so 
necessitates criticism of a traditional approach to ontological enquiry and a fundamental shift in 
methodology. For both philosophers, the very way we traditionally approach ontological questions 
precludes the possibility of describing phenomena in accordance with experience. Rather they are 
abstracted from a contextualising matrix, critically distanced from the enquirer and defined in 
theoretical terms. While this may not be immediately problematic in certain cases, satisfactory 
accounts of human freedom have proven particularly elusive. This of course is uncontroversial and 
one needn‟t appeal to the complexities of Heidegger and Sartre to establish as much. Contemporary 
discourse occasionally observes similar misgivings with respect to finding satisfying accounts of 
free will.  
Despite the broad range of positions in contemporary discourse on freedom, one may find 
consensus in the difficulty and seeming intractability of the problem. As Peter van Inwagen points 
out in his paper, „An Essay on Free Will‟: 
 
It is difficult to formulate the problem of „free will and determinism‟ in a way that will satisfy 
everyone.
4
 
 
Galen Strawson points out a possible reason for the problem in his summary of the debate on free 
will though he fails to explore it further: 
 
                                                          
1
 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth (New York: Continuum, 2002) 
2
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) 
3
 Ibid., p.1 
4
 Peter Van Inwagen, An Essay On Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1983) p.1 
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But in many human beings, the experience of choice gives rise to a conviction of absolute 
responsibility that is untouched by philosophical arguments.
5
 
  
From this quote at least the problem seems clear: philosophical arguments about freedom are often 
ill equipped to account for its experience.
 6
 For Heidegger and Sartre, the problem is much less the 
human conviction about absolute responsibility and more the invalidity of the method by which the 
problem is formulated. In other words, they will argue that traditional methods both have not and 
cannot satisfactorily account for the experience of choice. A brief overview of popular positions 
will serve to orientate their criticism in respect of contemporary discourse. Moreover, explicit 
criticism of the traditional approach to freedom is a significant feature of BT and BN so our interest 
in the contemporary debate is restricted to its usefulness in illustrating their projects. To that end, 
Strawson describes determinism and the two most common responses to it in the free will debate in 
the following way 
 
Briefly, determinism is the view that everything that happens is necessitated by what has already 
gone before, in such a way that nothing can happen otherwise than it does.
7
 
 
The implication of determinism seems to be that there is no such thing as free will, contradicting 
our „conviction of absolute responsibility‟. Its language seems uncontroversial and difficult to 
contest but its implications directly contravene first-personal experience of everyday life. The 
problem seems to turn on the issue of time: one may gladly concede that what „has happened‟ is a 
direct consequence of causal forces but to say that therefore all that „can happen‟ is equally 
determined, although rational, seems harder to swallow. Strawson goes on to introduce the 
compatibilist response to determinism: 
  
According to compatibilists, freedom is compatible with determinism because freedom is essentially 
just a matter of not being constrained or hindered in certain ways when one acts or chooses.
8
 
 
His description is particularly helpful if only to highlight the root of contention. The compatibilist, 
as described by Strawson at least, offers an equally uncontroversial account of freedom but relies on 
                                                          
5
 Galen Strawson, Free Will, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011: 
http://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/free-will/v-2/ 
6
 Nevertheless, two weaknesses in Strawson‟s claim may help to explain the discrepancy he identifies. First, 
given that he is a human being, one is compelled to ask whether Strawson is similarly „untouched‟ by 
philosophical arguments or for that matter, whether his philosophical arguments are „untouched‟ by the 
experience of choice. Secondly, his claim seems to presuppose a distinction between „human beings‟ and 
philosophical arguments, although no philosophical argument can be made without humans and only humans 
are capable of philosophical arguments.   
7
 Ibid 
8
 Ibid 
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the ambiguity of „choice‟ and „hindrance‟.9 In reductive terms,  a generic compatibilist defence of 
freedom may argue that if determinism is true then „choice‟ is necessarily stripped of its substance. 
Experiences such as deliberation, anxiety, conflict and of course the „conviction of responsibility‟ 
are seemingly rendered incoherent if every event is a necessary result of preceding causes. Lastly, 
Strawson defines the incompatibilist in the following way: 
 
Incompatibilists hold that freedom is not compatible with determinism. They point out that if 
determinism is true, then every one of one‟s actions was determined to happen as it did before one 
was born. They hold that one cannot be held to be truly free and finally morally responsible for one‟s 
actions in this case.
10
 
 
In his own summary, Timothy O‟Connor expands on the incompatibilist position: 
 
Incompatibilists think that something stronger is required: for me to act with free will requires that 
there are a plurality of futures open to me consistent with the past (and laws of nature) being just as 
they were – that I be able „to add to the given past‟...11 
  
It may be helpful to separate O‟Conner‟s claims. He states that the incompatibilist wants a stronger 
or more robust freedom than freedom as the compatibilist conceives it. For the incompatibilist, 
some „addition‟ to the predictable course of events must be identifiable in order to evidence 
freedom. But this would seem to presuppose a distinction between human action/choice and the 
causal world, as though choice operates outside the boundaries of causality. Nevertheless the 
presupposed distinction is unaffected and uninterrogated. For Heidegger and Sartre, the problem of 
presupposing such fundamental ontological characteristics of beings, skews any ontological 
investigation from the outset. Moreover, they share a central claim that this problem is inherent to a 
certain methodological approach to the problem of freedom in which it is seen „from above‟ with 
little or no meaningful appeal to the agent‟s experience. On our reading of the definitions provided 
by Strawson and O‟Connor, incompatibilists require that humans would have to be distinct from 
natural causality in order to be free: humans have to be able to „add to the given past‟. 
Compatibilists, on the other hand, want to show that we may be free despite being embroiled in 
natural causality. For both therefore, „the conviction of absolute responsibility‟ arising from the 
experience of choice is a problem that must be worked into a pre-existing view of nature. Both 
compatibilists and incompatibilists thus employ a dualistic approach. Heidegger and Sartre eschew 
such an approach. They both begin their respective texts, Being and Time (BT)
 12
 and BN, with its 
                                                          
9
 The traditional debate often revolves around the extent to which one has „choice‟ or is „hindered‟ or what 
these terms mean, as we shall see. 
10
 Ibid 
11
 Timothy O‟Connor, Free Will, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/freewill/ 
12
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) 
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identification and rejection. Charles Taylor refers to this approach as „rationalism‟ in his paper, 
„Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger‟: 
 
In speaking of “rationalism” I am supposing that a certain conception of reason played a determining 
role. [...] That is, what were seen as the proper procedures of rational thought were read into the very 
constitution of the mind and made part of its very structure. The result was a picture of the human 
thinking agent as disengaged, as occupying a sort of protovariant of the “view from nowhere” to use 
Nagel‟s suggestive phrase.13 
 
Thus the problem of the rationalist approach is that first, the philosopher adopts a disengaged way 
of thinking about the agent and second, the agent is conceived as a disengaged decision maker. The 
„dominance‟ of the former is necessary to be „read into‟ the latter. Taylor identifies two variants of 
rationalism, „dualism‟ and „mechanism‟, though both are „ontologies of disengagement‟. In fact, it 
may be worth noting that Taylor goes even further, including everyday thought in his critique of the 
rationalist approach: 
 
In speaking of the “dominant” view I am thinking not only of the theories that have been pre-eminent 
in modern philosophy, but also of an outlook that has to some extent colonized the common sense of 
our civilization.
14
 
 
Our concerns lack the scope necessary to investigate this claim but we can say that the current 
problem may be even worse than Taylor suggests.
15
 For Heidegger and Sartre, if a disengaged 
approach can be shown to be i) inherently problematic for understanding freedom and ii) a 
consistent feature of how freedom has been traditionally approached, it will the result of a 
methodological error arising from a fundamental misunderstanding in the approach to philosophy. 
As Inwagen, Strawson and others have indicated, a certain dissonance arises when comparing 
traditional philosophical arguments about freedom with average everyday experience. Although this 
may be a predictable consequence of developing philosophical arguments deliberately intended to 
maintain a „disengaged perspective‟ or what might more commonly be referred to as keeping a 
„critical distance‟.16 The effect can be seen in the assumptions adherents to the method allow 
                                                          
13
 Charles Taylor, Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp.317-337, pp.317-318 
14
 Ibid., p.319 
15
 It may be informative to consider the possibility that this „dominant view‟ has not „colonised the common 
sense of our civilisation‟ as much as it has been the ideological spearhead in this civilisations history of 
colonialism. 
16„Rationalism‟ excludes the context of first-personal experience resulting in accounts whose coherence 
depends on maintaining a „critical distance‟ from the realities of everyday life. Thus for Taylor, „The 
conditions of intelligibility are built into the elements and processes of the mind as internal properties. [...] 
This outlook forgets that for something to be intelligibly x is for it to count as intelligibly x, and that there are 
always contextual conditions for anything to count as something.‟ - Ibid., p. 332   
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themselves such as those made by Thomas Nagel in his essay, „What is it Like to be a Bat?‟17 
Therein Nagel asserts,  
 
In understanding a phenomenon like lightning, it is legitimate to go as far away as one can from a 
strictly human viewpoint.
18
 
 
Of course what a loosely „human viewpoint‟ might be is not explained. Nor for that matter does 
Nagel describe how he manages to „go far away‟ from a „strictly human viewpoint‟ and then return 
to reflect on his findings. This is not to mention the worrying realisation that by implication at least, 
Nagel seems to think that he can more „legitimately‟ understand the phenomenon of sporadically 
electrically charged particles than a bat. He also declares that „denial of the logical significance of 
what one cannot understand or describe is simply „cognitive dissonance‟‟,19 oblivious to consequent 
inference that „logical significance‟ is simply untouched, that is, disengaged from the very 
possibility of understanding and description. In other words, something may be considered logically 
significant though it is neither described nor understood. For Heidegger and Sartre, critical analysis 
of this disengaged methodology provides the framework for a renewed if not improved account of 
freedom. It is to that end that we focus our attention on their projects and particularly though not 
exclusively their major works, BT and BN. We will contend that the full value of these projects for 
the problem of freedom has often been overlooked or obscured. We will show how a combination 
of misunderstanding and misrepresentation has diluted the impact of their work on the 
contemporary understanding of freedom. Finally, that re-analysis may therefore afford us an 
account of freedom that does not suffer from the difficulties associated with the above-mentioned 
analytic accounts.  
Our first chapter will seek to establish the fundamental similarities between the two 
philosophers. We will show how both authors explicitly acknowledge and, to a greater or lesser 
extent, investigate the shortcomings of a traditional ontological methodology. Both will argue in 
favour of a methodological approach emphasising an inherent understanding of phenomena. 
Although they arrive at similar conclusions in that regard their positions diverge in their respective 
accounts of freedom. We will also show that Sartre‟s project is in large part influenced by BT but 
seeks to resolve what Sartre believes are fundamental problems therein. Sartre‟s primary concern in 
that regard is to include an account and proof of consciousness in an otherwise Heideggerian 
phenomenological ontology. In so doing, our first chapter will also outline some of the major 
differences between the two, suggesting some of the causes of popular misunderstanding. The 
                                                          
17
 Thomas Nagel, What is it Like to be a Bat?, The Philosophical Review, Vol.83 No.4, (1974) pp.435-450 
18
 Ibid., p.443 
19
 Ibid., pp.440-441 
10 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
accuracy of our interpretation will be largely reliant on maintaining the distinction between 
erroneous criticisms and complications arising from Sartre‟s misrepresentation of Heidegger‟s 
ontology.  
Chapter two will therefore be dedicated to analysis of Heidegger‟s fundamental ontology. It 
will seek to explicate that project and some of the complexities which often lead to 
misunderstanding and misinterpretation. As we will see, Heidegger‟s awkward syntax and the 
holistic structure of his work are structural features which have a significant effect on interpretation 
though they certainly make comprehension more difficult.
20
 Heidegger‟s first concern is that the 
problem of being
21
 as a whole has been „forgotten‟, implied and/or presupposed in almost all 
ontological enquiry. Focussing on the introduction of BT, we will explore Heidegger‟s investigation 
of the methodological approach to ontological enquiry, its shortcomings and the need for the 
„destruction‟ and „restatement‟ of what he considers the „leading questions of philosophy‟. 
Chapter three will then provide extended analysis of Sartre‟s phenomenological ontology. It 
will seek to evidence and make concrete the claim that Sartre has in fact produced what we will call 
an anthropocentric ontology of being, suffering from the kind of dualism inherent to rationalist 
accounts. We will investigate Sartre‟s division of being into his two ontological modes, being-in-
itself and being-for-itself. Although we will argue that Sartre‟s particular dualism does not function 
according to the same principles, the dependence of both modes on consciousness ultimately 
contradicts his initial intentions, resulting in a confused account of freedom. Nonetheless, criticisms 
of Sartre and his account of freedom often fail to read it in the appropriate context, producing 
invalid arguments and further complicating matters.22 As Peter Poellner states in his paper, „Early 
Sartre on Freedom and Ethics‟,  
 
Any interpretation of the early Sartre‟s views needs to take a stance on how seriously to take Sartre‟s 
description of his project, in the subtitle of BN, as „Phenomenological Ontology‟.23 
 
It is precisely this project we intend to focus our attention on whilst evidencing its dependence on 
Heidegger‟s project as outlined in BT.  
                                                          
20
 Here we agree with Mahon O‟Brien‟s conclusive recommendation about Heidegger‟s sometimes „vague‟ 
language: „And even when his wording seems vague or ambiguous or leaves us somewhat bewildered at 
times, I recommend that we look to reconcile the odd sporadic remark with the preponderance of the 
remaining textual evidence rather than the reverse.‟ – See, O‟Brien, Mahon (2014) Leaping Ahead of 
Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Being and Time, International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies, Vol. 22, No.4, p.549   
21
 For the purpose of ease, we will refer to „being‟ in the lower case throughout though both Sartre and 
Heidegger make a distinction between „being(s)‟ and „Being‟.  
22
 See, Ronald E. Santoni, Camus on Sartre‟s “Freedom”: Another “Misunderstanding”, The Review of 
Metaphysics, Vol. 61 No. 4 (2008) pp.785-813  
23
 Peter Poellner, Early Sartre on Freedom and Ethics, European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 23 No. 2 (2012) 
pp.221-247 
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Chapter four and five will address the accounts of freedom in Sartre and Heidegger. 
Heidegger's project and in particular, the methodology he describes, will ultimately attempt to raise 
the question of freedom to the pinnacle of philosophical thought, becoming the standard by which 
all enquiry is judged. In this manner, Heidegger highlights and unpicks presuppositions implicit in a 
traditional approach to ontology. Such a challenge will require that we address some fundamental 
assumptions of rationalist philosophy but that in so doing, the full force and efficacy of a radical or 
robust freedom will also be revealed. Analysis of both Sartre and particularly Heidegger will follow 
the progression of their arguments in the order and manner of their presentation. To that end, 
chapters four and five will offer a detailed analysis of Sartre and Heidegger‟s accounts of freedom 
respectively.  
Chapter four will isolate Sartre‟s argument for the necessity of freedom from his general 
project as explicated in chapter three. Therein, he describes an ontological freedom inferred from 
„intentionality‟ and consciousness. For Sartre, the experience of a motif24 is determined by a 
„fundamental project‟ rooted in the very structure of consciousness, differing depending on the 
unique perspective of each individual agent. We contend that a sympathetic reading will reveal the 
most serious concerns with Sartre‟s account, allowing for an adjustment in his interpretation.  
In a similar respect, chapter five will argue for maintaining what Heidegger calls, „essential 
insight‟ or what we refer to as interpretive sensitivity. We will contend that The Essence of Human 
Freedom (EHF)
25
 and ET are i) two halves of Heidegger‟s account of freedom and ii) an effort in 
applying the methodology described in BT. An appropriate reading will therefore demand that 
arguments and explanations are understood according to those principles. These two texts will 
firstly offer analysis of what Heidegger believes is the best available argument for the freedom he 
wants: Kant‟s transcendental and practical freedom. We will explicate Heidegger‟s interpretation 
with regard to his overall project, referring back to the methodology of BT. For Heidegger, Kant‟s 
account lacks the „radicalism‟ necessary to „problematise‟ the assumption of causality as the most 
primordial feature of first-personal experience. ET is an effort in precisely such „radicalism‟ 
whereby „man is no longer possessor of freedom‟ but is „possessed by freedom‟.  
As we will show, despite the problematic ambiguities Sartre finds in Heidegger‟s account, it 
offers a compelling argument for freedom as a necessary prerequisite for experience including the 
experience of causality. Moreover, that Sartre‟s criticisms can be satisfied in a manner that 
reinforces the premises of Heidegger‟s ontology. If accurate, this account may shed new light on 
some of the fundamental premises of a rationalist ontology, in particular, the disengagement of the 
                                                          
24
 Sartre refers to motif‟s(reasons) and mobile‟s (motives) in his account of choice. We will discuss these 
terms but will use the French throughout.  
25
 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom (New York: Continuum, 2002)  
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philosopher and their conception of the agent. We contend that Heidegger‟s account follows from 
the principles of his fundamental ontology adding weight to the claim that the „problem‟ of freedom 
is less to do with freedom as such and more a consequence of a misconception in how we approach 
the question of our freedom.              
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I 
Foundational Similarities 
 
Our first concern will be to briefly outline the fundamental similarities between Sartre‟s project 
of phenomenological ontology and that of his predecessor, Martin Heidegger. The central point 
therein the fundamental importance of the question of being to both projects. The question does not 
simply indicate the aim or direction of their projects but firstly, it provides the methodological 
horizon of their ontological investigations.  For both philosophers, all ontology is flawed from the 
outset if it fails to firstly appropriately formulate the question of being. Only after having doing so 
can one provide an investigation of a particular being and thus shed light on all beings, indeed on 
being as such. Secondly, its importance to the methodology of Heidegger and Sartre‟s projects can 
be summarised in its reflection of the fundamental concerns of average, everyday human 
experience. Heidegger and Sartre premise their projects on the claim that ontology must take the 
brute fact of presence or „there-ness‟ as the appropriate point of departure for any investigation. 
They will argue that efforts to disengage,
26
 detach or bracket-out the everyday experience of the 
enquirer from the enquiry is at best, disingenuous if not ill-conceived. Rather they adopt a 
„hermeneutics of facticity‟ whereby there-ness is already informative of the interpretive-matrix of 
meaning in average, everyday experience. An elaboration of their premises and methods will follow 
but our current interest is to observe the manifestation of their shared concern with the question of 
being and their rejection of idealist and realist traditions. Their view of experience as firmly rooted 
in the context of „the world‟27 is one of the main features distinguishing their projects from 
traditional ontology.  
As we shall see, BT provides a platform from which Sartre develops his project and view of 
human reality. It is therefore entirely unsurprising that one can specify points of similarity between 
them. One consequence of this is that Sartre often seems to slide from concurrence with Heidegger 
to opposition. Distinguishing his position will therefore demand a degree of interpretive sensitivity. 
The difficulty of achieving this is summed up by the opening words of Michel Haar‟s paper, „Sartre 
and Heidegger‟: 
 
                                                          
26
 See Charles Taylor, Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp.317-336 
27
 A term which has slightly different meanings for both but will be explored at length in the chapters 
dedicated to analysis of their projects. Briefly, Sartre argues that human beings are „inescapably engaged in 
the world‟ and without whom, „there would not be a world‟. For Heidegger, „the world‟ refers to the „unitary 
totality of history and nature‟; an inherent feature of what it means to be human.  
14 
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In the heyday of postwar existentialism, the names Sartre and Heidegger were often linked, evoking 
two aspects of the same doctrine. Today, more than thirty years later, it seems clear that no kinship 
ever bound the two philosophers, but that, on the contrary, they are radically opposed in every 
respect.
28
 
 
 Thus Haar claims that in the course of thirty years, scholarly opinion has swung from the 
association of Heidegger and Sartre to the assertion of their disparity. It would indeed be quite 
simple to disregard the „heyday of postwar existentialism‟ in favour of a contemporary reading but 
diligence and simplicity seldom go hand in hand. The task herein is rather less straightforward and 
though we will now outline the points of foundational similarity, the analysis of Sartre‟s view of 
human reality in chapter three will clarify their differences. These points of similarity are threefold 
and are derived from the fundamentality of the question of being in both their projects.  We will 
refer to the first as: i) critique of traditional ontology. We will explicate their argument that the 
methodological approach inherent to dualistic ontology is inappropriate to its concerns.  We will 
refer to the second as: ii) rejection of realism and idealism wherein we explicate the formalisation of 
their critique in the assertion of a strictly phenomenological methodology. We will refer to the third 
as: iii) prioritisation of human being(s) where we will explicate the methodological significance of 
their hermeneutics of facticity where the ontology of the enquirer and their immediate experience is 
an integral feature of the question of being. Finally, it will be important to note how Sartre‟s project 
differs from Heidegger‟s. Though, as we shall see, there are three significant differences worthy of 
mention, the most significant is Sartre‟s interpretation of the question of being. For Heidegger, the 
proximity of the question of being to the enquirer is such that it demands careful formulation to 
mitigate the inclination to disengagement and presupposition. Sartre‟s project reads more like an 
attempt to actually answer the question insofar as he is concerned to establish an existentialist ethics 
which is absent in Heidegger‟s ontology.     
 
i) Critique of Traditional Ontology 
Much like Heidegger, Sartre acknowledges that the question of being has thus far been 
overlooked. Of course neither Sartre nor Heidegger assert the total absence of ontological enquiry 
in the history of philosophy. Rather, for both, the dominant discourse has been methodologically 
inclined to presupposing the ontological character of beings thereby obscuring enquiry from the 
outset. Heidegger states that „This question [of being] has today been forgotten‟29 and similarly, 
Sartre claims that „being has not been given its due.‟30 Of course there is a difference between these 
                                                          
28
 Michel Haar, Sartre and Heidegger in Jean-Paul Sartre: Contemporary Approaches to his Philosophy 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981) pp.168-187, p.168 
29
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) p.21 
30
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) p.16 
15 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
claims. Nonetheless, whether an appropriate ontological discussion about the question of being has 
been lost or impeded, it is absent. On our interpretation, neither philosopher employs their phrase as 
a rhetorical device but a literal observation of the accuracy if not the validity of ontological 
discourse. If the ontological character of beings is conceded by the enquiry then investigation is 
deprived of its substance. Such enquiry could therefore only be ostensibly concerned with ontology 
having presupposed the fundamental characteristics of beings. Of course the accuracy of their 
hypothesis will be scrutinised but it is on this basis that Heidegger and Sartre begin their discourse 
with the assertion that all previous efforts in ontology have failed to appropriately approach the 
question of being. For both, culpability lies at the feet of an inappropriate methodology, though the 
explanation for this state of affairs differs. For Heidegger the evidence is found in the 
„presupposition‟31 of being that is inherent to the questions of traditional ontology. Typically these 
questions are formulated such that one might ask, „what is being?‟ or „what is the being of this 
entity?‟. In either case, the nature of the being that is sought after is presupposed by the „is‟ of the 
question. In the opening pages of BT, Heidegger asserts that the presupposition of „is-ness‟ „keeps 
one within an understanding of the „is‟, though it remains uncertain what „is‟ signifies‟.32 The 
problem is twofold. Firstly, the attribution of „is-ness‟ prescribes a mode of being in the sense that 
what „is‟ (as opposed to what „is not‟)33 already refers to beings of a particular ontological 
character. Secondly, Heidegger argues that we comport ourselves, that is think, act and behave, 
within an understanding of being where „understanding‟ refers to a pre-ontological relationship. 
This familiarity with or concern for being and the question thereof makes it all too easy to overlook 
or assume the nature of that relationship. The presupposition of „is-ness‟ indicates precisely such an 
oversight restricting enquiry to those beings which conform to the character of what „is‟. In this 
sense, the question „what is being‟ is taken to mean, „what does one understand of being, given that 
it „is‟?‟ For Heidegger, ontological enquiry must be committed to the „disclosure‟34 of being 
achieved in part by rejecting the temptation to formulate the question of being in the traditional 
manner.  
Sartre is similarly critical of traditional ontology but focuses his critique on the dualistic 
conception of being(s) he claims is also inherent to it. The introductory pages of BN allude to the 
„embarrassing dualism‟ of „being and appearance‟ [l‟être et le paraître] inherent in traditional 
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 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) p.27 
32
 Ibid., p.25 
33
 This is an „is‟ in the sense of Wittgenstein‟s, „the world is everything that is the case‟ where what „is‟ refers 
to the „existing state of affairs‟. The term is invalid in a discussion ostensibly intended to investigate the 
nature of what „is‟. See, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (Milton Keynes: Lighting 
Source UK, 2009) 
34
 A term that will be central to the problem of freedom in Heidegger‟s account referring to a directive to 
rethink ordinary concepts in order to reveal being.  
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ontology. Sartre discusses the dualisms of „interiority and exteriority‟ [l‟intérieur à l‟extériuer] with 
regard to „the existent‟ as well as „appearance and essence‟ [l‟apparence et l‟essence]. The concern 
is not the particular metaphysical definitions of each term but that a binary logic is applied in each 
case wherein an opposition persists throughout traditional ontological discourse. The problem, on 
our reading of Sartre, is that these dualisms are firstly, metaphysically invalid and secondly, 
ontologically disingenuous. In the first case, Sartre argues that dualistically conceived being will 
not admit of a relation between the two categories. Any ontology thus conceived is therefore 
incomplete since it cannot account for the holistic experience of being. In the second case, the 
conception of a disengaged agent which underlies the dualistic approach undermines their robust 
ontological responsibility that Sartre attributes to consciousness. In order for the philosopher to 
account for both „appearance‟ and „essence‟ or „interiority‟ and „exteriority‟ they must adopt an 
„objective‟, that is, „view from nowhere‟ perspective. As Taylor also explains, this Cartesian model 
of a mind disembodied and disengaged from experience is extended and read into the ontology of 
beings. Ontological enquiry is thus reduced to hypothetical propositions masquerading as an 
account of beings. According to Sartre, „considerable progress‟ has been made culminating in the 
„illegitimacy‟ of these „metaphysical dualisms‟: 
 
The obvious conclusion is that the dualism of being and appearance is no longer entitled to any legal 
status within philosophy. [...] That is why we can equally well reject the dualism of appearance and 
essence. The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence. The essence of an 
existent is no longer a property sunk in the cavity of this existent; it is the manifest law which 
presides over the successions of its appearances, it is the principle of the series.
35
 
 
The claim that essence is obscured by characterising it as a hidden „property‟ of an existent entails 
the „rejection of appearance and essence‟. Though Sartre maintains his own distinction between 
essence and existence,
36
 he rejects the traditional model of metaphysically precedent essences 
determining appearances. As we will see, he will argue that the particularities of appearance are 
evidence of a profound ontological relationship between modes of being proceeding from 
consciousness rather than the phenomena themselves. For Sartre, one takes a step towards the 
disclosure of being once one has divested oneself of a methodology which impedes the „arrival at 
the idea of the phenomenon‟37.         
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 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) pp.2-3 
36
 The central claim of Sartre‟s existentialism is that „existence precedes essence‟.  
37
 It may be worthy of note that Sartre explicitly accredits this „idea of the phenomenon‟ to Husserl and 
Heidegger. Ibid., p.2 
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ii) Rejection of Realism and Idealism 
Both Heidegger and Sartre formalise the rejection of realism and idealism as 
„phenomenology‟. David Woodruff Smith defines phenomenology in the following way: 
 
Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point 
of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward 
something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an object 
by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) together with appropriate enabling 
conditions.
38
 
 
He later adds that as a philosophical discipline, phenomenology „came into its own in the works of 
Edmund Husserl‟ whose writing and teaching had a profound impact on Heidegger and by 
extension therefore, Sartre. Crucially, Heidegger‟s opus takes issue with and thoroughly rejects a 
central feature of Husserl‟s phenomenology. As Woodruff Smith explains, 
 
We are to practice phenomenology, Husserl proposed, by “bracketing” the question of the existence 
of the natural world around us. We thereby turn our attention, in reflection, to the structure of our 
own conscious experience. [...] Consider my visual experience wherein I see a tree across the square. 
In phenomenological reflection, we need not concern ourselves with whether the tree exists: my 
experience is of a tree whether or not such a tree exists.
39
 
 
We are not concerned to provide an exegesis of Husserl‟s argument. Suffice it to say therefore that 
on Woodruff‟s interpretation,  „bracketing‟ is premised on distinguishing the question of the „pure‟ 
structure of conscious experience from the question of the nature of beings. Thus the question of the 
nature of the experience of a tree is at least prior to if not entirely independent from the question of 
its existence. For Heidegger this method of „bracketing‟ maintains an implicit and disingenuous 
disengagement between the thing and our experience of it. If, as Heidegger will argue, the 
fundamentality of the question of being underlies all experience then the question of the nature of 
the experience of the tree is deeply intertwined with the question of its existence. By „bracketing‟ 
out this concern what remains is a disengaged abstraction of immediate experience. Sartre remains 
quite in line with Heidegger when he claims that previous failures are a direct result of 
shortcomings in the dominant traditions of idealism and realism. Consequently a solution is 
required that does not adhere to either:  
 
[...] we have ruled out a realistic conception of the relations of the phenomenon with consciousness. 
[...] we have ruled out the idealist solution of the problem. It appears that we have barred all doors 
and that we are now condemned to regard transcendent being and consciousness as two closed 
totalities without possible communication. It will be necessary to show that the problem allows a 
solution other than realism or idealism.
40
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 David Woodruff Smith, Phenomenology, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ 
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 Ibid 
40
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) pp.19-20 
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This move away from realism and idealism may also be seen in light of Heidegger‟s claim that,  
 
Both realism and idealism have – with equal thoroughness – missed the meaning of the Greek 
conception of truth, in terms of which only the possibility of something like a „doctrine of ideas‟ can 
be understood as philosophical knowledge.
41
  
 
Heidegger derives his definition of phenomenology from his interpretation of Greek accounts of the 
phenomenon and the logos. He understands the latter as a reference to a kind of discourse which 
„lets-something-be-seen‟ regardless of whether what is seen is considered „real‟. If being is neither 
„behind‟ nor „beyond‟ the phenomenon then what remains is the phenomenon itself. Just as 
Heidegger‟s definition of phenomenology is „to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the 
very way in which it shows itself from itself‟,42 Sartre argues that being is disclosed from the 
phenomenon itself:  
 
For the being of an existent is exactly what it appears. [...] It does not point over its shoulder to a 
true being which would be, for it, absolute. What it is, it is absolutely, for it reveals itself as it is. The 
phenomenon can be studied and described as such, for it is absolutely indicative of itself. [...] The 
appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence.
43   
 
In this passage Sartre almost directly reiterates the sentiment of Heidegger‟s claim that,  
 
Least of all can the Being of entities ever be anything such that „behind it‟ stands something else 
„which does not appear.44 
 
For both,
45
 entities do not have an „objective reality‟ beyond perception (as in traditional 
realism) nor are they simply the „subjective‟ product of concepts and ideas (as in traditional 
idealism). The reality of entities and their appearance to the perceiver are inherently intertwined in a 
complex of indivisible relations which, all too often, are insufficiently described by a dualistic 
approach to ontology. Thus for Heidegger, „appearance‟ [Erscheinung], is more precisely „the 
announcing-itself by something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through 
something which does not show itself.‟46 What „appears‟ therefore does not refer to perceptible 
occurrence but, in the first instance, a reference-relation between what is announced and what is not 
shown.    
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 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) pp.57-58 
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 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) p.2 
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 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) p.60 
45
 The degree of their similarity in this regard and their reasons for the rejection of metaphysical dualisms will 
become apparent in the analysis of their projects. 
46
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This study of the phenomenon is posited in opposition to realism and idealism. Though the 
strength of that opposition differs, the foundational principle is the same in both cases. Heidegger 
asserts that the presupposition inherent to previous ontological discourse tends to find its expression 
in one or the other of these two traditions.
47
 His criticism expands to include Aristotle, Descartes 
and Kant. For Heidegger, whether one posits the objective reality of „the world‟ independent of 
perception or whether „the world‟ is reduced to our subjective perspective on it, being is obscured. 
In the realist approach, the concrete mind-independent properties of an entity describe its being. In 
the idealist approach, entities are the construct of ideas whose being is manufactured in the mind. In 
either case, Heidegger will argue that being is construed as the „most universal‟ concept „already 
included in the apprehension of an entity‟, „indefinable‟ by virtue of its supposed universality or is 
„self-evident‟ in all „comportment towards entities‟. Consequently, a thorough explication of being 
is overlooked in favour of methodologies categorising entities as subject or object. It is on the basis 
of this broad criticism that Heidegger accuses traditional ontology of blindness and perversion 
„from its ownmost aim‟ insofar as it has failed to firstly „clarify the meaning of being‟.48  
Though Sartre also explicitly rejects realism and idealism, he does so for different reasons 
requiring that he is not as severe in his criticism.
49
 He does state that realism and idealism have 
fallen short of appropriately addressing the question of being: 
 
We have indeed established [...] that the being of the phenomenon can on no account act upon 
consciousness. In this way we have ruled out a realistic conception of the relations of the 
phenomenon with consciousness. We have shown also that [...] consciousness can not get out of its 
subjectivity [...] and that consciousness can not act upon transcendent being nor without 
contradiction admit of the passive elements necessary in order to constitute a transcendent being 
arising from them. Thus we have ruled out the idealist solution of the problem.
50
         
   
Almost at once, Sartre rejects the possibility that an external objectivity can have a determinative 
effect on consciousness and claims that „passively‟ receiving objects of consciousness is necessary 
for self-consciousness, so that he also rejects the possibility that consciousness can have a 
determinative effect on external objectivity.51 In ruling out the „realistic conception‟ and the 
                                                          
47
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„idealist solution‟ Sartre wants to establish the necessity of an approach to the question of being that 
does not adhere to the presupposed principles of either methodology. Both, he will argue, are 
dualistically conceived and therefore both reinforce the conception of a disengaged agent. 
Ultimately, both realism and idealism (insofar as, for Sartre, these exemplify the traditional 
discourse) are ill equipped to address consciousness‟ robust ontological responsibility and therefore 
cannot provide a satisfying account of freedom.          
 
iii) Prioritisation of Human Being(s) 
For both Sartre and Heidegger, the prioritisation of human beings (consciousness or Dasein) is 
a methodological principle: investigations into the ontology of consciousness/Dasein must precede 
any investigation of the ontology of other entities. In neither case does it refer to any metaphysical 
priority where entities of „the world‟ are somehow dependent on consciousness/Dasein for their 
existence. Nevertheless, for both philosophers an account of consciousness/Dasein is the 
appropriate point of departure in the ontology of being.
52
  
The first way Dasein takes priority over all other entities refers to the distinction between the 
ontical and the ontological. Broadly speaking, we understand the ontical to refer to an entity‟s 
concrete, observable properties or what we might call matters of „fact‟. The ontological, on the 
other hand, refers to the underlying structures which ground the ontical or the nature of, the being, 
of entities. For Heidegger, an understanding of Dasein requires an account of the relationship 
between the ontical and the ontological that is an account directed by enquiring after the structures 
which make Dasein‟s ontical comportments possible. By contrast, what we have referred to as a 
disengaged account, is marked by either exclusive treatment of the ontical or conceiving the 
ontological as removed or disengaged from a factical phenomenology. In either case, the underlying 
structures of being remain presupposed. Thus though, in his first mention of the ontical, Heidegger 
states that,  
 Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical.53 
Ontical and ontological are not, nor does Heidegger think they should be, sharply divided in an 
account of Dasein. Thus, continuing his introduction to the „priority of the question of being‟, he 
goes on to assert the entanglement of ontical and ontological with particular respect to Dasein: 
  
Rather it [Dasein] is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue 
for it.
54
 
                                                          
52
 Nevertheless, this seems to provide the basis from which Sartre‟s argument lapses into a metaphysical 
claim. This is exemplified by the prerequisite necessity of consciousness for nihilation and thereby the 
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On our interpretation therefore, what distinguishes our concrete or observable properties is precisely 
an underlying concern for being as such. It is in this sense that accounting for Dasein‟s ontical 
comportments will necessitate a confrontation with the question of being. Moreover, the categories 
serve as an explanatory tool to firstly, distinguish the concern of his enquiry from previous efforts 
and secondly, to illustrate the pervasiveness of the question of being to all human concerns. To that 
end, for Heidegger, Dasein is pre-reflectively self-aware: 
 
The self is there for the Dasein itself without reflection and without inner perception, before all 
reflection. Reflection, in the sense of a turning back, is only a mode of self-apprehension, but not the 
mode of primary self-disclosure.
55
  
 
This pre-reflective self-consciousness seems to be behind Heidegger‟s claim that Dasein has a 
„relationship‟56 to its being. He differs from Sartre in respect of „self-apprehension‟ insofar as Sartre 
will appeal to a „pre-judicative comprehension of non-being‟ in order to explain consciousness‟ 
relationship with itself. By contrast, Heidegger‟s account refers to the pre-ontological 
„understanding‟ of Dasein and its being as a basis for understanding being in general. We will 
explore this particular difference and its consequences for an account of necessary human freedom 
at a later stage. For the moment it may be informative to note that on our interpretation, this 
difference is indicative of Sartre‟s concern that pre-reflective self-consciousness leaves Dasein in 
ambiguous ethical territory. After all, if „the self is there for Dasein itself without reflection‟ then its 
actions and behaviour are not ultimately its own responsibility. The self and all its characteristics 
become either an a priori absolute or a spontaneous consequence of circumstance. We therefore 
understand Sartre‟s proof of consciousness as an effort to correct this oversight by „ontologising‟57 
reflective self-awareness. If, as Sartre states, consciousness is always consciousness of what it is not 
then consciousness is ontologically bound to be aware of itself in its distinction from all other 
objects. Consciousness is thus burdened with a profound ontological-ethical responsibility, the 
rejection of which is tantamount to bad faith. That aside, our concern for the moment is how 
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Heidegger‟s account of pre-reflective self-awareness grounds his claim that Dasein „understands 
itself in its being‟:  
 
Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished 
by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. [...] and this implies that Dasein, in its 
Being, has a relationship towards that Being – a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this 
means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to 
some degree it does so explicitly. [...] Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of 
Dasein‟s Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.58 
 
For Heidegger, Dasein‟s inherent „issue‟ with being firstly, characterises its relationship and 
secondly, establishes the possibility of an ontological understanding. Phenomena thus can only be 
disclosed by an entity for which ontology is a possibility. As such the first entity to be ontologically 
interrogated is the entity which performs the enquiry. The being of humans or human-being is of 
marked significance for both Heidegger and Sartre. The explanations for the prioritisation of 
human-being differ from Heidegger to Sartre but both reach the same conclusion. We will explore 
key differences but the central distinguishing feature is that prioritisation of Dasein is for Heidegger 
strictly a methodological principle albeit a necessary one. It provides an account in favour of 
ontology from the first-personal perspective as somehow already rooted in an ontological 
understanding such that it makes little or no sense to begin from any other position. Sartre‟s 
argument for the prioritisation of consciousness seems to read that methodological principle into the 
very ontology of consciousness. His claim that a relation between the two regions of being is 
established in consciousness by means of knowledge implies that knowledge and therefore a 
relation between for-itself and in-itself is literally impossible without consciousness. Sartre‟s 
argument for the prioritisation of consciousness is nevertheless premised on Heidegger‟s albeit 
taken further.     
For Heidegger, Dasein must be prioritised in three ways. Each way presents its own 
complexities but it may be best to read them all as a single argument leading to the third which is 
the methodological priority. The first way is an „ontical priority‟ of Dasein insofar as its „existence‟ 
is already included in its being: 
  
The first priority is an ontical one: Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determinate character of 
existence.
59
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The immediate concern is distinguishing the first from the second way of taking priority since both 
refer to existence as a characteristic of and determinative for Dasein. For Heidegger, the „existence‟ 
of Dasein refers to „the possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself‟. Insofar as „the question of 
existence‟ is for Heidegger, an „ontical affair‟, it refers to those possibilities which are „straightened 
out‟ through „existing itself‟. Thus in this respect, existence refers to the everyday normative 
concerns contributing to an „understanding of oneself‟. 60 Moreover, the question of Dasein‟s 
existence is not a matter of disengaged analysis but actual, everyday existing. Existence is therefore 
an „ontical affair‟ insofar as it refers to the ongoing, everyday question Dasein poses to itself about 
its behaviour  or comportment in the world and what this means regarding the kind of self it can be. 
Dasein firstly takes priority insofar as it must understand itself as existing in „the world‟. The point 
is already indicated by the phrase „Da-sein‟ wherein being („sein‟) is inextricably tied to a localising 
„there-ness‟ („da‟). Further, this first ontical priority establishes Heidegger‟s claim that Dasein‟s 
issue with being is characterised by presence in a „world‟. This is how we understand what 
Heidegger refers to as „thrownness‟: Dasein‟s ontological condition presupposes its presence in „the 
world‟. It is not an extension of some mental projection and is not subject to Cartesian scepticism. 
Dasein‟s being presupposes a physical, „existence‟, constituting its ontical priority. Moreover, it is 
important to note that to claim that Dasein has the character of existence is not in itself to make a 
priority claim of any kind. This is not to assert that Dasein takes priority over the non-Dasein but 
that it is different in respect of its character. 
The second way that Dasein takes priority is that „Dasein is ontological‟: 
 
The second priority is an ontological one: Dasein is in itself „ontological‟, because existence is thus 
determinative for it.
61
  
 
Our interpretation of this second way is derived from the first. „Existence is determinative‟ means 
that Dasein‟s comportment to its existence in „the world‟ is grounded by an ontological 
understanding of its being and being as such. This is to say that ontological analysis of Dasein 
„always requires that existentiality is considered beforehand‟.62 The fact of Dasein‟s physical 
presence is not immaterial to analysis of Dasein‟s nature. It is in this sense that, „Dasein always 
understands itself in terms of its existence‟. Dasein‟s ontology is such that its existence in „the 
world‟ determines its understanding of itself. So the second way Dasein takes priority is that it 
understands its „existence‟ ontologically, that is in respect of being as such. Again, this in and of 
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itself, is not a priority claim for Dasein over other entities but a further account of its distinction 
which will lead to its methodological prioritisation.  
The third is that „Dasein provides the possibility of all ontology‟:  
 
But with equal primordiality Dasein also possesses – as constitutive for its understanding of 
existence – an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own. Dasein has 
therefore a third priority as providing the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any 
ontologies. Thus Dasein has turned out to be, more than any other entity, the one which must first be 
interrogated ontologically.
63
   
 
Before providing a brief explication of the third way, one point ought to be made clear. It may be 
objected that the introduction of Dasein‟s „understanding itself‟ is an attempt to smuggle in an 
unspecified epistemological argument. After all it might seem that existence could be determinative 
for Dasein without requiring that Dasein understand itself. The lack of an explanation seems to pose 
a serious problem for Heidegger‟s claim but the objection collapses with the recognition that for 
Heidegger, „understanding‟ (Verstehen) is „pre-ontological‟ and is thus always already part of the 
being of Dasein. Dasein does not „understand itself‟ in the sense of having knowledge or awareness 
of a specific self. Rather Dasein „understands itself‟ in the sense of understanding itself as a self as 
such.64 In other words, Dasein‟s „primary mode of self-disclosure‟ is not in the mode of reflection 
or „self-apprehension‟ characteristic of self-awareness or self-knowledge. Rather insofar as the self 
is pre-ontologically „there for Dasein‟, the self is ultimately grounded in Dasein‟s relationship with 
being. In other words, Dasein „understands itself‟ or discloses itself in terms of its relationship to 
being as such and thus primarily conceives itself in terms of self as such.       
Dasein‟s third way of taking priority is the „ontico-ontological condition‟ for ontology and 
consists in two claims:  
(1) That Dasein‟s pre-ontological understanding of its own being is equi-primordial with its 
pre-ontological understanding of the being of all other entities.  
(2) An investigation of the ontology of Dasein must precede an investigation of the ontology of 
other entities as a methodological necessity.  
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be conscious or unconscious, it cannot fall between the two, for there are only two modes of being. [...] By 
refusing an understanding not linked to consciousness, he is reaffirming the preeminance of knowledge.‟ - 
Michel Haar, Sartre and Heidegger in Jean-Paul Sartre: Contemporary Approaches to his Philosophy 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981) p.171 
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Heidegger‟s second claim is the assertion of the methodological priority of Dasein and follows from 
the first. Equi-primordiality of pre-ontological self-understanding and pre-ontological 
understanding of the being of all other entities means that Dasein has a permanent and underlying 
relationship to all beings (including itself) and being as such. For Heidegger, it is this relationship 
that is expressed by the human ability to phrase and ask ontological questions. The nature of that 
relationship and therefore the nature of Dasein and being are disclosed by determining an 
appropriate methodological approach. Nevertheless, claiming that an understanding of the being of 
Dasein is a constitutive part of an understanding of the being of all entities raises an obvious 
objection. It does not seem to clearly follow that Dasein‟s understanding of its being results in its 
understanding the being of all entities. One may understand one‟s own nature and yet understand 
nothing of the world around them. The argument turns on the interpretation of „the understanding of 
being‟. Dasein understands its being as a relation to being as such: this is the sense in which it 
„takes issue‟ with being. All entities fall under the category of being-as-such, insofar as they are. 
Therefore, Dasein must understand the being of all entities. Dasein‟s „understanding‟ is not 
restricted to itself but things as such. Heidegger cannot and does not claim that Dasein understands 
all entities in all their descriptive detail but this has no bearing on a pre-ontological understanding. 
The significance of consciousness in Sartre‟s project is principally in keeping with Heidegger‟s 
prioritisation of Dasein. Like Dasein‟s relationship to being by way of understanding and based on 
pre-reflective self-consciousness, Sartre argues that „knowledge‟ of entities is possible given 
consciousness only insofar as consciousness is consciousness of being conscious of something 
which it is not:  
 
However, the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its 
object, is that it be consciousness of itself as being that knowledge. This is a necessary condition, for 
if my consciousness were not consciousness of being consciousness of the table, it would then be 
consciousness of that table without consciousness of being so.
65  
 
Sartre‟s argument for the prioritisation of consciousness66 can be inferred from this necessary 
and sufficient condition for consciousness. Thus,  
(1) The necessary condition for consciousness of something is being conscious of oneself as 
conscious of that thing [which „I‟ am not].  
(2) The necessary condition for consciousness of something is consciousness of oneself.  
(3) Therefore an investigation of the ontology of consciousness necessarily precedes an 
investigation into the ontology of other things.
67
  
                                                          
65
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) p.8 
66
 This is not the same as awareness. Sartre uses the term as a reference for the central feature of first-personal 
experience.  
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Not unlike Heidegger‟s second priority, Sartre asserts that consciousness „founds its own being‟ and 
consequently, has a relationship to its own being. Furthermore, one can find similarities with 
Heidegger‟s third priority when Sartre asserts that ontology is only possible by virtue of 
consciousness. The „whole foundation of a „world‟‟, an external environment containing objects of 
consciousness, requires consciousness: 
 
But the peculiar possibility of being [...] is of being the foundation of itself as consciousness through 
the sacrificial act which nihilates being. The for-itself is the in-itself losing itself as in-itself in order 
to found itself as consciousness. Thus consciousness holds within itself its own being-as-
consciousness, [...] If being in-itself can be neither its own foundation nor that of other beings, the 
whole idea of foundation comes into the world through the for-itself.
68
 
 
Thus we see from the opening sentence that the „possibility of being‟ requires that consciousness 
founds itself. This „self-foundation‟ through the „sacrificial nihilation69‟ produces consciousness 
which in turn means that the being of consciousness is „held within‟ consciousness. Therefore the 
being of consciousness has a relationship to itself which „is one of being‟. From thence comes „the 
whole idea of foundation‟ in respect of a „world‟: ontology made possible by virtue of the for-itself 
and its relationship to itself.
70
 For Sartre, all ontological encounters are founded on the nature of 
consciousness as consciousness of something which it is not. Therefore, ontological enquiry must 
begin with the being which distinguishes itself from all other entities. Nonetheless it will be 
important to note that, as Haar says, 
 
As a general rule, Sartre takes inspiration from Heidegger only in so far as the preeminence of 
consciousness is not shaken.
71
 
 
Read materially, one can understand the ease with which Heidegger and Sartre were identified in 
„the heyday of postwar existentialism‟. For Heidegger the „world‟ is inseparable from Dasein such 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
67
 One may note a difference in the emphasis on the necessity of beginning from consciousness as opposed to 
Dasein. For Heidegger, the methodological principle expresses the most appropriate means of approaching 
ontological discourse. For Sartre, on the other hand, the „knowing consciousness‟ is structured such that 
ontology cannot but proceed from consciousness.  
68
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) p.106 
69
 The term relates to, but is distinct from, „annihilation‟. It does not refer to destruction but to constituting the 
meaning of objects by virtue of what they are not. 
70
 It should be noted that the translation of this passage is problematic. The claim that „the whole idea of 
foundation comes into the world through the for-itself‟ is ontical and thus quite different from the ontological 
claim that the possibility of ontology requires the for-itself. The original French does not include the word, 
„idea‟ and thus avoids such an error. It states, „...le foundement en general vient au monde par le poir-soi.‟ 
See, Jean-Paul Sartre, L‟être et le néant, (Tel Gallimard, 1943) p.118   
71
 Michel Haar, Sartre and Heidegger in Jean-Paul Sartre: Contemporary Approaches to his Philosophy 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981) pp.174/5 
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that understanding necessarily includes the context of a „world‟.72 Similarly Sartre argues that 
consciousness encounters the world and constitutes it such as it is, by means of that encounter. 
 
iv) Subtle and Significant Differences 
Although we maintain that Sartre‟s project is based on Heidegger, there are important 
differences between them. A brief discussion will illustrate how Heidegger‟s concerns with 
philosophical methodology are obscured ultimately undermining the possibility of an alternative 
approach to the problem of freedom. Sartre bases his project on the two ontological modes, being-
in-itself and being-for-itself. They are distinguished by the for-itself positing nothingness in order to 
establish knowledge of the in-itself as something that „simply is‟. In this respect it is reminiscent of 
the kind of metaphysical dualism typical of traditional ontology. Of course Heidegger also 
distinguishes Dasein from non-Dasein entities but this distinction is intended to illuminate Dasein‟s 
mode of being in respect of its situation. For Heidegger, Dasein‟s being is not essentially divorced 
from the being of other entities. Sartre‟s inclusion of nothingness on the other hand, necessitates 
that the for-itself is essentially distanced from the in-itself. Analysing the function of Sartre‟s two 
modes of being will show that a similar dualism extends beyond terminology. Discussion of these 
ontological modes will follow so only a brief account is needed here. In short, Sartre‟s existentialist 
ontology describes consciousness‟ division of beings: being-in-itself is the mode of being of non-
conscious entities and being-for-itself the mode of being of conscious entities.
73
 This distinction 
will also be discussed at length in the chapter dedicated to analysis of Sartre‟s project.74 At the 
moment it will serve to note that Sartre explicitly argues that being-in-itself entities do not 
encounter themselves and are incapable of doing so. Though Sartre is careful to avoid sliding from 
an epistemological to a metaphysical argument, his reliance on the dualism of subject and object 
engender precisely that risk. His argument is ultimately that the for-itself does not create in-itself 
entities in any empirical sense but that the in-itself is the „original contingency‟ of the for-itself:  
 
The in-itself cannot provide the foundation for anything; if it founds itself, it does so by giving itself 
the modification of the for-itself. It is the foundation of itself insofar as it is already no longer in-
itself, and we encounter here again the origin of every foundation. [...] It follows that this in-itself, 
engulfed and nihilated in the absolute event which i s the appearance of the foundation or upsurge if 
the for-itself, remains at the heart of the for-itself as its original contingency.
75
 
 
                                                          
72
 „[...] world is defined in Being and Time as that “wherein” Dasein understands being. Being-in-the-world is 
the very unity and identity of Dasein, and cannot be split into two independent parts, such as “consciousness” 
and “world.”‟ – Ibid., pp.174/5 
73
 It is important to note that the for-itself is not equivalent to consciousness but is the nihilating characteristic 
which allows for the upsurge of consciousness.  
74
 See, Sartre‟s Project of Phenomenological Ontology, p.57 
75
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) p.106 
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Unlike Heidegger‟s „destruction‟76 of traditional ontology, Sartre superimposes existentialist 
ontology onto the traditional dualism of subject and object. Though this may not be without good 
reason
77
 it renders the rejection of „embarrassing dualisms‟ all the more complicated.  
a) Firstly, Sartre adopts Heidegger‟s project78 but does not provide a similar exegesis of 
traditional ontology and the methodology involved. His intention to „complete the definition of 
Dasein‟79 and „pass beyond Heidegger to a still more fundamental project‟80 by the inclusion of 
consciousness therefore lacks the philosophical grounding necessary to justify his adjustment of 
Heidegger‟s project.  
b) Secondly, Sartre‟s focus on consciousness effectively shifts focus from the question of 
being, of which human beings are a part, to the question of what it means to be a human being. This 
raises the problem of anthropocentrism or the centrality of conscious entities (human 
beings/Dasein) to the world of independently existing objects.
81
 Heidegger is clear that Dasein and 
the world are mutually constitutive. Though Dasein's being-ontological constitutes the possibility of 
an ontological encounter with the world as such, the world constitutes the ground of Dasein. 
Sartre‟s account of consciousness tilts the balance of Dasein and world towards the former. 
Consequently, Sartre risks introducing an epistemological and a metaphysical precedence of 
consciousness over the world.
82
  
c) Finally, Sartre shifts the question of being from the observation of Dasein's ontological 
condition to an injunction necessitating a response. His claim that Heidegger overlooks Descartes 
and specifically the cogito
83
is intended to cement a radical responsibility into the ontology of 
consciousness such that all action is ultimately the burden of human beings. His concern that 
                                                          
76
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) p.49 
77
 Sartre seems pre-occupied with the concern that Heidegger‟s failure to include consciousness in his 
ontology risks reducing the human-being to a being-in-itself.  
78
 It may be informative to note that Heidegger is the most heavily referenced authority (37) in BN alongside 
Descartes (35) and Husserl (34). 
79
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) p.18 
80
 Ibid., p.585 
81
 „Understanding has meaning only if it is consciousness of understanding. My possibility can exist as my 
possibility only if it is my consciousness which escapes itself toward my possibility. Otherwise the whole 
system of being and its possibilities will fall into the unconscious – that is into the in-itself.‟ Ibid., p.109 
82
 This is exemplified by comparison of Sartre‟s phrase „existence precedes essence‟ with Heidegger‟s, „the 
essence of Dasein lies in its existence‟.  Sartre divides essence from the totality of human acts whereas 
Heidegger asserts an inherency of essence to the fact of existence. See, Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and 
Humanism (London: Methuen, 1973) pp.26/28/29 and Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962) p.68, respectively.  
83
 Sartre claims, „Heidegger [...] begins with the existential analytic without going through the cogito.‟ 
„Heidegger is so persuaded that the “I think” of Husserl is a trap for larks, fascinating and ensnaring, that he 
has completely avoided any appeal to consciousness in his description of Dasein.‟ - Jean-Paul Sartre, Being 
and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) pp.97/109 
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Heidegger conceals an ethical/moral aspect of his project
84
 betrays his own need to attach a moral 
weight to the machinations of consciousness.
85
 But we will argue that this shift moves the 
discussion from the ontological to the ontical: from what Heidegger thinks of as the proper concern 
of philosophy to normative ethics. It will be our claim that Sartre‟s grounding of consciousness in 
nothingness necessitates that it establishes its own relationship to being. His account of this in 
respect of what he calls the fundamental project, abandons pre-ontological grounding precisely in 
order to establish a robust conception of responsibility. If the ontical refers to all comportment 
which presumes a relationship to and a pre-ontological understanding of being then in so doing, 
Sartre‟s nothingness-grounded consciousness exchanges the ontology of being for an ontical 
freedom.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
84
 „In truth Heidegger‟s description shows all too clearly his anxiety to establish an ontological foundation for 
an Ethics with which he claims not to be concerned, as also to reconcile his humanism with the religious 
sense of the transcendent.‟ „And we shall note as Heidegger did (although the expressions “authentic” and 
“unauthentic” which he employs are dubious and insincere because of their implicit moral content)...‟ – Ibid., 
pp.104/552 
85
 This is confirmed by Existentialism and Humanism which explicitly seeks to assert a moral basis for his 
view of human reality. 
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II 
Heidegger‟s Fundamental Ontology, Dasein and the Question of 
Being 
 
Before beginning it will be instructive to note that the forthcoming analysis will be restricted to 
investigating BT from the point of view of its fundamental ontology and its methodologically 
conceived phenomenology. Our concern is to establish these features of Heidegger‟s „early work‟ as 
a background to investigating the explicit treatment of freedom in the „later essays‟. We therefore 
put to one side the substantial and serious literature addressing the role of freedom in BT.
86
 
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that extended discussion of what Heidegger calls authenticity,
87
 and 
the call of conscience
88
 would certainly attest to the persistence of freedom in Heidegger‟s thought, 
if not the theoretical structures that ultimately underpin his conception of freedom. Of particular 
note to that end is question of what Heidegger calls, „resoluteness‟ (Entschlossenheit) which for 
Mahon O‟Brien, and here we agree, is a central feature of Heidegger‟s project in BT and his later 
work. He states,  
 
Resolve is characterised as an open willingness to be „claimed‟ by the call of conscience, to 
acknowledge openly the fact that rather than free floating, autonomous self determining authors of our 
own destiny, we find ourselves thrown into a world with an horizon of possibility determined by our 
own radical finitude. […] The radical disjuncture between the early and later Heidegger in this context 
then can only be maintained through a distortion of Being and Time‟s account of authenticity.89 
 
                                                          
86
 See particularly, Mahon O‟Brien, Heidegger and Authenticity: From Resoluteness to Releasement (London: 
Continuum, 2011) and Thomas Sheehan, Martin Heidegger in A Companion to the Philosophers (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2003) 
87
 „The most familiar conception of “authenticity” comes to us mainly from Heidegger's Being and Time of 
1927. The word we translate as „authenticity‟ is actually a neologism invented by Heidegger, the 
word Eigentlichkeit, which comes from an ordinary term, eigentlich, meaning „really‟ or „truly‟, but is built 
on the stem eigen, meaning „own‟ or „proper‟. So the word might be more literally translated as „ownedness‟, 
or „being owned‟, or even „being one's own‟, implying the idea of owning up to and owning what one is and 
does.‟ See, Varga, Somogy and Guignon, Charles, Authenticity, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) 
88
 In tracing the continuity of Heidegger‟s thought from BT to his later work, O‟Brien appeals to the theme of 
the call of consciousness. Here he connects it to a confrontation with „the thrown‟ nature of existence which 
we will argue, in reference to what we will call „submission‟, is central to Heidegger‟s account of freedom: 
„Conscience is the call of care and we are fundamentally caring beings. It forces us to confront the thrown, 
abandoned nature of our existence which all of us recognise but few of us reflect on for extended periods, 
preferring instead to flee to the anaesthetised existence of “the they”.‟ - Mahon O‟Brien, Heidegger and 
Authenticity: From Resoluteness to Releasement (London: Continuum, 2011) and Thomas Sheehan, Martin 
Heidegger in A Companion to the Philosophers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003) p.40 
89
 Ibid., p.53 
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Though we are lacking in space and time to address these herein, there are also significant 
similarities in the premises of those explications with our own, beginning with the importance of the 
methodological framework described in BT and its impact on Heidegger‟s later work.90 In the 
interests of developing the explication of that framework, we may therefore begin by observing that 
Heidegger‟s BT opens with the assertion that the question of being has been „forgotten‟.91 The claim 
comes in the context of an argument for „restating‟ the question since this „forgotten-ness‟ is 
characterised by an assumed familiarity with the question and its meaningful content. Moreover, for 
Heidegger the sense of familiarity with the question is not unwarranted but misunderstood such that 
it obscures investigation.
92
 As Stephen Mulhall states in the Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and 
Time, 
  
Accordingly, when Heidegger claims that the philosophical tradition has forgotten the question with 
which he is concerned, he does not mean that philosophers have entirely overlooked the question of 
the Being of beings. Rather, he means that, by taking certain answers to that question to be self-
evident or unproblematically correct, they have taken it for granted that they know what the phrase 
„the Being of beings‟ signifies – in other words, they have failed to see that there is a question about 
the meaning of „Being‟.93 
 
Thus critique of the ontological tradition and proposal of fundamental ontology comprise what he 
refers to as the formalisation of the question of being. In this chapter we will seek to explicate this 
formalisation by establishing three points. First, fundamental ontology is underpinned by a 
methodology which assumes an understanding of the question and its meaning is implicit in all 
human activity including and for his purposes in BT, particularly, the act of enquiry itself. The 
problem is that very inherency provides a false sense of security with respect to the question and its 
meaning. As we will see, Heidegger will argue that all human activity or comportments is indicative 
of a pre-ontological understanding of and thus relationship to being. In other words, if Husserl‟s 
method required that questions of the existence and nature of objects are bracketed-out of an 
analysis of consciousness then Heidegger will investigate human experience as profoundly rooted in 
the fundamental question of being. Far from impeding a „pure‟ ontology of human experience 
therefore, all comportment including philosophical enquiry can be revealing of that relationship and 
understanding. Second, that investigation will therefore focus its attention on average, everyday 
human experience and engagement with the world. If, as Heidegger argues, the question of being is 
                                                          
90
 As O‟Brien states, „The essential spirit of this „early‟ work is something which I believe that much of his 
„later‟ philosophy is similarly imbued with. Furthermore, the structural dynamics of his later work are, in 
many crucial respects, consistent with his early structural approach in Being and Time.‟ See, Ibid., p.9 
91
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) p.21 
92
 Heidegger states that, „Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the 
meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way.‟ – Ibid., p.25 
93
 Stephen Mulhall, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time (Oxon: Routledge, 
2005) p.7 
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inherent to my being as such then any disengagement from immediate experience in either the form 
or function of ontological investigations is both disingenuous and ultimately exacerbates the 
forgotten-ness of the question. Third, therefore the ontology of human being as Da-sein or there-
being, is the appropriate point of departure and the only sincere means of addressing the question of 
being. We will explicate the following three dimensions of Heidegger‟s project in order to clarify 
his argument for freedom in respect of the above points: 
i) Fundamental Ontology - This section will pay special attention the „fundamental‟ kind of 
ontology Heidegger wants. The term is not only included to distinguish his ontology from what he 
calls, „traditional ontology‟. Fundamental ontology is premised on the primordiality of the 
relationship of Dasein to the question of being.  The profundity of that association is such that the 
enquirer cannot „rationally distance‟ or disengage from the question thus avoiding the risk of 
presupposition prevalent in the traditional methodological approach. Heidegger‟s critique of the 
ontological tradition particularly, Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, is therefore central to explicating 
his formalisation of the question of being. 
ii) The Role of Dasein - Heidegger claims that Dasein has „ontico-ontological priority‟ over 
all other entities. We understand and explicate this prioritisation in two respects: First, as a claim 
about the ontological condition of Dasein which is that all of Dasein‟s everyday action and 
behaviour or comportment, is indicative of an understanding of being. Second, as a methodological 
principle that therefore the question of being must be addressed by prioritising an investigation of 
Dasein. For Heidegger, the enquirer‟s comportment while enquiring is itself indicative of an 
understanding of being and must therefore firstly be observed and acknowledged in order to 
maintain the integrity of the investigation. Heidegger offers three reasons for his prioritisation of 
Dasein, previously described in chapter one.   
iii) Phenomenology as the Method of Ontology – Heidegger thus interprets phenomenology as 
the method of fundamental ontology. His etymologically derived definition of „phenomenon‟ and 
„logos‟ reinforces the methodological principle that investigation of Da-sein-ness is the only 
appropriate and sincere means of addressing the question of being. It is in light of these points that 
Heidegger will present his account of freedom.  
 
i) Fundamental Ontology 
Central to explicating the formalisation of the question of being is Heidegger‟s fundamental 
ontology as premised on a critique of the ontological tradition. We will therefore begin by outlining 
the errors Heidegger argues are implicit to traditional methodology. We will then explicate the 
fundamentality of Heidegger‟s methodological approach whereby enquirer and enquiry are 
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inextricably linked rendering disengagement impossible. Finally we will discuss the significance of 
Heidegger‟s critique and fundamental ontology to the question of being.  
a) What Fundamental Ontology is Not 
Heidegger goes to great lengths to contrast his ontology with „traditional ontology‟ and this, he 
argues, is not without good reason.
94
 An absolute rejection of the tradition requires that no remnant 
can remain untested:  
 
The question of Being does not achieve its true concreteness until we have carried through the 
process of destroying the ontological tradition. In this way we can fully prove that the question of the 
meaning of Being is one that we cannot avoid, and we can demonstrate what it means to talk about 
„restating‟ this question.95 
 
For Heidegger, the predilection for disengagement exemplified by rationalist ontology is so 
pervasively problematic that neither its passive approval nor active inclusion is acceptable. It will 
serve to clarify precisely what Heidegger means by the ontological tradition and where it is 
mistaken before we attempt to account for the „destruction‟.  
Heidegger refers to Aristotle, Descartes and Kant to evidence both the prevalence and the 
problem inherent to a methodological tradition. An extended discussion of Aristotle and Kant will 
follow in our chapter on the primordiality of freedom in Heidegger‟s account. Our concern will 
temporarily be restricted to Descartes insofar as he is also of particular importance to Sartre. Suffice 
it to say, Heidegger‟s critique of Descartes is applicable to Aristotle and Kant albeit to differing 
degrees. Thereby Cartesian dualism and the predication of existence in the proof of God as 
epistemic guarantor serve as prime examples of rationalist disengagement where both philosopher 
and agent are conceived as disengaged thinkers. On our interpretation, the very premise of 
Descartes investigation to find some point of epistemic certainty firstly, presupposes the ontological 
character of the enquirer and secondly, the meaning of the truth he seeks. For Heidegger, the failure 
to interrogate these presuppositions leads to the inaccuracy of their ontological conclusions. In other 
words, if one does not begin with the disclosure of all presuppositions, one necessarily describes an 
ontology which aims at the discovery of essential properties of things rather than revealing their 
being: 
 
The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the 
possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so 
doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies 
themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. Basically, all 
ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, 
                                                          
94
 Distinguishing fundamental with traditional ontology is a feature of the „destruction‟ of the latter. - Ibid., 
p.41 
95
 Ibid., p.49 
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remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning 
of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.
96  
 
In this respect, the failure of the rationalist approach to disclose the presupposition of 
disengagement necessarily obscures an investigation of freedom. Although Descartes‟ methodology 
is rationally formulated, Heidegger argues that it fails to address being as it is and from itself. 
Descartes‟ „ego‟ remains undisclosed whether or not it can be attributed with a „cogito‟. His res 
cogitans and res extensa describe entities with different properties without revealing their mode of 
being. Descartes‟ ontological error is betrayed by the presupposition that the modes of being of 
entities can be inferred from their properties. His argument describes thinking as a property of the 
„I‟ but it does not follow that „I am that which thinks‟. This may be what Heidegger means by the 
following:  
 
[...] the ego cogito of Descartes, the subject, the “I”, reason, spirit, person. But these all remain 
uninterrogated as to their Being and its structure, in accordance with the thoroughgoing way in which 
the question of Being has been neglected. It is rather the case that the categorical content of the 
traditional ontology has been carried over to these entities with corresponding formalisations and 
purely negative restrictions, or else dialectic has been called in for the purpose of interpreting the 
substantiality of the subject ontologically.
97
 
 
Here we understand the substantiality‟ of the ontological subject as its very is-ness or that which 
accounts for the possibility of its presence. This, Heidegger argues, is overlooked by Descartes in 
favour of the „categorical content of traditional ontology‟. Consequently an interpretive matrix is 
imposed on an ontological enquiry which both obscures a meaningful investigation and determines 
the characterisation of the entities involved. For Heidegger, traditional ontology has committed 
itself to these errors obligating a new ontology to first lay those errors bare. Their replication in a 
renewed or „restated‟ discourse is therefore impossible, „destroying‟ traditional ontology. He argues 
that these errors extend back at least to „medieval scholasticism‟ and provide Descartes with his 
basic premises and methodological approach:  
 
Everyone who is acquainted with the middle ages sees that Descartes is „dependent‟ upon medieval 
scholasticism and employs its terminology. But with this „discovery‟ nothing is achieved 
philosophically as long as it remains obscure to what a profound extent the medieval ontology has 
influenced the way in which posterity has determined or failed to determine the ontological character 
of the res cogitans.
98
 
 
That „medieval scholasticism‟, Heidegger argues, relies on a Greek „orientation‟ to the 
interpretation of the question of being which directly affects the analysis of phenomena, particularly 
time: 
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 Ibid., p.31 
97
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) p.44 
98
 Ibid., p.46 
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The full extent of this cannot be estimated until both the meaning and the limitations of the ancient 
ontology have been exhibited in terms of an orientation directed towards the question of Being. [...] 
When this is done, it will be manifest that the ancient way of interpreting the Being of entities is 
oriented towards the „world‟ or „Nature‟ in the widest sense, and that it is indeed in terms of „time‟ 
that its understanding of Being is obtained. [...] Entities are grasped in their Being as „presence‟; this 
means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time – the „Present‟.99 
 
Thus to fully come to terms with and confront the question of being it is necessary first to unpick its 
terms in order to reveal an underlying, presupposed „orientation‟. In this case, the „determinations 
or failures to determine the ontological character of the res cogitans‟ is a consequence of „grasping 
the being of entities‟ in the temporal mode of presence. Furthermore, that this is an expression of an 
orientation towards time itself as just „one entity among other entities‟,100 equally divisible from the 
whole and describable by its essential properties. These properties render an understanding of time 
as essentially fixed: insofar as those properties are permanent features and essential, time itself is 
understood as fixed „presence-at-hand‟.101 By means of a similar effort to identify and attribute 
essential properties, entities are „grasped‟ without regard to their change over time but to the 
„definite present‟. Their past and thus the question of their origin and the future and thus the 
question of their cessation are not open to discussion. A central feature of the being of entities is 
thereby overlooked and obscured in respect of their relation to time.          
b) A „Restatement‟ of the Question 
Heidegger proposes the following for a „restated‟ ontology:  
 
The task of ontology is to explain Being itself and to make the Being of entities stand out in full 
relief.
102
 
 
Our immediate concern is not how but precisely what is to be achieved. In accordance with the 
above, fundamental ontology is directed toward an understanding of the relationship between 
Dasein and the question of being thereby answering the question of being: to disclose being such 
that it „stands out in full relief‟. 103 Heidegger restates the question of being as a question of the 
„meaning‟ of being to this end. His underlying argument seems to be that if the ontological tradition 
has obscured enquiries into being because of a methodological error, then correcting that method 
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should produce an improved account. In re-orienting the traditional question from what/whether 
being „is‟ to the „meaning of being‟, the enquirer confronts the primordiality of the understanding of 
being inherent to enquiry and all comportment. In this sense, we interpret Heidegger‟s „restatement‟ 
to the meaning of being as the formalisation of a hermeneutic approach to phenomenological 
ontology. Heidegger clarifies this point in holding Kant accountable for the same error: 
  
In taking over Descartes‟ ontological position Kant made an essential omission: he failed to provide 
an ontology of Dasein. This omission was a decisive one in the spirit [im Sinne] of Descartes‟ 
ownmost Tendencies.
104
 
 
The assertion that Kant had taken over Descartes‟ ontological position is of course open to debate. 
Nonetheless, the failure to „provide an ontology of Dasein‟ is certainly true of both. This is to say 
that neither Descartes nor Kant prioritise the being of the enquirer and their comportment to enquiry 
in their respective investigations.   
Of course Heidegger‟s recognition of errors in previous ontologies alone does not ensure him 
against their repetition, albeit in a different guise. To that end, it is important to explicate 
Heidegger‟s shift of the question from what being „is‟ [was ist] to what being „means‟ [der Sinn].105 
On our reading, enquiring after the „meaning‟ of being is intended to avoid the problems Heidegger 
perceives as inherent to traditional ontological methodology. Firstly, it resists any assumption of 
familiarity with being(s) such that their character cannot be implied by the language of the enquiry. 
Secondly, this methodological compulsion to investigate the hermeneutics of being(s) from 
immediate experience obstructs any effort at disengagement.
 106
 If disengagement is the traditional 
methodological principle directing ontological discourse to what being „is‟, as such, adopting the 
„view from nowhere‟, then Heidegger‟s restated question will force the enquirers introspection in 
the context of a relationship to being or a view from right-here. This is how we understand 
Heidegger‟s claim that:  
  
But even if we ask, „What is “Being”?‟, we keep within an understanding of the „is‟, though we are 
unable to fix conceptionally what this „is‟ signifies.107 
 
Discourse premised on what being „is‟ presupposes an uninterrogated understanding of what one 
means by being such that it „is‟. Moreover, Heidegger refers to „temporality as the meaning of the 
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being of that entity which we call “Dasein”.‟108 Dasein must think of itself in respect of time, that is 
in respect of its past, present and future. So shifting to an introspective hermeneutics of being will 
necessitate that „time is brought to light as the horizon for all understanding of being‟.109 For 
Heidegger, time has served the function of distinguishing what he calls temporal entities (natural 
and historical processes) with non-temporal entities (spatial and numerical). The problem is that this 
function has become almost self-evident, serving to designate „criterion for various realms of 
entities‟. This is veiled behind the „is-ness‟ of the question of being which presupposes the 
relationship between the answer and time. The answer to the question, „what is being?‟ acquires a 
timeless quality insofar as it refers to the essential properties of being. Time serves only to contrast 
that realm of being from what Heidegger calls the „temporal‟ which „always means simply being 
[seined] „in time‟‟: 
 
We are accustomed to contrasting the „timeless‟ meaning of propositions with the „temporal‟ course 
of propositional assertions.
110
  
 
Conversely, an introspective hermeneutics of being must encompass „temporal being‟ particularly 
insofar as „there-ness‟, the ontical grounding characteristic of Dasein is both spatially and 
temporally located. Secondly, the question of meaning invites confrontation with what Heidegger 
calls the „ancients‟ by contrasting what being has meant with what it means contemporaneously. 
This is how we interpret the following: 
 
Because Being cannot be grasped except by taking time into consideration, the answer to the 
question of being cannot lie in any proposition that is blind and isolated. [...] Whether the answer is a 
„new‟ one remains quite superficial and is of no importance. Its positive character must lie in its 
being ancient enough for us to learn to conceive the possibilities which the „Ancients‟ have made 
ready for us.
111
 
 
Directly confronting the problem of what being means (rather than implying its meaning behind its 
„is-ness‟) requires that enquiry reach back to earlier interpretation and in that respect, maintain a 
temporal horizon.  
c) Two Features of Fundamental Ontology 
Two conclusions about Heidegger‟s fundamental ontology can be drawn from what we have 
discussed thus far. First, the formulation of the question of being is crucial to the direction of the 
investigation and what it reveals. Secondly, a sincere effort to address the question of being cannot 
be achieved by rational disengagement and abstraction. Instead, as the only entity for which being is 
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an issue, Dasein must be the first subject of enquiry. As such, fundamental ontology requires that 
entities are interrogated in context of a „world‟:  
 
[...] understanding of Being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something 
like a „world‟, and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which become accessible 
within the world.
112
 
 
On our interpretation, „understanding‟ here refers to the relationship Dasein has to the question of 
being where concern for being betrays a pre-ontological awareness of being as such. Thus for 
Heidegger, Dasein‟s understanding is neither purely rational (à la Descartes) nor transcendental (à 
la Kant) but is grounded by the localising context of a world and those beings belonging to it. A 
brief allusion to the relationship between „primordiality‟ and „something like a world‟ will also 
serve our purposes. Dasein‟s equi-primordial understanding of being and „something like a world‟ 
is indicative of its previously discussed ontico-ontological priority. In this sense, average everyday 
comportment to entities in the world is revealing of a primordial, pre-ontological familiarisation 
with their being. This is what Heidegger refers to as the „existentiell‟ or a way of understanding 
being by reference to „Dasein‟s ontical affairs‟.113Thus disclosing the being of entities from 
themselves requires investigating what is „already there‟ about the entity where already-there-ness 
refers to a primordial understanding. A disengaged account is therefore any enquiry into being 
which overlooks, by presupposition or otherwise, the contextualising matrix of the world and the 
understanding it reveals. We will refer to this as the error of „unrelatedness‟, which as we have seen 
is equally applicable to both realism and idealism in Heidegger‟s estimation. In her paper on, „The 
Question of Being: Heidegger‟s Project‟, Dorothea Frede highlights this issue:  
 
[...] the mistake lies in the theoretical approach as such. As mentioned earlier, the stance taken in 
theorizing allows the thinker to have a detached point of view. The thinker can treat the objects of his 
investigation as “indifferently occurring” things that exist independent of observation, just as the 
observer in his turn is at liberty to fasten on any object. So observer and observed, thinker and the 
object of his thought, are regarded as “indifferently occurring” alongside one another.114  
 
For Heidegger, a core problem is, to borrow Frede‟s term, this „theoretical approach as such‟: 
adherence to a principle of „clinical observation‟ or „disinterested analysis‟. Insofar as both realism 
and idealism hold to this „approach‟, both implicitly assert unrelatedness between enquirer and 
world
115
 and are as such, subject to the same criticism. For the former, reality exists independent of 
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observation and for the latter reality is a construct of observation. The dualism inherent to their 
methodologies implies an enquirer capable of straddling these metaphysical boundaries in order to 
assert their „indifferently occurring‟ observations. On our reading, Frede‟s criticism of the „detached 
point of view‟ reflects the disingenuousness that Heidegger attributes to the ontological tradition. 
That disingenuousness is rooted in the contradiction that accepting the premises of the „theoretical 
approach‟ ultimately makes it impossible to establish its conclusions beyond theory. This is the 
sense in which we‟ve argued that philosophical arguments about freedom are ill equipped to 
account for its experience and will therefore perpetually suffer a seeming intractability. If the 
„theoretical approach‟ requires disengagement from the interpretive matrix which contextualises the 
encounter with entities then its claims and conclusions cannot be revealing of their experience.  
d) The Significance of Fundamental Ontology to the Question of Being 
For Heidegger, fundamental ontology is the only appropriate way of addressing the question of 
being: it is the „formal structure‟ of that question. Section two of the introduction to BT opens in 
regard to this point: 
  
The question of the meaning of Being must be formulated. If it is a fundamental question, or indeed 
the fundamental question, it must be made transparent, and in an appropriate way.
116  
 
This formulation is what we have argued concludes in its formalisation with respect to fundamental 
ontology and the ontico-ontological priority of Dasein. On our interpretation therefore, the 
appropriateness of making „the fundamental question transparent‟ is measured in the sincerity of the 
methodology underpinning an enquiry. That is, the prioritisation of an introspective analysis of the 
enquirer in the context of a concern for being. Three reasons can be given for the high value 
Heidegger places on fundamental ontology in light of what has been said thus far: i) shifting the 
question from what being is to the meaning of being, ii) the prioritisation of Dasein‟s „ontical 
affairs‟ or its everyday comportment iii) the tightly interlocking or holistic features of fundamental 
ontology and Dasein.   
We have said that Heidegger‟s adjustment of the question of being is primarily intended to 
correct the problem of presupposition. Thereby Heidegger advances the argument that a 
hermeneutic analysis methodologically compels confrontation with the primordiality of Dasein‟s 
comportment to being. Enquiry after the meaning of being will therefore bring Dasein‟s relationship 
to the forefront of the investigation. This is how we interpret Heidegger‟s insistence on analysis of 
Dasein as a primary and necessary feature of the question of being: 
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Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it – all these ways of 
behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being for those particular 
entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, 
we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being. the very asking of this 
question is an entity‟s mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired 
about – namely, Being.117   
 
For Heidegger, the fact of questioning, comportment to the question and the understanding of the 
question are all „constitutive modes of being‟ which are part and parcel of enquiry into being. 
Similarly, ontological enquiry about an object will require that the entity perceiving and enquiring 
after the object be „made transparent‟ and in so doing, the relationship of both to being as such. It is 
crucial for Heidegger, therefore that „Dasein must be shown in its average everydayness‟: 
 
We must rather choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this [Dasein] can 
show itself in itself and from itself [an ihm selbst von ihm selbst her]. And this means that it is to be 
shown as it is proximally and for the most part – in its average everydayness. [...] When taken in this 
way, the analytic of Dasein remains wholly oriented towards the guiding task of working out the 
question of Being.
118
 
 
Two points are worthy of note for our purposes here. First, that we understand Heidegger‟s 
reference to average everydayness in respect of the ontical priority of Dasein. Second, what we 
might call the particular-generality of Heidegger‟s enquiry which is the basis for the argument he 
presents in favour of freedom as we will show in the corresponding chapter. In respect of the first 
point, Heidegger‟s choice of „access‟ to being by means of Dasein‟s average everydayness is on our 
interpretation, both a mechanism to resist the predilection of disengagement and a means of 
grounding the analysis itself in the comportment to entities. Thus the pursuit of the fundamental 
question is not removed from my immediate experience but on the contrary, my actual experience, 
in all its particularities, will be revealing of a broader and prerequisite understanding. This brings us 
to the second point where here, as in the ET, Heidegger argues that an investigation into being in 
general can and methodologically should proceed from the particular. Thus approaching the 
fundamental question of philosophy will require that we first investigate the enquirer. Similarly, 
Heidegger will argue in the ET that „going-after-the-whole‟, that is asking after being as such, 
requires „going-to-the-roots‟, an ontological analytic of Dasein. We will discuss this issue further in 
the chapter on Heidegger and freedom but it will serve our current purposes to note that 
Heidegger‟s prioritisation of Dasein is, on our reading, intended to illuminate the question of being 
by reinforcing its inherency to Dasein.   
In his paper entitled, „Dasein, the Being that Thematizes‟, Robert R. Brandom offers a helpful 
reflection on Dasein‟s interlocking features:  
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Heidegger claims that in his discussion of Dasein he is not just doing anthropology, but fundamental 
ontology. Part of the cash value of this claim must be that he is not merely offering us a set of 
descriptions, in however rich vocabulary, which all just happen to be true of us. Rather, his 
characterizations form a tightly interlocked set of features, no one of which could be exhibited 
without all the others. [...] Thus to claim that entities could exhibit some of these ways of being 
without others is to claim that there is no such thing as Dasein, that Heidegger has gotten it wrong.
119
 
 
We argue that this holistic account of Dasein‟s interlocking features is equally applicable to 
fundamental ontology and Heidegger‟s argument for freedom. Thus Heidegger‟s investigation of 
Dasein provides him access to the question of being and formalised as fundamental ontology. They 
are so intertwined that separating fundamental ontology from the question of being equates to a 
rejection of the former; that there is no such thing as fundamental ontology. If, as Heidegger claims, 
„the meaning of being must already be available to us‟120 then fundamental ontology must be 
simultaneously concerned with the enquirer, the enquiry and the answer to the question. The „cash 
value‟ of fundamental ontology is its holistic structure which keeps each aspect of enquiry related to 
one another and in the context of being as such.  
 
ii) The Role of Dasein 
 The relationship of the question of being to Dasein is central to fundamental ontology. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger‟s methodological prioritisation rests on the validity of attributing an 
understanding of being to Dasein. Of course Heidegger‟s assertion that concern for being and 
therefore an understanding of being is inherent to Dasein is insufficient to account for its validity. 
Furthermore, Dasein‟s centrality to fundamental ontology entails an equivalent significance to the 
question of being which cannot be taken at face value. To that end, we will describe Dasein in two 
ways. The first will provide a positive statement of what Heidegger means by Dasein. The second 
will identify what Dasein is not, eliminating any possibility of conflation. This will also establish 
the validity of attributing understanding to Dasein. We will conclude by applying these points to the 
significance of Dasein to the question of being.   
a) A Positive Understanding of Dasein 
An immediate interpretation has already been mentioned in the outline of fundamental 
ontology. In the simplest terms, Dasein is the enquirer. Yet, for Heidegger, this identifying 
declaration does more to conceal and obscure than inform. The total content of the relationship 
between „Dasein‟ and „enquirer‟ is concentrated in the „is‟. Familiarity with „is-ness‟ identifying 
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enquirer and Dasein presupposes their mode of being in lieu of an explicit investigation. Heidegger 
refers to this problem at the beginning of his text: 
 
It is said that „Being‟ is the most universal and the emptiest of concepts. As such it resists every 
attempt at definition. Nor does this most universal and hence indefinable concept require any 
definition, for everyone uses it constantly and already understands what he means by it. In this way, 
that which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden 
has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged 
with an error of method.
121
 
 
Clearly, a simple identification of Dasein and enquirer is insufficient for our purposes.  
Heidegger refers to Dasein as having ontico-ontological priority over all other entities. That is, 
Dasein‟s ontical comportments are indicative of a primordial understanding of being(s). Insofar as 
this will include enquiry itself, a sincere investigation of being(s) will be preceded by analysis of 
Dasein. Heidegger also refers to this relationship between Dasein and the question of being in the 
following: 
 
Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished 
by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive 
state of Dasein‟s Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that 
Being – a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in 
which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is 
peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of 
Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein‟s Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is 
ontological.
122
 
 
Two points in this quote are of particular interest for our purposes. First, though Heidegger 
distinguishes Dasein from other entities, he specifies an ontical distinction. Second, Heidegger‟s 
claim that Dasein is ontological seems to rely on the same presupposed familiarity with „is-ness‟ 
that he criticises in the ontological tradition. We will address these points individually but it will 
benefit the interpretation of Heidegger‟s argument to see them as related claims.  
In respect of the first point, it is crucial for Heidegger‟s argument that what distinguishes 
Dasein from other entities are its „ontical affairs‟. That is to say, Dasein‟s distinction is strictly in 
respect of its comportment to entities. On our interpretation of Heidegger‟s argument, this is 
intended to reinforce a methodological principle that analysis of Dasein, though the priority, must 
be pursued firmly within the context of a broader enquiry into being as such. An ontical distinction 
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thus restricts the predilection to attribute characteristics to Dasein that would implicitly establish its 
independence from being. In other words, insofar as the ontical is revealing of an ontological 
understanding then ontical distinction refers to a negative relation. Thus one may distinguish 
graphite from wood but their difference is revealing of a relation constituting „the pencil‟. Similarly, 
we understand Heidegger‟s reference to Dasein‟s ontical distinction as a description of its relation 
to being. So distinguishing Dasein from the world, for instance, reveals a relation constituting 
being.  
In respect of the second point and as we have explained, Heidegger is critical of the claims in 
traditional discourse in part because of the methodologically necessitated presupposition of 
ontological characteristics. His own claim that Dasein is ontological is therefore particularly 
problematic especially given that the prioritisation of Dasein depends on the validity of the claim 
that the question of being is inherent to Dasein. To that end, we may note Heidegger‟s first 
statement that Dasein‟s occurrence amongst entities, its ontical comportment, is not one of 
indifference. Rather Dasein‟s presence amongst entities is immediately and fundamentally 
ontologically-oriented. This is how we interpret the following claim that „Dasein is ontically 
distinguished by the fact that being is an issue for it‟. Thus Dasein‟s comportment to entities is 
indicative of a prerequisite ontological understanding of being(s). This is also how we understand 
the assertion that Dasein is ontological. The presuppositions implicit in „is-ness‟ are confronted by 
Dasein‟s ontical-ontological relation to entities. Therefore when Heidegger declares that Dasein is 
ontological, this is only to say that Dasein cannot but relate to being(s) by means of an ontological 
understanding.
123
  
Dasein therefore is the entity for whom being-ontological is a „constitutive state‟. As such, the 
ontology of entities is a possibility inherent to Dasein. Heidegger makes this clear in the second and 
third ways in which Dasein takes priority over all other entities: 
 
The second priority is an ontological one: Dasein is in itself „ontological‟ [...] But with equal 
primordiality Dasein also possesses – as constitutive for its understanding of existence – an 
understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own. Dasein has therefore a 
third priority as providing the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any ontologies.
124
 
  
Importantly the priority of Dasein in investigating the question of being must not be misinterpreted 
as the metaphysical priority of Dasein over all other entities, especially since that is the kind of 
criticism Heidegger levels at the idealist strand of traditional ontology. Misunderstanding Dasein as 
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dominant over all other entities constitutes the kind of unrelatedness Heidegger wants to avoid. An 
accurate understanding demands sensitivity to the syllabic composition of the term. „Da-sein‟ can 
be literally translated as „being-there‟ („there-being‟). An ontically contextualising „there-ness‟ is 
included in the definition of the term. We do not therefore interpret „Dasein‟ as a hypothetical 
proposition against which experience can be measured. Rather its ontical-ontological description 
invites a fundamental introspection on pre-ontological understanding of „there-ness‟ implicit in all 
ontical comportment. If Dasein‟s „issue‟ with the question of being is grounded in its ontical 
situatedness and „always already‟ being in the world is an „essential structure‟125 of Dasein, then 
understanding Dasein requires that we explicate precisely how Dasein „always already‟ finds itself 
in „something like a world‟. Thus far we have explicated always already being in something like a 
world with respect to Dasein‟s ontical comportment to entities. In that sense, Dasein‟s everyday 
engagement with the world is inherently indicative of an always present and prerequisite 
understanding of being(s). On our reading of Heidegger, this central characteristic of Dasein is also 
ontologically grounded. Here, always already being in something like a world refers to Heidegger‟s 
critique of disengagement and his insistence on analysis of Dasein, specifically in its average 
everydayness, as a point of departure for enquiring after being. Furthermore, in our understanding 
of Heidegger‟s project this is his central philosophical point. His claim that Dasein is caught in an 
inextricable ontical-ontological relatedness to the world is anchored in the argument that ontological 
truth is only possible on condition that human experience and its objects are mutually presupposing. 
Thus the relationship of experience to its objects must be pragmatically grounded in the brute fact 
of presence-hood in the world. Therefore a pre-ontological understanding of the world and being(s) 
as such is implicit in their manipulation. This is what Heidegger seems to mean when referring to 
Dasein as an entity which „in its very being, comports itself understandingly towards that being‟ in 
that it is „grounded upon that state of being which we have called “being-in-the-world”‟126 This 
„state of being‟, on our reading, describes a fundamental and constitutive feature of experience as 
such so that there can be no experience which does not presuppose and thus reaffirm a 
contextualising framework of worldliness. On Mulhall‟s reading therefore, 
  
Heidegger‟s use of the term „Dasein‟, with its literal meaning of „there-being‟ or „being-there‟ to 
denote the human way of being emphasizes that human existence is essentially Being-in-the-world; 
in effect, it affirms an internal relation between „human being‟ and „world‟.127  
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An extended discussion of the relationship between Dasein, the world and ontological truth will be 
an important part of explicating ET and EHF in our penultimate chapter. Suffice it to say that for 
Heidegger, the ontical-ontological relatedness of Dasein to the world is grounded in the mutual 
presupposition of experience and its objects. Frede explains this point in concise terms:  
 
If there are basically two separate entities, subject and object, that occur side by side, the question of 
how contact is possible between the thinking subject and independently existing objects remains an 
insoluble problem, even if one grants that the subject somehow bestows the “form” or the “meaning” 
on the objects. For this question remains: How can there be truth if it is conceived of as the 
correspondence between our thoughts (or the content of our consciousness) and the outside world? 
In other words, what guarantees the objectivity of our subjective impressions?
128
 
    
Heidegger‟s criticism of the ontological tradition is rooted in these concerns so an accurate and 
appropriate account of Dasein requires bearing them in mind. The „thinking subject‟ cannot be 
disengaged from „independently existing objects‟ else there could be no certainty of these objects as 
independently existing at all. Similarly, independently existing objects cannot be disengaged from 
the thinking subject else there could be no „truthful correspondence‟ between thought and objects. 
Heidegger‟s account of Dasein‟s comportment to entities in the world will be illustrative of his 
claim that Dasein has a pre-ontological understanding of being(s).  He categorises these entities 
under one of two modes of being: Zuhandensein (ready-to-hand or equipment) and Vorhandensein 
(present-at-hand or objects). A brief outline of each will be sufficient for our purposes.  
b) Disclosure of Being-Ontological in Relation to Equipment 
Zuhandensein refers to the comportment to entities in the mode of their use as equipment. It 
describes an ontical engagement within a contextualising matrix of values and significances, 
grounded in a pre-ontological understanding. For Heidegger, Zuhandensein is „essentially‟ it‟s 
being „something-in-order-to‟. Thus the appropriate comportment to an entity towards achieving 
some other end will disclose its being in relation to Dasein:  
 
Equipment is essentially „something-in-order-to...‟ [“etwas um-zu...”]. A totality of equipment is 
constituted by various ways of the „in-order-to‟, such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, 
manipulability.
129
  
 
The hammer for example discloses the „equipmentality‟130 of its being insofar as it is manipulated 
„in order to‟ achieve the end of hammering a nail. Importantly, Zuhandensein is not restricted to a 
localised understanding. The „ready-to-hand‟ does not refer just to the particular entity currently in 
use but to that entity insofar as using it is an instance of an encounter with the environment as 
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subject to use or manipulation. Heidegger confirms this broader understanding in reference to 
„Nature‟: 
 
So in the environment certain entities become accessible which are always ready-to-hand, but which, 
in themselves, do not need to be produced. Hammer, tongs, and needle, refer in themselves to steel, 
iron, metal, mineral, wood, in that they consist of these. In equipment that is used, „Nature‟ is 
discovered along with it by that use – the „Nature‟ we find in natural products.131 
 
Thus an encounter with the world is implicit in the use of equipment such that an inherent relation 
of Dasein to the world is a constitutive feature of manipulating or engaging with entities. Crucially 
this relation is mutually presupposing so that the ontical-ontological understanding disclosed by 
equipmental-comportment confronts the totality of relations. As Brandom reminds us, 
  
Heidegger is clear that there is no equipment without Dasein, and no Dasein without equipment. 
Dasein and Zuhandensein mutually presuppose one another as substructures of being-in-the-world.
132
 
     
Dasein and Zuhandensein are „mutually presupposing‟ in that for an entity to be equipment it must 
be used by Dasein towards achieving an end, and conversely whatever Dasein handles towards 
achieving an end becomes equipment. Nevertheless, this characterisation refers only to the system 
of relations between entities within the „substructure of being-in-the-world‟. Dasein‟s three ways of 
taking priority mean that it cannot but recognise this system of relations.  
c) Disclosure of Being-Ontological in Relation to Things 
Michael Wheeler, describes the present-at-hand or Vorhandensein in the following way:  
 
When Dasein engages in, for example, the practices of natural science, when sensing takes place 
purely in the service of reflective or philosophical contemplation, or when philosophers claim to 
have identified certain context-free metaphysical building blocks of the universe (e.g., points of pure 
extension, monads), the entities under study are phenomenologically removed from the settings of 
everyday equipmental practice and are thereby revealed as fully fledged independent objects, that is, 
as the bearers of certain context-general determinate or measurable properties (size in metres, weight 
in kilos etc.). Heidegger calls this mode of Being presence-at-hand, and he sometimes refers to 
present-at-hand entities as „Things‟.133 
 
These „Things‟ are not simply objects occurring in the world but are „encountered in such a way 
that their worldly character comes to the fore‟. 134 They involve an engagement that is not one of use 
but observation and in this respect we understand this as the engagement with objects typical of 
rational enquiry, detached from practical engagement. We have previously referred to the present-
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at-hand in respect of Heidegger‟s critique of Descartes and his dependence on „medieval 
scholasticism‟ whereby beings are treated exclusively in the mode of the present. To be clear this 
„present‟ refers to a mode of relation to its objects whereby temporal presence is extended infinitely 
as a contextualising metaphysical space in which objects can be observed. This is how we 
understand what Heidegger refers to as the „there-is‟135 of presence-at-hand and therefore its 
„inappropriateness‟ to Dasein:  
 
But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity 
[Dasein] as “existence” [Existenz], this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification 
of the traditional term “existentia”; ontologically, existentia is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, 
a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein‟s character.136 
  
Moreover, it is important to note that the present-at-hand is not independent of equipmental-
comportment. On our reading of Heidegger, observational engagement remains ontologically 
grounded in a form of pragmatic relation but where the „something-in-order-to‟ has to do with 
rational analysis. Thus a breakdown of equipmental-comportment, for instance, will reveal an 
otherwise implicit observational engagement. So if my pen should fail in applying ink to the page, 
my relation to it will be characterised by a rational reflection on its component parts. But this 
comportment characterised by a contextualising infinite presence, a theoretical space where entities 
are suspended for observation, is premised on an ontical-ontological understanding of being(s). This 
can be illustrated with respect to Heidegger‟s criticism of the presupposition inherent to rationalism. 
As we have seen, Heidegger argues that the dualistic hypothesis is valid on condition of a pre-
existing relation between experience and its objects. In this sense, observational-comportment (the 
mode of being characterised as Vorhandensein) is similarly possible on condition of a prerequisite 
understanding of being(s). Thus the breakdown of relations in practical engagement does not 
dissolve objects from experience but furnishes the possibility of an observational/rational relation. 
d) The Significance of Dasein to the Question of Being 
In light of what has already been said we will restrict ourselves to the statement of three key 
conclusions drawn from the consideration of Dasein‟s significance to the question of being:  
 Dasein is the entity of ontico-ontological priority to the question of being.   
 Dasein‟s prioritisation is reflective of both a methodological requirement to fundamental 
ontology and an ontological claim that the possibility of ontological truth presupposes an 
understanding of being(s).  
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 Analysis of Dasein must be framed by its average everydayness insofar as its practical 
(Zuhandensein) and theoretical (Vorhandensein) engagement disclose this pre-ontological 
understanding.  
Thus for Heidegger, an existential analytic of Dasein is part and parcel of enquiry into question of 
being. Failure to provide such an analytic therefore risks a disengaged account of being(s).  
 
iii) The Identification of Phenomenology with Ontology 
Having discussed [fundamental] ontology, the majority of our focus will be dedicated to 
phenomenology but a brief reiteration will provide coordination and context. We will consider 
phenomenology in two ways. First, we will outline the etymologically-derived definition in regards 
to the „phenomenon‟ and the „logos‟. Second, we will develop that definition into phenomenology 
as methodology, concluding by applying our understanding of phenomenology to the question of 
being. Our intention will be to show that for Heidegger, phenomenology is the formalisation of the 
analysis of Dasein in respect of its everyday comportment. If, as we have argued in our 
interpretation of Heidegger, rationalist, that is disengaged, methodology is marked by 
disingenuousness then phenomenology is intended as a sincere means by which to approach the 
question of being.  
a) What Heidegger Means by Phenomenology 
For the remainder of this analysis „ontology‟ will refer to fundamental ontology unless 
otherwise stated. Put simply, ontology describes an effort to disclose the being of entities in relation 
to the totality and thus ultimately establish a confrontation with being as such. It will seek to 
maintain the holistic structure of immediate experience by addressing its enquiries in terms of 
hermeneutic facticity. We understand this in much the same terms as Miguel de Beistegui outlines 
in The New Heidegger. In distinguishing Heidegger‟s understanding of hermeneutics from 
traditional definitions he says,  
 
With Heidegger, hermeneutics no longer refers to the science of interpretation, but to the process of 
interpretation that is an essential characteristic of life or existence itself. […] The mode of access to 
being is through this understanding of being that Dasein already has. […] All deliberate 
interpretations take place on the basis of Dasein‟s primordial facticity, that is, on the basis of a pre-
reflexive understanding of being from within a concrete situation that has intrinsic relation to the 
interpreter‟s life and personal as well as common history, to his past as well as his future.137 
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In this respect and as previously stated, the brute facticity of immediate and localised present-hood 
is always-already indicative of a primordial relationship between human-being and being as such. 
Finally, it is rooted in the philosophical claim that ontological truth is possible on condition of such 
a pre-ontological understanding of being(s), what we have referred to as the mutual presupposition 
of experience and its objects. An equally simple summary of phenomenology will provide us a 
preliminary sketch of how they are identified by Heidegger. Phenomenology can be understood in 
two ways though they are not sharply distinguished:  
 Phenomenology as the etymologically-derived definition of the term. This is a literal 
understanding, individually defining „phenomenon‟ and „logos‟ before recombining them. 
 Phenomenology as the most appropriate „methodological conception‟ of ontology. Here 
phenomenology is the means of arriving at an ontological disclosure of being.  
Maintaining a distinction between these definitions may contradict the implications of the term but 
will help us clarify the identification of phenomenology with ontology. Of course Heidegger‟s 
project requires that these and previous concerns are not individual parts but overlap each other.  
The first way of understanding phenomenology refers to the Greek root of the word. Heidegger 
divides phenomenology into the phenomenon and the logos. For Heidegger, the Greek for 
phenomenon translates as „appearance‟ or more precisely, a „showing-itself-in-itself.‟138 We will 
outline the distinction between phenomenon and appearance before elaborating what Heidegger 
means by showing-itself-in-itself. As Heidegger states: 
  
“Phenomenon”, the showing itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be 
encountered. “Appearance”, on the other hand, means a reference-relationship which is in an entity 
itself, and which is such that what does the referring (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible 
function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a „phenomenon.‟ Both appearance and semblance 
are founded upon the phenomenon, though in different ways. The bewildering multiplicity of 
„phenomena‟ designated by the words “phenomenon”, “semblance”, “appearance”, “mere 
appearance”, cannot be disentangled unless the concept of the phenomenon is understood from the 
beginning as that which shows itself in itself.
139
 
 
There is a difference between phenomena as appearance, semblance and mere appearance
140
 though 
they are all founded on the phenomenon. For Heidegger, understanding the phenomenon as a 
showing-itself-in-itself renders the phenomena encountered all the more comprehensible. 
Nevertheless, phenomena encountered as semblance seem to prima facie contradict Heidegger‟s 
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definition of the phenomenon as showing-itself-in-itself. This is especially problematic because 
Heidegger also says semblance can be understood as a showing-itself-as-what-it-is-not:
141
 
 
Now an entity can show itself from itself [von ihm selbst her] in many ways, depending in each case 
on the kind of access we have to it. Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as 
something which in itself it is not.
142
   
 
Of course our discussion of appearance and semblance is preliminary and will not explore the issues 
involved at length. The point is to elucidate our interpretation of methodological phenomenology as 
the most appropriate or sincere means of comportment to ontological enquiry and ultimately how 
this grounds Heidegger‟s argument for freedom. To that end, a question arises as to whether 
something which shows-itself-as-what-it-is-not truly shows itself at all. If what is shown is not what 
the entity is then it cannot conform to the definitions of the phenomenon. We are obligated to 
understand how semblance is reconciled with the phenomenon in light of this contradiction. 
Heidegger acknowledges the importance of this reconciliation: 
  
If we are to have any further understanding of the concept of phenomenon, everything depends on 
our seeing how what is designated in the first signification of θαινόμενον („phenomenon‟ as that 
which shows itself) and what is designated in the second („phenomenon‟ as semblance) are 
structurally interconnected.
143
 
 
This „structural interconnection‟ is constituted by the fact that a given phenomena cannot show 
itself as something it is not unless the phenomenon is „already included within what it isn‟t‟. In 
other words, semblance must already imply the phenomenon it is a semblance of. „Seeming‟ to be 
something necessitates revealing that which is ostensibly hidden. As Claudio proclaims to Leonato, 
„Give not this rotten orange to your friend. She‟s but the sign and semblance of her honour.‟144 
„Seeming‟ ripe already implies the contrary rottenness of the orange that it is. To „seem‟ honourable 
is to be such that one does not „seem‟ dishonourable. Thus the semblance of honour reveals the 
dishonour which seeming purports to hide. Heidegger consolidates this reconciliation in the 
following way: 
 
Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself – that is, of 
being a phenomenon – can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it „merely look 
like so-and-so‟. When θαινόμενον signifies „semblance‟, the primordial signification (the 
phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is 
founded.
145
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Something cannot make a „pretension of showing itself‟ without firstly showing itself even when 
pretension purports to hide what it is. An encounter with that which „hides something‟ already 
includes an encounter with the „hidden-ness of that thing‟. This, it seems, is the sense in which 
semblance, showing-itself-as-what-it-is-not, is founded on the phenomenon, showing-itself-in-itself.  
„Appearance‟ on the other hand, refers to what Heidegger calls the „announcing-itself‟. He is 
clear that appearance does not refer to the familiar usage for which something that appears is also 
that which shows-itself: it is not the contrary term to what is usually meant by a „disappearance‟ for 
example. An appearance, for Heidegger, „does not show itself‟: 
 
Thus appearance, as the appearance „of something‟ does not mean showing-itself; it means rather the 
announcing-itself by [von] something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through 
something which does not show itself.
146
 
 
 „Appearance‟, in Heidegger‟s sense, therefore refers much more to that which „indicates‟ or 
„presents‟ in the sense of a physical malady or illness. One may for instance „present‟ the symptoms 
of flu but what shows-itself may be a loss of colour or runny nose which „announce‟ a virus. 
Heidegger nonetheless insists that „appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself‟. 
Though it is strictly an „announcing-itself‟, a phenomenon is „constitutive for appearance‟. In other 
words, what is announced by the reference-relationship of an appearance is only possible on 
condition of an underlying showing-itself. It is in this sense that appearance and semblance are both 
„founded on the phenomenon‟.  
We may divide the terms „showing-itself‟ and „in-itself‟ to highlight their individual 
significance. The first refers to the disclosure of being as opposed to its discovery or definition. 
What shows-itself need not be sought or defined in order to determine what it is. As a „showing-
itself‟, the phenomenon is first encountered as „already available to us‟. In this sense, Heidegger‟s 
notion of disclosure avoids unrelatedness by revealing what is inherent to the phenomenon by virtue 
of what is already available. The „it‟ of „itself‟ specifies a given entity from a multiplicity of other 
such entities. Much like the phenomena of semblance, the entities which it is not are „already 
included within it‟ and thereby constitute the specification of „it‟ as „itself‟. Thus showing-itself-in-
itself refers to the disclosure of being by means of relatedness to its constitutive world.  
Heidegger‟s interpretation of logos also relies on what he calls a „word-for-word‟ translation 
from the Greek. Logos becomes „discourse‟ or more specifically, „to make manifest what one is 
„talking about‟ in one‟s discourse‟147 but what Heidegger means by „making manifest what is 
discussed‟ is unclear. The „manifestation of discourse‟ does not mean making what is said „real‟ or 
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„true‟. For Heidegger, the „reality‟ or „truth‟ of what is discussed has very little bearing on whether 
or not discourse is „manifested‟. Logos is rather „letting-something-be-seen‟ irrelevant of whether 
what is seen is agreed upon as „real‟ or „true‟: 
 
Furthermore, because the λόγορ is a letting-something-be-seen, it can therefore be true or false. But 
here everything depends on our steering clear of any conception of truth which is construed in the 
sense of „agreement‟.148 
 
Manifesting discourse does not require „reality‟ or „truth‟ in the sense of empirical observation. To 
let something be seen means only that what is discussed is disclosed
149
 by what is spoken about. In 
this sense, what is manifested in discourse can even be „false‟ and still adhere to „letting-something-
be-seen‟. Falsehood or „being false‟ in discourse means only that it is spoken [sprechen] as a 
covering up: 
 
Similarly, „Being false‟ amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up [verdecken]: putting 
something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as 
something which it is not.
150
 
 
In this respect, when what is spoken about is covered up one encounters the discourse as a 
deception. Even in the case of a „successful‟ deception, the discourse is still encountered as such. 
Truth in regards to logos is an unhidden-letting-something-be-seen. Falsehood is therefore letting-
something-be-seen-as-covered-up: 
 
When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking 
back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen as something, it thus 
acquires a synthesis-structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up. The „truth of 
judgments‟, however, is merely the opposite of this covering-up, a secondary phenomenon of truth, 
with more than one kind of foundation.
151
 
 
Though we may speak of something so as to cover it up, our speech is encountered as a covering 
up. One always „points to‟ that which is hidden even whilst passing it off as something else and this 
„pointing to‟ simultaneously hides and reveals what is spoken about. Thus deceptive discourse 
requires a simultaneous encounter with what is hidden and the means of its obscuration. For 
Heidegger, difficulty with this simultaneity is due to a „misunderstanding of the Greek conception 
of „truth‟. He claims that „Αιζθήζειρ, the sheer sensory perception of something, is „true‟ in the 
Greek sense [...]‟.152 Simultaneously covering up and pointing to what is spoken about does not 
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constitute a falsehood in the sense of contradicting empirical truth. Deception is rather encountered 
as such thereby revealing what is ostensibly „hidden‟.   
Thus we have an interpretation of the phenomenon as a showing-itself-in-itself: a necessary 
disclosure of being. Showing reveals its relatedness to the world which constitutes the phenomenon, 
including the observer. The logos, as we have understood it is a letting-something-be-seen, 
specifically in regards to the manifestation of what is spoken about. Even deceptive discourse is 
encountered as such, in much the same manner as semblance: 
 
Thus “phenomenology” means to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in 
which it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls 
itself “phenomenology”. But here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim formulated above: 
„To the things themselves!‟153 
 
In light of this, we can explain the difficulty of distinguishing the two ways of understanding 
Heidegger‟s phenomenology. This is partly due to the fact that although conflating methodology 
and definition is generally problematic, it holds in the case of phenomenology. Phenomenology 
must be a methodology insofar as its definition describes the aim of ontology. As previously 
mentioned, the „hammer-ness‟ of a hammer is disclosed in its appropriate use: in the phenomenon 
of hammer-ing. Similarly, „that formal branch of research we call phenomenology‟ is only revealed 
by „grasping objects‟ such that entities are encountered from themselves in the world. Thus 
understanding phenomenology by application means it is understood phenomenologically: 
 
What is it that phenomenology is to „let us see‟? What is it that must be called a „phenomenon‟ in a 
distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit 
something explicitly? Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show 
itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which is proximally and for the most 
part does show itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground. 
Yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets covered up again, or 
which shows itself only „in disguise‟, is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities, as 
our previous observations have shown. This Being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes 
forgotten and no question arises about it or about its meaning.
154
 
 
Here Heidegger returns to the problem of „forgetting‟ the question of being which opened his 
analysis. We are better positioned to understand his reference to the „hidden‟ in light of what has 
been said about appearance and semblance. The phenomenon is precisely that which leads to what 
„does not show itself‟ but not in the colloquial sense of what cannot be seen. What „remains hidden‟ 
is quite precisely the being of entities and ultimately being. Phenomenology understood 
phenomenologically is therefore the disclosure of the being of entities by means of what „covers 
them up‟. That being of entities is „covered up‟ in the same sense of the reference-relation which is 
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announced by it. What „proximally and for the most part shows itself‟ is also that which announces 
the being of entities but strictly and solely as an announcement. Failure in the appropriate 
application of phenomenology to disclose the being of entities will invariably commit ontology to 
this „covering up‟ and ultimately „forgetting‟ of the question of being. Heidegger refers to this 
application of phenomenology as methodology when he states,  
 
Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of 
giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.
155  
 
Heidegger‟s eo ipso identification of phenomenology as the proper method of ontology is certainly 
bold. As discussed, Heidegger criticises the methods of the ontological tradition as either 
insufficient or obstructive to the task of ontology. The ontological tradition thus either falls short of 
serious enquiry or presupposes being, obscuring interrogation. Nonetheless, it does not follow from 
these criticisms that phenomenology provides the sole means of addressing ontology. Read 
simplistically, Heidegger seems to assert the impossibility of ontology in the absence of 
phenomenology and this would indeed constitute a very difficult claim. Heidegger‟s contradiction 
of that claim exacerbates its difficulty:  
 
One can determine the nature of entities in their Being without necessarily having the explicit 
concept of the meaning of Being at one‟s disposal. Otherwise there could have been no ontological 
knowledge heretofore. One would hardly deny that factically there has been such knowledge. Of 
course „Being‟ has been presupposed in all ontology up till now, but not as a concept at one‟s 
disposal – not as the sort of thing we are seeking.156 
 
Putting to one side the unhelpful possibility of a glaring contradiction, Heidegger‟s claim refers to a 
particular kind of ontology: fundamental ontology. Moreover, his criticisms of traditional ontology 
are not incidental to his claim. It is made in light of the proposed „destruction of traditional 
ontology‟. Thus we can take the claim to mean, „only as phenomenology, is [fundamental] ontology 
possible‟ or „only as phenomenology, is [the appropriate] ontology possible‟. Either, it seems, 
would suffice. The point is simply that any ontology which sincerely undertakes its task, its 
„ownmost aim‟, will do so by means of phenomenology. A definition of phenomenology as a 
„methodological conception‟ will help us further clarify their identification: 
  
„Phenomenology‟ neither designates the object of its researches, nor characterises the subject-matter 
thus comprised. The word merely informs us of the “how” with which what is to be treated in this 
science gets exhibited and handled. To have a science „of‟ phenomena means to grasp objects in such 
a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly 
and demonstrating it directly.
157
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For Heidegger, phenomenology is not tasked with defining phenomena but providing an appropriate 
means of addressing the „subject-matter‟ of ontology. It seeks to „exhibit‟ the being of entities 
without presupposition or imposition. „Directly demonstrating‟ objects requires avoiding the 
unrelatedness of those objects from the constitutive world. But this we can readily infer from 
everyday experience: „directly demonstrating‟ or „exhibiting‟ the being of this pencil is implicit in 
its use. It is in this sense that objects disclose their being in relatedness to the world. In 
„Intentionality and the World: Division I of Being and Time‟, Harrison Hall reflects this use of 
phenomenology as the means by which objects are „exhibited‟ in the world: 
  
Heidegger makes these discoveries by getting things to show themselves to us as they really are in 
our ordinary dealings with them. [...] His claim is that the hammer and doorknob really are what they 
are as practically employed. The trick is to see what they are without changing them from 
instrumental to perceptual objects and breaking down the network of relations essential to their 
instrumental nature.
158
 
 
This „trick‟ is the task of phenomenology as methodology. The concern of phenomenology, on our 
interpretation of Heidegger‟s understanding, is precisely „how‟ one addresses objects, thereby 
avoiding „changing an instrumental object to one of perception‟. Thus doorknobs disclose their 
being only in their use, revealed by the attempt to „open-the-door-by-means-of-the-knob‟. The door 
it opens, the function of the door and the environmental system of relations which contextualise the 
door are already included in the „door-knob‟. Abstracting the doorknob from the world results in the 
„breakdown of relations essential to its nature‟: the principal error of the ontological tradition and a 
description of the problem with a „disengaged‟ approach to philosophical enquiry. For Heidegger, 
only strict adherence to a specified methodology avoids the risk of abstraction. It must also 
guarantee that objects are addressed in a manner appropriate to the world to which they are 
essentially related. As we have seen, ontology is tasked with laying entities bare such that they 
disclose being in themselves and from themselves.
159
 Success in that regard requires eliminating the 
imposition of presuppositions, occurring as a consequence of an inappropriate methodology. This is 
only possible given a methodology which is critical of the enquirer and therefore must be a 
methodology which is „self-critical in a positive sense‟.160 Phenomenology‟s focus on „how‟ objects 
are addressed rather than „what‟ is addressed presents just such a „self-critical‟ methodology. For 
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Heidegger, phenomenology is the most appropriate means by which ontology is possible because it 
meets these criteria. The application of phenomenology (phenomenology understood 
phenomenologically) must fulfil the requirements of fundamental ontology.  
b) The Significance of Phenomenology to the Question of Being 
As the sole means by which ontology is possible, phenomenology is the only way of 
addressing the question of being. The assertion fails to mention a crucial issue, though it follows. 
Phenomenology is distinguished by its prioritisation of the enquirer. It demands assessment of one‟s 
methodological approach to ontology. This is the sense in which it is presented as „self-critical‟. 
The enquirer becomes the focus of enquiry: 
 
Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – 
transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity‟s mode of Being; and as 
such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about – namely, Being. This entity which 
each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall 
denote by the term “Dasein”.161  
 
The significance of phenomenology to the question of being must be understood in the light of 
Dasein‟s centrality to that question. Understanding Dasein results in understanding the significance 
of phenomenology because it is the entity for which „the very asking of this question‟ is a mode of 
its being. In regard to the relationship between phenomenology and the question of being, it will 
suffice to say that phenomenology must be the method by which the question of being is addressed: 
 
With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities – ontology. 
In explaining the task of ontology we found it necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology 
taking as its theme that entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront 
the cardinal problem – the question of the meaning of Being in general.162 
 
For Heidegger, understanding the question of being requires phenomenology as a method precisely 
because it is concerned with interrogating the enquirer. He is assured of Dasein‟s importance to 
phenomenology (and thereby of phenomenology to the question of being) by virtue of its inherent 
understanding of being. The ontico-ontological distinctiveness of Dasein describes its 
phenomenological appropriateness for ontology. If phenomenology is „to let that which shows itself 
be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself‟ and Dasein must take issue 
with being and thus have an understanding of being, then an ontology of Dasein will provide a 
phenomenological disclosure of being. In other words, „destruction‟ of the philosopher‟s 
disengagement by means of a phenomenological, existential analytic will aid the disclosure of 
being(s).     
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III 
Jean-Paul Sartre‟s Project of Phenomenological Ontology 
 
Sartre‟s project rests on two related concerns. Primarily, BN163 is intended to provide a form of 
phenomenological ontology which is centred on consciousness. The book‟s secondary, though no 
less significant, concern is addressing and ultimately adjusting Heidegger‟s ontology, principally 
the ontology of Dasein. An accurate explication of Sartre‟s project will therefore invariably require 
comparison with Heidegger‟s project of phenomenological ontology, as this was presented in the 
previous chapter. For Sartre, Heidegger‟s failure to include consciousness and an epistemic account 
thereof constitutes a fundamental error in his ontology of Dasein and therefore his project as a 
whole. Ultimately, we will show that Sartre‟s argument for freedom is central to his claims of a 
robust responsibility couched in his interpretation of intentionality. It is our contention that Sartre‟s 
effort to „establish consciousness epistemologically‟ betrays a misunderstanding of Heidegger‟s 
project. We contend that Sartre seems to read the methodological prioritisation of human experience 
into the very constitution of consciousness such that it becomes the locus of all ontology and 
meaning. Nonetheless, arriving at that conclusion will require careful analysis of Sartre‟s project 
which, he claims, is intended to answer five central questions: 
 
What is the meaning of these two types [for-itself and in-itself] of being? For what reasons do they 
belong to being in general? What is the meaning of that being which includes within itself these two 
radically separated regions of being? If idealism and realism both fail to explain the relations which 
in fact unite these regions and which in theory are without communication, what other solution can 
we find for this problem? And how can the being of the phenomenon be transphenomenal? I have 
written the present work in order to try answering these questions.
164
 
 
Thus for Sartre, his project is intended, in part at least, to establish a „solution‟ to the problem of the 
„radically separated regions of being‟. As we have already seen, Heidegger argues that dualism 
merely describes a negative relation to being, not the lack of a relation. In other words, the radical 
separation of regions of being presupposes their communication. Analysis of Da-sein therefore 
presents an appropriate methodological point of departure to disclose an implicit understanding. 
Conversely, Sartre seems to want to propose a theoretical solution to the problem and, we argue, 
will do so by appeal to what he calls a „pre-reflective cogito‟. As we will show, Sartre wants to 
supplement the Heideggerian account of Dasein, which he understands as describing the ontological 
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ground of human-being, with an epistemological account. This is how we interpret Sartre‟s 
statement that, 
 
Thus to the necessity of ontologically establishing consciousness we would add a new necessity: that 
of establishing it epistemologically.   
 
Later adding,  
 
In other words, every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional 
consciousness of itself. 
 
And concluding that therefore,  
 
…reflection has no kind of primacy over the consciousness reflected-on. It is not reflection which 
reveals the consciousness which renders the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective cogito which 
is the condition of the Cartesian cogito.
165
 
 
„Establishing consciousness epistemologically‟ is, on our reading of Sartre, necessary because, he 
argues, Dasein is described in ethically ambiguous terms, reducing it to a „thing-like, blind in-
itself‟166 and leaving little room for responsibility and thus freedom. In the appeal to Descartes 
therefore, Sartre wants to establish a primordial res cogitans (a thinking or experiencing „I‟) to 
which he can attribute a profound ontological responsibility. In chapter four we will ultimately 
argue that Sartre‟s attempt to slot an account of a pre-reflective cogito into the ontology of Dasein 
grounded by its being-in-the-world and distinguished by its relationship to being, constitutes an 
internal contradiction in Sartre‟s project and a misunderstanding of Heidegger. Though we will not 
discuss these issues in the following analysis, reference to Sartre‟s „epistemic proof of 
consciousness‟ will help shed light on his relationship to Heidegger and the argument for freedom. 
To that end it will suffice to focus our attention on the first three of Sartre‟s questions representing 
the three core claims of BN:   
i) Being-in-Itself and Being-for-Itself – Simply speaking, the former is the type of being of 
non-conscious entities. The pen, for example, is unaware of itself and as such, cannot 
extend beyond its boundaries to project possibilities. Being-in-itself is limited to the fact 
that it is. Being-for-itself is the type of being of conscious entities. Being-for-itself is 
described as „a lack‟, not possessing any positive determinations.    
ii) ‘The Problem of Nothingness’ – For Sartre, nothingness is central to consciousness, 
rendering impossible an absolute identification of oneself with the external world and one‟s 
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actions.
167
  Consciousness‟ „pre-judicative comprehension‟ of non-being allows for a sense 
of authorship over the self, responsibility for action and an encounter with the world such as 
it is. 
iii) The Centrality of Consciousness – Sartre claims that ontological discourse is impossible 
in the absence of consciousness because it alone provides the possibility of ontology. 
Consciousness is therefore a necessary prerequisite for an encounter with the world as such. 
This does not mean that the empirical world depends on consciousness but that the 
meanings of things in the world are inconceivable in the absence of consciousness.  
Before beginning our analysis, it is important to note three key points. First, though each of 
these core claims will be explicated independently, they are indispensable parts of a collective 
whole. Each refers to and requires the others in propping up Sartre‟s view of human reality. Second, 
Sartre‟s style of writing often lends itself to criticism. His syntactic complexity therefore demands 
greater interpretive sensitivity. Consequently, full and proper comprehension requires careful 
interpretation. Finally, Sartre‟s insistence on the inclusion of consciousness means that his 
arguments often slide from the ontological to the epistemological. One preliminary example can be 
found in his use of „meaning‟. In the previous chapter we explicate Heidegger‟s argument for 
adjusting ontological questions from asking what a being, and being in general, „is‟ to what one 
means by a being such that it „is‟. We explicate this adjustment in respect of Heidegger‟s effort to 
methodologically compel the enquirer into a hermeneutic introspection of facticity precisely in 
order to disclose an otherwise implicit/presupposed understanding of being. Sartre‟s claim that 
„essence is the meaning of the object‟ collapses this distinction into an assertive claim about 
being(s). If „essence is the meaning of the object‟ then meaning is no longer instructive of a 
relationship to being(s) but describes being(s) as such. Thus the „is-ness‟ of objects becomes the 
responsibility of the being for whom meaning is a possibility.
168
 Although our intention at this stage 
is not to propose criticisms of Sartre based on a comparison with Heidegger, we will address some 
points of contention so that Sartre‟s project may stand out in full relief.        
 
i) Being-in-Itself and Being-for-Itself 
The first core claim that Sartre makes is that there are two modes of being, being-in-itself and 
being-for-itself, and the corresponding two kinds of entity, the in-itself and the for-itself. Our 
explication will be restricted to two main questions. We will first seek to define both being-in-itself 
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and being-for-itself though it should be noted that Sartre regards these as inextricably intertwined 
types of being. Our definitions are provided with the sole intention of clarifying the modes of being 
inherent to entities in Sartre‟s project, not their independence. We will then address their 
relationship. In so doing we hope to explicate Sartre‟s argument for the need to „establish 
consciousness epistemologically‟ and the basis of that argument in his interpretation of 
intentionality. Sartre argues that the for-itself could not be without the in-itself, much as „colour 
could not exist without form‟.169 Of course this raises the question of whether this dependence is 
reciprocal. Sartre later adds,  
 
[...] the in-itself has no need of the for-itself in order to be; the “passion” of the for-itself only cause 
there to be in-itself [seulement qu‟il y ait de l‟en-soi]. The phenomenon of in-itself is an abstraction 
without consciousness but its being is not an abstraction.
170
  
 
Thus Sartre suggests that the phenomenon of the in-itself, it‟s being-there, depends on the „passion‟ 
of the for-itself. One may therefore be inclined to infer traditional disconnected dualism at work 
here. Therefore it is important to clarify that these passages are set in the context of an attempt to 
„conceive of a synthetic organisation such that the for-itself is inseparable from the in-itself and 
conversely such that the in-itself is indissolubly bound to the for-itself...‟171 We understand this to 
be the logical extension of Sartre‟s stated intention to find „the meaning of that being which 
includes within itself these two radically separated regions of being‟.172 To that end Sartre asserts 
that, „Doubtless the for-itself is a nihilation, but as a nihilation it is; and it is in a priori unity with 
the in-itself‟,173 later adding the following: 
 
What does this mean if not that the indissoluble totality of in-itself and for-itself is conceivable only 
in the form of a being which is its own “self-cause”? [...] And if we can raise the question of being of 
the for-itself articulated in the in-itself, it is because we define ourselves a priori by means of a pre-
ontological comprehension of the ens causa sui. [...] Has it not appeared due to the mere fact of the 
upsurge of the for-itself, and is not the for-itself originally a project of being its own self-cause? 
Thus we begin to grasp the nature of total reality. Total being, [...] that being whose existence would 
be a unitary synthesis of the in-itself and of consciousness – this ideal being would be the in-itself 
founded by the for-itself and identical with the for-itself which founds it – i.e., the ens causa sui.174 
 
Thus for Sartre, a „unitary synthesis‟ of „total being‟ is predicated primarily on the for-itself 
„founding‟ the in-itself such that the „indissoluble totality of in-itself and for-itself‟ is only possible 
given an ens causa sui, that is, given a being that does not merely disclose „total being‟ but by 
virtue of the „upsurge of the for-itself‟ founds total being. Therefore it is clear that Sartre wants to 
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describe an inherent and necessary relationship between these two modes of being. In effect, the 
phenomenon of the in-itself presupposes the for-itself.
175
 Thus colour cannot exist without form but 
colour and form are not synonymous.
176
 The relationship of being-in-itself to being-for-itself is 
complicated by the subtlety of these distinctions.  
a) Definition of Being-in-Itself/Being-for-Itself 
Sartre provides only a brief explication of being-in-itself in contrast to his thorough discussion 
of being-for-itself.
177
 The end of his introduction to BN, provides a sketch of how we are to 
understand being-in-itself:  
 
But if being is in itself, this means that it does not refer to itself as self-consciousness does. It is this 
self. It is itself so completely that the perpetual reflection which constitutes self is dissolved in an 
identity. [...] In fact being is opaque to itself precisely because it is filled with itself. This can be 
better expressed by saying that being is what it is. [...] Being-in-itself has no within which is opposed 
to a without and which is analogous to a judgment, a law, a consciousness of itself. The in-itself has 
nothing secret; it is solid (massif).
178
 
 
To say that an entity simply, „is this self‟ does little to progress a definition. Similarly, references to 
„solidity‟ and „opacity‟ may only serve to obfuscate rather than illuminate. Sartre asserts that the in-
itself „is itself so completely that the perpetual reflection which constitutes a self is dissolved in an 
identity‟: it need not refer to itself but already „is this self‟ such that its nature is fully revealed and 
restricted to the fact of itself. This is what Sartre refers to as the „being of phenomena‟.179 By means 
of clarification one might turn to Sartre‟s example of „cup‟ and „inkwell‟.180 Therein both cup and 
inkwell are described as entities for which their being is „neither a matter of indifference nor the 
opposite‟. It is in this sense that the in-itself is „glued to itself‟, „neither self-affirmative nor self-
denying‟.181 The defining characteristic of the in-itself is the necessity of its absolute identification 
with itself such that it simply is and cannot be otherwise or more precisely, it does not contain the 
possibility for being other than it is. The in-itself is therefore that which must be what it is and could 
not be otherwise.  
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Nevertheless it would still seem that Sartre‟s being-in-itself is indebted to accounts from 
traditional ontology.
182
 Thus it will help our explication to clarify that for Sartre, being-in-itself and 
being-for-itself are „two modalities of being‟ and that, „the in-itself and the for-itself are not 
juxtaposed. Quite the contrary, the for-itself without the in-itself is a kind of abstraction; [...]‟.183 
Thus in-itself and for-itself are fundamentally related modalities inherent to „being in general‟.  
We now require a definition of being-for-itself:  
 
The self therefore represents an ideal distance within the immanence of the subject in relation to 
himself, a way of not being his own coincidence, of escaping identity while positing it as a unity – in 
short, of being in a perpetually unstable equilibrium between identity as absolute cohesion without a 
trace of diversity and unity as a synthesis of a multiplicity. This is what we shall call presence to 
itself. The law of being of the for-itself, as the ontological foundation of consciousness, is to be itself 
in the form of presence to itself.
184
 
 
Sartre later adds the following: 
 
Thus the for-itself must be its own nothingness. The being of consciousness qua consciousness is to 
exist at a distance from itself as a presence to itself, and this empty distance which being carries in 
its being is Nothingness. Thus in order for a self to exist, it is necessary that the unity of this being 
include its own nothingness as the nihilation of identity. [...] The for-itself is the being which 
determines itself to exist inasmuch as it can not coincide with itself.
 185
 
 
We interpret this to mean that therefore an entity is an instance of the for-itself (and is characterised 
by being-for-itself) if it is present to itself, and is thus at once identical to itself (as every entity is) 
and yet not identical to itself (in that it is on the one hand subject and on the other hand object, and 
this implies a distinction). Here again Sartre refers to the for-itself in respect of being the cause of 
itself or the ens causa sui. Crucially, he now describes this in relation to the „self‟ and the nature of 
consciousness born of „Nothingness‟. He states that „in order for a self to exist‟ the for-itself must 
produce an „ideal distance within the immanence of the subject in relation to himself‟. This 
„distance‟ between self and itself, he says is „Nothingness‟. Moreover, Sartre is very clear that this 
self „exists‟ in the mode, that is, „in the form of presence to itself‟ which is „the law of being of the 
for-itself‟. He is unequivocal that on his account, „the ontological foundation of consciousness‟ is 
grounded in presence to self. „The law of being of the for-itself‟ is such that consciousness is 
ultimately in a permanent state of „unstable equilibrium‟ because, as „its own Nothingness‟, the for-
itself cannot permit of any „coincidence‟ with the self. At a later stage in this chapter we will 
explicate the relationship between this account of consciousness and Sartre‟s effort to „correct‟ the 
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account of Dasein by attributing to it a robust, ontological responsibility. Suffice it to say that for 
Sartre, Dasein‟s „understanding of being‟ implicit in its everyday comportments absolves human 
action of an ethical/moral imperative. His addition of „Nothingness‟ at the ontological root of 
consciousness requires that it is always present before itself, incapable of ever fully identifying with 
itself and thus always in a position to observe and assess itself. But putting this to one side, our 
immediate concerns are firstly, the process by which the for-itself engages in active „nihilation‟ 
such that it can be „present to itself‟ and secondly, the relationship between being-for-itself and 
consciousness.     
A lengthy discussion of „nihilation‟ will follow so a general definition will suffice herein. 
„Nihilation‟ refers to the establishment of a matrix of negative relations between beings by the for-
itself. To „nihilate‟ something therefore is to encounter them by means of the nothingness which 
arises between consciousness and its object. This nihilating activity is for Sartre, the fundamental 
feature of the for-itself which comes into being only through an act of nihilating the in-itself. To 
that end Sartre states that, 
 
 For the for-itself, to be is to nihilated the in-itself which it is.186 
 
The aforementioned „unstable equilibrium‟ of the for-itself is, on our reading, attributable to this 
permanent state of making nothingness arise in, or nihilating, the in-itself which brings it (the for-
itself) into being. Indeed a distinction can and will be made between the for-itself‟s nihilation of 
itself and of the in-itself. The for-itself can of course nihilate itself in reflection and must nihilate 
the in-itself as a fundamental mode of self-presence. Nevertheless, we contend that Sartre‟s 
reference to the „pre-reflective cogito‟ and his appeal to Descartes are indicative of the primordiality 
of reflection (the for-itself nihilating itself) in his project. This is how we understand what Sartre 
refers to as the „unity of the three temporal ekstases‟187 referring to the three stages or „ekstases‟ by 
which the for-itself separates from self. Therein, nihilation of the in-itself is succeeded by reflection 
or the nihilation of for-itself by itself. We argue and will discuss, that these ekstases are 
simultaneous and therefore equally primordial.
188
 At first sight the definition of being-for-itself 
seems to rest on an underlying fallacy: on Sartre‟s understanding of being-for-itself, the for-itself 
can only be present to itself after actively nihilating. This is to say that prior to active nihilation, the 
for-itself is an in-itself in „absolute identification with itself‟ and is not present to itself. Two related 
but distinguishable problems appear: 
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1) Sartre must account for what motivates nihilation from a state of self-identity.  
2) Nihilation presupposes a characteristic distinction and metaphysical separation between for-
itself and in-itself. The for-itself differs from the in-itself in respect of its potentiality for 
nihilation.  
Nevertheless, these problems and the critique they suggest are a product of having fundamentally 
misunderstood Sartre‟s project.189 The two problems have their corresponding and related solutions: 
a) the simultaneity of presence to self and active nihilation of being-in-itself and b) the impossibility 
of potentiality for active nihilation with respect to the for-itself:  
a) For Sartre, presence to self and active nihilation of being-in-itself are simultaneous and 
cannot occur independently of each other. There can be no presence to self without active 
nihilation and active nihilation must result in presence to self. Active nihilation is not a will 
governed capacity but a necessary characteristic of the for-itself. Sartre points this out in 
explicating the three „ekstases‟ of consciousness.190 The first and second „ekstases‟ refer to 
the „temporalisation‟ of consciousness and „presence to self‟ respectively. The third 
„ekstases‟ of „transcendence‟ refers directly to the simultaneity of presence to self and 
active nihilation. Therein, consciousness is „not something which would first be in order 
subsequently to put itself in relation with this or that end [...]‟.191 Similarly, the for-itself is 
in a permanent state of active nihilation and is therefore immediately present to itself.  
b) Properly speaking, the for-itself cannot be in a state of potentiality for active nihilation: if it 
is not actively nihilating it cannot be for-itself.    
An account of being-for-itself that focuses exclusively on presence to self and ignores 
nihilation and therefore the dependence of the for-itself on the in-itself invites an interpretation of 
Sartre which skates too close to the disconnected dualisms he wants to avoid. Whether or not Sartre 
is successful in this regard (and we do not believe he is) it is important that one note the subtleties 
of his argument even if only to ensure the accuracy of criticism. Haar risks precisely such 
misinterpretation:  
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[Being-in-Itself is] Not only things, objects, but in general every being that is not conscious, every 
being in the world partakes of the in-itself.
192
 
 
By categorising „every being that is not conscious‟ as entities of being-in-itself and therefore 
undermining the relationship between consciousness and being-in-itself, Haar cannot resist the 
temptation to criticise Sartre for founding his project of phenomenological ontology on those 
dualisms: 
 
Accomplishing one of the last possibilities still open to Metaphysics in its death throes, Sartre 
reverses the propositions traditionally dominant. He is the anti-Leibnizian.
193
  
 
On our reading, his criticism is not wholly inaccurate but fails to correctly specify the cause of the 
problem. It is not untrue that Sartre reserves some vestige of traditional metaphysics in his project 
and does so explicitly. Nonetheless the effort to identify the „meaning of being which includes two 
radically separated regions‟194 would be doomed from the outset were they simplistically divided. 
And though achievement does not necessarily follow from intention, it does signify awareness. 
Sartre specifies that presence to self depends on a relation, albeit negative, to the in-itself. 
Consciousness‟ type of being is „perpetually in a state of unstable equilibrium‟ precisely because its 
relationship to active nihilation of the in-itself necessitates an encounter with the in-itself while 
simultaneously rendering identification with it impossible. Sartrean consciousness includes this 
relationship between being-for-itself and being-in-itself: 
 
The for-itself is the in-itself losing itself as in-itself in order to found itself as consciousness. Thus 
consciousness holds within itself its own being-as-consciousness, and since it is its own nihilation, it 
can refer only to itself; but that which is annihilated in consciousness – though we can not call it the 
foundation of consciousness - is the contingent in-itself.
195       
 
At this point it will suffice it to say that consciousness‟ type of being necessitates a nihilating 
relationship to and an encounter with being-in-itself. Failure to acknowledge the importance of this 
relationship tends to suggest that Sartre undermines the value and meaning of a reality independent 
of the whim of consciousness. Nonetheless this does not exempt Sartre from the charge of 
anthropocentrism though it will be discussed at a later point.  
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b) The Relationship Between Being-in-Itself and Being-for-Itself 
In order for us to establish how Sartre overcomes the problem of disconnected dualisms (thus 
separation and disengagement), it is worth recalling that his project is focused on accounting for the 
relationship between these „two regions of being‟: 
 
Our inquiry has led us to the heart of being. But we have been brought to an impasse since we have 
not been able to establish the connection between the two regions of being which we have 
discovered. [...] But what we can retain is the reminder that it is not profitable first to separate the 
two terms of a relation in order to try to join them together again later. The relation is a synthesis. 
Consequently the results of analysis can not be covered over again by the moments of this 
synthesis.
196
 
 
Clearly, Sartre wants to account for the „connection between these regions of being‟ by analysing 
them in relation. In this respect, he echoes Heidegger‟s methodological concern to avoid 
abstraction. A relationship between these regions is established by virtue of nihilation. The loss of 
the in-itself as in-itself to found consciousness in fact necessitates a permanent association of the in-
itself and the for-itself in the mode of presence to self. Nevertheless, the „empty distance‟ of 
nothingness between the for-itself and itself which facilitates and mediates this encounter moves 
Sartre away from Heidegger. Far from a primordial understanding of being implicit in Dasein-ness 
(being-ontological), Sartre‟s account requires that consciousness must encounter being(s) across 
this distance. But this, as we will show, is precisely what affords Sartre the room to attribute a 
robust ontological responsibility and therefore ontological freedom, to consciousness.    
In order to clarify the nihilation of the in-itself by the for-itself as a mediating connection 
between these regions of being it is important to set it in the context of nihilation as an activity of 
the for-itself. This is how we interpret Sartre‟s claim that, 
 
Thus by the mere fact that there is a world, this world can not exist without a univocal orientation in 
relation to me.
197
 
 
On our reading, Sartre‟s emphasis on the „there-is‟ of the world is indicative of the encounter with 
beings contingent on active nihilation. Thus the world can be said to be „there‟ only insofar as one 
is capable of distinguishing and identifying particular beings within the totality. Nothingness which 
distances beings from the for-itself thereby makes it possible that one may observe that „there-is‟ a 
world. More to the point, the law of presence to self, rooted in the for-itself, is such that 
consciousness must be equally aware of its role in the establishment of there-ness‟s (beings in 
respect of their there-ness) so the existence of „this world‟ is permanently experienced in its relation 
to me. In expanding on this point, Sartre makes comments that lend weight to an interpretation of 
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„the world‟ as a reference for the totality of in-itself entities. After explaining his rejection of the 
classical Cartesian division between mind and body, he states: 
 
That is why we ought not to take this as our point of departure but rather our primary relation to the 
in-itself: our being-in-the-world.
198
 
 
This may be interpreted to mean that consciousness‟s relationship to the in-itself is grounded by 
„our being-in-the-world‟ such that „the world‟ must have some special connection to or be a direct 
reflection of, the in-itself. But we understand in-itself to be a feature of the „indefinite multiplicity 
of reciprocal relations‟ which is more appropriately „the world‟. It refers to a space of relations 
between the for-itself and the in-itself which produces an „indefinite multiplicity‟. Sartre explains 
that „the world‟ understood without its relation to the for-itself would result in the in-itself returning 
to its indifferent self-identity.
199
 „The world‟ therefore results from the activities of the for-itself and 
its relation to the in-itself and cannot therefore be understood as wholly one or the other. An 
extended discussion of „the world‟ and its relationship to the for-itself will follow. For the moment, 
we may note that though Sartre rejects a traditional disconnected dualism of for-itself and in-itself, 
he is at risk of undermining his intention to establish a connection between these two regions of 
being. His claim that the for-itself makes there be a world by denying that it is a being,
 200
 
presupposes the same disconnected dualism that he wants to overcome. Of course this is not an 
argument for a causal relationship between the for-itself and „the world‟ but for the impossibility of 
disassociating the in-itself and its meaning from the for-itself. His argument that „being-there‟ 
requires a „distance‟ posited between object and perceiver is exemplified in what Sartre calls a 
„strictly external‟ negation.201 Therein, nothingness is posited „at the heart of being‟ such that the 
for-itself is „wrenched away‟202 from itself creating an ontological distance: 
 
Similarly I see my hand touching objects, but do not know it in its act of touching them. [...]For my 
hand reveals to me the resistance of objects, their hardness or softness, but not itself. Thus I see my 
hand only in the way that I see this inkwell. I unfold a distance between it and me, and this distance 
comes to integrate itself in the distances which I establish among all the objects of the world.
203
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This is the sense in which we claim that nihilation serves the dual function of facilitating and 
mediating an encounter with being(s). The „distance unfolded between it and me‟ is necessary to 
encounter beings without which being can be no more than it „is‟, self-identical in-itself. Crucially, 
Sartre characterises this encounter with beings in terms of „knowledge‟ so that „knowing‟ my hand 
is here equated to revealing the hand „itself‟. His insistence on a mediated distance between 
perceiver and perceived is explained by his commitment to „establishing consciousness 
epistemologically‟204 in the „pre-reflective cogito‟. Here he explicitly claims that distance between 
perceiver and perceived is necessary for knowledge: 
 
[...] man is always separated from what he is by all the breadth of the being which he is not. He 
makes himself known to himself from the other side of the world and he looks from the horizon 
toward himself to recover his inner being. Man is “a being of distances.”205 
 
Thus insofar as the for-itself knows the in-itself as a consequence of nihilation then by extension, 
„man knows himself across the distance of nothingness‟. Haar highlights the problem with Sartre‟s 
preference for „knowledge‟ by contrasting it with Heidegger‟s pre-ontological „understanding‟.206 In 
its reliance on observation, the former is symptomatic of traditional ontology whereas the latter 
refers to a pre-existing ontological relationship between perceiver and perceived. Sartre does clarify 
his use of „knowledge‟ and its appropriate interpretation in respect of his project:  
 
There is only intuitive knowledge.  
 
Later adding, 
  
Knowledge appears then as a mode of being. Knowing is neither a relation established after the event 
between two beings, nor is it an activity of one of these two beings, nor is it a quality or a property or 
a virtue. It is the very being of the for-itself in so far as it is presence to---; that is, in so far as the for-
itself has to be its being by making itself not to be a certain being to which it is present.
207
 
 
Clearly then, knowledge as Sartre understands it with respect to the encounter with beings does not 
correlate precisely with the kind of knowledge dependent on rationalist disengagement. In fact, 
Sartre‟s assertion that knowledge „is the very being of the for-itself‟ insofar as it is in the mode of 
presence to self, brings him very close to Heideggerian claims about the inherent understanding of 
being. Nevertheless, on our reading, it is paramount to Sartre‟s project that consciousness cannot 
fully identify with itself or being as such, primordially, intuitively or otherwise. Thus though 
intuitive knowledge does not equate to rationalist knowledge Sartre‟s „pre-eminence of 
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knowledge‟,208 „distancing‟ and „wrenching‟209 are indicative of his predilection for the dualisms his 
project is intended to have done away with.
210
   
Three related but distinct conclusions can be drawn from an outline of the relationship between 
being-for-itself and being-in-itself in Sartre. First, Sartre shares some basic premises with 
Heidegger but states that his project is in aid of establishing a connection between two regions of 
being. This connection, we claim, is rooted in Sartre‟s effort to „establish consciousness 
epistemologically‟. Second, the nihilating activity of the for-itself necessitates a perpetual 
confrontation with the in-itself, characterised by the law of presence to self. The „upsurge‟ of self is 
therefore explained by the loss of the in-itself as in-itself by virtue of nihilation which „wrenches‟ it 
away from itself establishing an ontological distance by means of which a self becomes self-
present. This is how we understand the claim that, „for the for-itself, to be is to nihilate the in-itself 
which it is.‟211 Third, the inherency of nihilation to the for-itself necessitates a relationship to the in-
itself albeit as a „losing of itself‟.212 For Sartre, introducing nothingness into a state of absolute self-
identity, rather than shattering all relations, establishes a negative relationship between the for-itself 
and what it is not. Therefore Sartre‟s two regions of being are locked in relation insofar as the for-
itself must encounter the in-itself and the in-itself cannot be observed without the for-itself. 
  
ii) ‘The Problem of Nothingness’ 
The second core claim of Sartre‟s project relates to what he calls, „the problem of 
nothingness‟213. Two particular concerns will be addressed in explicating nothingness. First, we will 
determine precisely what the problem of nothingness is by exploring two aspects of nothingness: 
nihilation and non-being. Second, we will address what Sartre calls the „origin of nothingness‟.214 In 
so doing we will develop our claim that Sartre‟s epistemological establishment of consciousness is 
couched in his conception of nihilation as a distancing/mediating feature of conscious experience. 
Sartre raises the question of the problem of nothingness on two separate occasions.
215
 His response 
                                                          
208
 Michel Haar, Sartre and Heidegger in Jean-Paul Sartre: Contemporary Approaches to his Philosophy 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981) p.171 
209
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) p.299 
210
 It is possible that Sartre includes a mediating nothingness in his account in order to adjust what he thinks 
of as an error in Heidegger: „Heidegger endows human reality with a self-understanding which he defines as 
an “ekstatic pro-ject” of its own possibilities. [...] But how could there be an understanding which would not 
in itself be the consciousness (of) being understanding? This ekstatic character of human reality will lapse 
into a thing-like, blind in-itself unless it arises from the consciousness of ekstasis.‟ Nevertheless, chapter four 
and the conclusion will show how this possible adjustment leads to an inconsistent account of freedom. – p.98 
211
 Ibid., p.461 
212
 Ibid., p.106 
213
 Ibid., p.25 
214
 Ibid., p.45 
215
 Ibid., pp.35/46 
70 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
is developed over chapter 1, sections 1-4 of BN. Our interpretation is based on these sections 
although it aims to be consistent with the whole text.  
a) Nihilation and Non-Being 
Our first concern will be to expand on our outline of nihilation before turning to non-being. We 
will discuss nihilation with respect to the introduction of negativity to objects in the world and the 
self which we will connect to Sartre‟s concept of external and internal negation. In order to clear the 
ground for an exploration of nihilation and non-being, it is important to bear in mind that for Sartre, 
nothingness is not a phenomenon unto itself. Nothingness is meaningless in the absence of 
consciousness. We understand the following as an effort to emphasise this point: 
 
If [...] we tried to ask ourselves what “was there” before a world existed, and if we replied “nothing,” 
we would be forced to recognise that this “before” like this “nothing” is in effect retroactive. [...] 
Negation here springs from a consciousness which is turned back toward the beginning. If we 
remove from this original emptiness its characteristic of being empty of this world and of every 
whole taking the form of a world, as well as its characteristic of before, which presupposes an after, 
then the very negation disappears, giving way to a total indetermination which it would be 
impossible to conceive, even and especially as a nothingness.
216
 
 
Thus the phenomenon of nothingness is brought into being by consciousness whose nature posits it 
as a means of an encounter with the world.
217
 The only conceivable nothingness is that which 
„springs from consciousness‟; nothingness independent of a conscious mind to conceive of it is 
wholly incoherent. On our reading of Sartre, nothingness therefore does not refer to a structure but 
quite precisely a phenomenon deeply rooted in consciousness‟ ontological condition. This is neither 
the nothingness of colloquial conversation nor that of a pre-Big Bang universe but a necessary 
characteristic of an encounter with the world.  
With that said, our first concern is the nihilation that introduces negativity into objects in the 
world and its relation to external negation. Nihilation can be understood as the process by which 
nothingness is introduced to distinguish subject from object, perceiver from perceived. It is the 
fundamental characteristic of consciousness necessary for Sartre‟s interpretation of intentionality. 
Therein Sartre will argue that consciousness always being conscious of something requires that this 
„something‟ must be an entity other than consciousness and therefore not consciousness. Thus 
consciousness is both related to and distanced from its objects by virtue of its root in not-ness. 
Moreover, observation of entities also requires that consciousness distinguish a plurality of possible 
entities. Therefore, in so far as consciousness is directed at an individual entity, it is directed at that 
entity as „not me‟ and „not anything else‟. Nihilation, for Sartre, brings negative relations into 
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existence. It is the process by which consciousness‟ „pre-judicative comprehension of non-being‟ 
makes negative relations between things in the world into real existences where „pre-judicative‟ 
means „prior to judgement‟, i.e. prior to any negation. Sartre‟s first mention of nihilation comes in 
the well-known discussion of Pierre‟s absence from a café:  
 
When I enter this café to search for Pierre, there is formed a synthetic organization of all the objects 
in the café, on the ground of which Pierre is given as about to appear. This organization of the café 
as the ground is an original nihilation.
218
 
 
We understand this to mean that the appearance of the „objects in the café‟ is already „synthetically 
organised‟ around the expectation of Pierre being there; the appearance of the objects are grounded 
in the expectation of Pierre‟s presence. The „original nihilation‟ therefore is the negative perception 
of a café absent of an anticipated presence. My immediate perceptions in this respect at least are 
entirely oriented along the contours of my expectations and intentions. Of course the assertion that 
Pierre is not here also functions as a negative judgment or negation. Though they are closely 
related, it will be informative to distinguish negation from nihilation. The former is simply the 
judgment that something is simply not-x, for example that „a match is not a twig‟. In the case of the 
nihilation of the objects of the world, the associated kind of negation is what Sartre calls, „external 
negation‟: 
   
When I say, for example, „A cup is not an inkwell,‟ it is very evident that the foundation of this 
negation is neither in the cup nor in the inkwell. Both of these objects are what they are, and that is 
all. The negation stands as a categorical and ideal connection which I establish between them 
without modifying them in any way whatsoever, without enriching them or impoverishing them with 
the slightest quality; they are not even ever so slightly grazed by this negative synthesis.
219
 
 
Nihilation on the other hand founds the possibility of negation such that the reality of the distinction 
between match and twig, cup and inkwell is possible on condition that these objects are equally 
nihilated: 
 
Thus the original nihilation of all the figures which appear and are swallowed up in the total 
neutrality of a ground is the necessary condition for the appearance of the principle figure, which is 
here the person of Pierre. This nihilation is given to my intuition; I am witness to the successive 
disappearance of all the objects which I look at – in particular of the faces, which detain me for an 
instant (Could this be Pierre?) and which as quickly decompose precisely because they “are not” the 
face of Pierre.
220
 
  
Again, it is worthy of note that though Sartre refers to this nihilation in terms of intuition, which we 
understand in the sense of „intuitive knowing‟, „the disappearance of objects‟ is described in respect 
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of Pierre‟s absence. In other words, any phenomenal experience is anthropocentrically grounded in 
my particular expectations and intentions. That said, clearly for Sartre, these negative judgements 
are reflections of an „original nihilation‟. The varieties of possible negative judgments in the world 
are founded on nihilation. One may say that „a cup is not an inkwell‟, „I am not the cup‟ or „I am not 
you‟. Moreover, one may make these judgments at once and, though each constitutes a different 
negation, each is founded on nihilation. Sartre explains the simultaneity of negations and of 
resulting negations in speaking of the „image of an absent Pierre‟: 
 
The image must enclose in its very structure a nihilating thesis. It constitutes itself qua image while 
also positing its object as existing elsewhere or not existing. It carries within it a double negation; 
first it is the nihilation of the world (since the world is not offering the imagined object as an actual 
object of perception), secondly the nihilation of the object of the image (it is posited as not actual), 
and finally by the same stroke it is the nihilation of itself (since it is not a concrete, full psychic 
process.)
221    
 
Thus the image of absence is „doubly negating‟ insofar as it is an image but what it captures, as it 
were, is precisely the lack of an image. The „double negation‟ is here founded on three distinct 
nihilations: of the world, of the object of the image and the image itself „qua image‟. The negative 
judgment that the „cup is not an inkwell‟ does not refer to a „lack‟ in either. Thus the negation of the 
cup as inkwell detracts from neither the cup as „cup‟, nor inkwell as „inkwell‟. Rather both are 
equally and originally nihilated. The claim that neither object is even „slightly grazed‟, points to a 
central argument in Sartre‟s project. Similarly, Heidegger asserts that „Dasein is never to be taken 
ontologically as something present-at-hand‟. Such entities are not merely „indifferent‟ to their being 
but are „such that their being can neither be a matter of indifference nor the opposite‟.222 Though 
Heidegger‟s Vorhandensein characteristically differs from Sartre‟s cup or inkwell-like object, 223 a 
comparison will shed further light on the role of nothingness in Sartre‟s project. Thus both are 
described in terms of their indifference to negative judgements and for both Heidegger and Sartre, 
the perceiver is prioritised. Nevertheless and as we have seen, the relationship between Dasein and 
Vorhandensein is mutually engaging. Dasein‟s comportment to the present-at-hand discloses their 
being but equally discloses Dasein and the primordiality of its understanding. By contrast for Sartre, 
consciousness‟ external negations, grounded by an original nihilation, establishes its relationship to 
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being(s) such that the symbolic and interpretive significance of experience is a direct by-product of 
an original nihilation.
224
   
By means of clarification, Sartre states that these objects are unaffected by this „negative 
synthesis‟ as it does not „constitute them‟. But this would seem to contravene the claim that 
nihilation and consciousness‟ „pre-judicative comprehension of non-being‟ endows the world with 
meanings. Otherwise, Sartre could not maintain his argument about „destruction‟, for example. 
Therein he claims that „storms do not destroy, they rather re-distribute masses of beings‟.225 He 
argues that only „man‟ is capable of destruction in the sense that only „man‟ perceives the re-
distribution of beings as a loss. For Sartre, there is a difference between the making of a negative 
judgment and the experience of what he calls a négatité. In the first case, the observation of entities 
must be mediated by negation in order to arrive at a negative judgment. Thus no „lack‟ is observed 
in the entities themselves but in regard to the for-itself. In the second case, one experiences a 
reality: 
 
There is an infinite number of realities which are not only objects of judgment, but which are 
experienced, opposed, feared, etc., by the human being and which in their inner structure are 
inhabited by negation, as by a necessary condition of their existence. We shall call them négatités.
226
 
 
A négatité thus refers to a reality „inhabited by negation‟, where negativity is integral to their 
structure by virtue of the relation of this reality to human expectations and projects. A négatité  
therefore is dependent on an original nihilation. Observing the debris and carnage left by a 
„destructive storm‟ is to experience one such reality inhabited by negation. Thus though a storm 
may have crossed oceans, disturbing all in its wake, it is not considered „destructive‟ until it reaches 
a population. In this respect, observation is imbued with the experience of „what has been lost‟ and 
what is „no longer‟. Therefore on our interpretation, the experience of a négatité is the result of the 
totality of the nihilation of the observed in addition to the inherent „lack‟ of consciousness.  
We will now discuss the nihilation of the self as it relates to what Sartre calls „internal 
negation‟. It is a simpler phenomenon to explicate if for no other reason than the regularity of its 
mention:  
 
But we can already guess the meaning of the other type of negation if we consider such expressions 
as „I am not rich‟ or „I am not handsome.‟ [...] they do not mean only that the speaker is denied a 
certain quality but that the denial itself comes to influence the inner structure of the positive being 
who has been denied the quality. When I say, „I am not handsome,‟ [...] I intend to indicate that „not 
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being handsome‟ is a certain negative virtue of my being. It characterises me within; as negative it is 
a real quality of myself – that of not being handsome – and this negative quality will explain my 
melancholy as well as, for example, my failures in the world.
227
 
 
Thus again though the object of not being handsome is negatively encountered, it establishes a 
„real‟ positive relation. Nevertheless, this differs from external negation in one way above all. A 
„negative synthesis‟ unfolds a distance between perceiver and object to establish a real, albeit 
negatively characterised, matrix of relations between objects. Thus we interpret the „indifference‟ 
Sartre attributes to these objects in respect of the brute facticity of their appearance; the relation 
established between perceiver and object discloses „nothing‟ or the raw fact of the „there-is‟. On the 
other hand, an internal negation will not permit an absolute hermeneutic signification. Given that 
nihilation is the central activity of the for-itself an internal negation cannot be „indifferent‟ or 
„passive‟. Rather an internal negation, that is a judgement of lack internal to the self, is grounded in 
an original nihilation, characterising a relationship to these objects in terms of potentiality or 
possibility. If, as Sartre states, the for-itself is „contingent‟, that is if it is the in-itself losing itself as 
in-itself then a negation such as „I am not handsome‟ is „lost‟ at the moment of its pronouncement. 
Thus though a positive relationship, a „quality‟, is established between self and the object of „not-
being-handsome‟, it is characterised in terms of the ontological possibility to-not-be-handsome. 
Thus, unlike external negations whose objects are characterised passively or in terms of their 
indifference, the nihilating activity of the for-itself perpetually distances self from its objects such 
that they reveal only what one could be and thereby a framework for accountability. This is how we 
interpret the following:  
 
To give in to fatigue, for example, is to transcend the path by causing it to constitute in itself the 
meaning of “a path too difficult to traverse.” It is impossible seriously to consider the feeling of 
inferiority without determining it in terms of the future and of my possibilities.
228
    
  
Of course we do not interpret these as empirical facts in neither Sartre‟s account nor everyday 
experience for that matter. Neither attractiveness nor the „difficulty‟ of a path is an empirically 
verifiable feature of the world. For Sartre, the nihilation of self, the loss of in-itself as in-itself, 
situates consciousness in a world characterised by that relation such that „I‟ is experienced as „he-
who-cannot-traverse-the-path‟ or „he-who-is-looked-upon-unfavourably‟. This is also how we 
interpret Sartre‟s claim that this real quality explains my failures in the world insofar as it expresses 
the anticipation of judgement in the eyes of „the other‟.229 In this sense, internal negation can be a 
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defence against the glare of the other affirming the expression of a purposeful project. Thus „I‟, my 
project, the other and the world in which these relations play out are simultaneously nihilated. 
Nihilation therefore entails the impossibility of „finding oneself‟ at a disadvantage or haphazardly 
suffering „twists of fate‟.230 Rather an encounter with a world in which one is „insufficiently fit to 
traverse this path‟ or „too unattractive to liaise with those they find attractive‟ is the realisation of a 
„general plan‟:  
 
But the inferiority complex itself is a project of my own for-itself in the world in the presence of the 
Other. As such it is always transcendence, as such again it is a way of choosing myself. This 
inferiority which I struggle against and which nevertheless I recognise, this I have chosen from the 
start. [...] it is nothing other than the organised totality of my failure behaviour, as a projected plan, 
as a general device of my being, and each attitude of failure is itself transcendence since each time I 
surpass the real toward my possibilities.
231
       
 
We interpret these attitudes of failure as expressing the relation to what is here the conscious object 
of inferiority perpetually transcended as „opaque‟, in-itself reality and thus constituted as a 
possibility. On our reading, the expression of my inferiority is simultaneously experienced in 
respect of the possibility that „I will be inferior‟. So the „project of my own for-itself‟ is less a 
consciously crafted effort to realise my inferiority and more the „projection‟ of an inferiority 
complex across the empty distance constituting presence to self. Inferiority or any other such 
conscious object is thus experienced as a hypothetical postulation not a concrete feature of being. 
Sartre‟s intentional model of consciousness is made possible by an original nihilation and the 
permanent possibility of presence to self. An „inferiority complex‟ resulting from internal negation 
is quite precisely an instance of consciousness as consciousness of itself: a project of itself in 
anticipation of „the other‟.  
We may now turn our attention to an explication of non-being as distinct from nothingness. 
Examples of non-being are found mainly in the discussion of the „problem of nothingness‟ where 
Sartre‟s expression often allows non-being to overlap with other kinds of negativity. It will 
therefore be helpful to firstly provide a positive definition of non-being. The central feature of non-
being is its status as „the transcendent fact of non-existence‟.232 Non-being refers to the ever-
present, real possibility of negativity where „negativity‟ refers to the absence of something or a 
negative judgment about something. For Sartre, non-being grounds the possibility of negativity 
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which establishes a relation between beings. We will therefore explicate the transcendence of non-
being as „the permanent objective possibility of a negativity‟.233  
As indicated by what we have outlined thus far, Sartre‟s account of human engagement with 
the world requires a permanent and transcendent possibility of negativity as an objective reality 
shaping thought and behaviour. Thus non-being may be best understood simply as negative being. 
At the outset of his chapter on „The Origin of Negation‟, he explains that all questions imply and 
necessitate the possibility of a „negative reply‟: 
 
Thus the question is a bridge set up between two non-beings: the non-being of knowing in man, the 
possibility of non-being of being in transcendent being. Finally the question implies the existence of 
a truth. By the very question the questioner affirms that he expects an objective reply, such that we 
can say of it, “It is thus and not otherwise.” In a word the truth, as differentiated from being, 
introduces a third non-being as determining the question – the non-being of limitation. This triple 
non-being conditions every question and in particular the metaphysical question, which is our 
question.
234
 
 
So non-being refers to the permanent objective possibility of negativity, applicable to all of human 
reality including the question of being. Sartre‟s „triple non-being‟ does not reflect different kinds 
and is not unique to „the metaphysical question‟ but describes the permeation of human reality by 
non-being. Thus the „truth‟ that something „is thus and not otherwise‟ is supported by being limited 
to what it is. Thus cup and inkwell are insofar as they are not the space between and around them. 
In this respect, non-being does not function in the same way as what we will call empirical non-
existence. For Sartre, non-being, what is not, is an „objective existence‟ whose symbolic role and 
significance in human experience is inherent to what is. Conversely the empirically non-existent is 
traditionally understood as what is not the case and therefore what is not true. Of course both 
empirical non-existence and non-being require further clarification but it will suffice at this juncture 
to state that they are not identifiable.   
Sartre‟s claim that triple non-being conditions the metaphysical question in particular does not 
imply prioritisation. Rather all human activity necessarily involves the transcendent possibility of 
non-being. In fact, the non-being of limitation entails the claim that one encounters truth on the 
condition of permanent non-being:  
 
Nothingness beyond the world accounts for absolute negation; but we have just discovered a swarm 
of intra-mundane being which possess as much reality and efficacy as other beings, but which 
inclose within themselves non-being. [...] Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being – like a 
worm.
235
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Sartre‟s „swarm of intra-mundane being‟ thus refers to the fabric of empty distances across which 
beings relate in a matrix of symbolic values and signifiers whose meanings are contingent on the 
projection of a perpetually nihilated self. If nothingness „lies coiled in the heart of being‟ then non-
being is inherent to enquiry and all human activity because the in-itself is primarily encountered in 
respect of my transcendence and thus experience as a possibility. Enquiry, in Sartre‟s project, 
necessitates recognition of the possibility of non-being in order to function meaningfully: 
  
Thus at the moment when I ask, “Is there any conduct which can reveal to me the relation of man 
with the world?” I admit on principle the possibility of a negative reply such as, “No, such a conduct 
does not exist.” This means that we admit to being faced with the transcendent fact of the non-
existence of such conduct.
236
 
 
Enquiry must, from the outset, include „the possibility of a negative reply‟. This possibility need not 
reflect a genuinely realisable alternative. Rather enquiry presupposes the transcendent fact of non-
existence. Moreover, Sartre explains, the „possibility of a negative reply‟ requires that one have a 
„pre-judicative comprehension of non-being‟: 
 
Thus my question by its nature envelops a certain pre-judicative comprehension of non-being; it is in 
itself a relation of being with non-being, on the basis of the original transcendence; that is, in a 
relation of being with being.
237
 
 
And it is in this sense that he asserts, 
 
[...]non-being does not come to things by a negative judgement; it is the negative judgement, on the 
contrary, which is conditioned and supported by non-being.
238
 
 
A problem begins to appear at this stage: if the pre-judicative comprehension of non-being is a 
relation of being with non-being, recognition would itself require the possibility of the non-being 
(„the non-being of knowing in man‟) of pre-judicative comprehension and so on ad infinitum. In 
other words, if non-being is a i) transcendent possibility, ii) a permanent objectivity and iii) 
necessary for truth then recognition of a pre-judicative comprehension must itself be subject to the 
permanent and transcendent possibility of negativity. In an effort to „establish consciousness 
epistemologically‟, Sartre has seemingly introduced the permanent possibility of uncertainty about 
his own claims. Although the problem indicates the kind of difficulty inherent to Sartre‟s project it 
nonetheless rests on a misunderstanding: assuming an ontological equivalence of negative 
judgements and non-being. We may consider the negative judgment that „x is not y‟ which could 
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not be made without discerning their properties. Discernment of this sort necessitates that one first 
ask whether „x‟ is „y‟ and this preceding question must „admit the „possibility of a negative reply‟‟. 
Thus simply observing the properties of „x‟ and „y‟ presupposes a pre-judicative comprehension of 
their non-being. Whether or not there actually are distinguishing properties unique to either „x‟ or 
„y‟ has no bearing on their possibility. Thus non-being and negative judgments are not ontologically 
equivalent.
239
  
Sartre‟s pre-judicative comprehension of non-being can be explicated in two ways. Both will 
help us consolidate its prerequisite necessity and the role of nothingness in Sartre‟s account of 
consciousness. In his project, the first is intuitive and restricted to analysis of the terms themselves. 
It is our contention that the terms are chosen to serve a specific purpose. The second is derived from 
comparing Sartre‟s explanation with a strikingly similar passage in BT. It is our further contention 
that this similarity reinforces their shared fundamental principles. First, it is important to note that 
the comprehension of non-being is pre-judicative: comprehension preceding judgment. Common 
application of the term „comprehension‟ denotes competence requiring knowledge of both what is 
and what is not true about a given subject. Pre-judicative comprehension precedes precisely such an 
understanding and may better be interpreted as understanding without judgment. It is a pre-
ontological understanding or, as Heidegger puts it, a „primary understanding which is one of the 
constituents of the Being of the “there” in general.‟240 Second, similarity between Sartre and 
Heidegger in this regard extends beyond vocabulary. Sartre‟s first mention of pre-judicative 
comprehension
241
 begins as follows:  
 
In every question we stand before a being which we are questioning. Every question presupposes a 
being who questions and a being which is questioned. [...] On the other hand, this being which we 
question, we question about something. [...] From this point of view the question is a kind of 
expectation; I expect a reply from the being questioned.
242
 
 
Questioning, for Sartre, involves a relationship of expectation between the „being who questions, 
the being questioned and what is being questioned about‟. In the sub-section entitled, „The Formal 
Structure of the Question of Being‟, Heidegger refers to a similar relationship though „enquiry‟ is 
preferred to „question‟:  
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Every inquiry is a seeking [Suchen]. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought. [...] 
Any inquiry, as an inquiry about something, has that which is asked about [sein Gefragtes]. [...] 
Furthermore, in what is asked about there lies also that which is to be found out by the asking [das 
Efragte]; this is what is really intended: with this the inquiry reaches its goal.
243  
 
Here also enquiry involves a fundamental relationship including „what is asked about‟ and „what is 
to be found out‟. Nonetheless, Sartre‟s adjustment from the pre-ontological to the pre-judicative is, 
on our reading, indicative of his preference for an epistemic account of consciousness. Moreover, it 
is Sartre‟s inclusion of that proof that we contend obscures the ontology he otherwise adopts and 
ultimately therefore a satisfying account of freedom. As we have seen, for Sartre, consciousness‟ 
directedness to its objects is premised on the permanent reality of non-being. In other words, all 
engagement with objects either in terms of observing an inkwell or asking a question, presupposed 
what Sartre calls the „possibility of a negative reply‟. The „non-being of limitation‟ similarly 
establishes the there-ness of beings as „this and no more‟ so that its appearance is supported by a 
pre-judicative non-being. Furthermore, we have explained that non-being is a product of the for-
itself (the in-itself losing itself as in-itself) which nuances and characterises all of conscious 
experience in terms of a negation. Thus internal negations for example are „transcended‟, that is 
„wrenched away from‟ and „distanced‟ such that the relationship of self to its objects becomes one 
of possibility. But here we argue that the permeation of human reality by non-being as a 
prerequisite to questioning and observation (if not all human comportment) characterises all 
experience in terms of a hypothetical postulation. Insofar as the self, bound by the for-itself‟s law of 
presence to self, must transcend its objects towards its possibilities and must encounter beings on 
the basis of a preceding comprehension of non-being, then it will follow that the encounter with 
being(s) as such is premised on the permanence of non-being and is equally transcended.
244
      
As mentioned, it will be necessary to clarify the difference between empirical non-existence 
and non-being. As a necessary feature of conscious experience „coiled in the heart of being‟, non-
being cannot be identified with empirical non-existence. Non-being is inherent to being: not 
external, before or after. By contrast, empirical non-existence refers to a vacuum. The difficulty of 
description testifies to its emptiness though Sartre does provide an allusion.245 As „negative being‟, 
non-being does not require observation of empirically verifiable absence but the possibility of 
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negativity. In this sense, Sartre‟s ontology can be summarised by the phrase, the encounter with 
being rests on the possibility of its negation and the pre-judicative comprehension of non-being. 
Sartre describes „Pierre‟s‟ failure to attend an appointment to exemplify the point:  
 
I have an appointment with Pierre at four o‟clock. I arrive at the café a quarter of an hour late. Pierre 
is always punctual. Will he have waited for me? I look at the room, the patrons, and I say, “He is not 
here.” [...] But now Pierre is not here. This does not mean that I discover his absence in some precise 
spot in the establishment. In fact Pierre is absent from the whole café; [...]
246
 
 
Thus the experience of the „whole café‟ is consumed by, that is, permeated by non-being underlying 
the observation of Pierre‟s absence. Crucially it is not experienced as his empirical non-existence 
since, properly speaking, such an experience is „impossible to conceive‟ [„impossible de 
concevoir‟247]. His absence is a négatité. Two points arise in concluding our outline of nihilation 
and non-being: First there seems to be a prima facie contradiction in designating empirical non-
existence impossible to conceive even though some conception is necessary to make that point and 
second, we need to place a certain emphasis on the distinction between négatité and non-being.         
Sartre insists on the distinction between non-being and empirical non-existence. He claims that 
nothingness evoked by describing the universe before the dawn of time does not equate to non-
being. But his additional claim that one cannot conceive of empirical non-existence is quite 
different.
248
 If empirical non-existence is impossible to conceive then the assertion itself must be 
equally impossible. Sartre does not acknowledge this problem though we contend that it can be 
accounted for by approaching the claim sincerely. Taking Sartre at his word, the actual attempt to 
conceive of what was there before there was anything, is only possible on condition of removing all 
points of reference. Any point of reference presupposes a „there‟ where one wants to find nothing. 
Insofar as perspectives presuppose a perceiver, all perspectives are necessarily impermissible in a 
sincere conception of empirical non-existence.
249
  
The importance of distinguishing non-being from négatité is compounded by a similar 
distinction between non-being and nihilation. As we have seen, nihilation refers to the activity of 
making nothingness arise between beings and thus establishing an interpretive matrix of relations. 
Nihilation is therefore grounded by the permanent possibility of non-being. Négatité has been 
described as a reality inhabited by negativity requiring its observation in contrast to expectation. We 
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have exampled instances of négatité by reference to destruction and „Pierre‟s absence‟. Both 
include the negative judgment that something is „no longer‟ or „not present‟. As with nihilation, 
negative judgments also presuppose the permanent possibility of non-being. But négatité describes 
the experience of inhabiting a totality of negative judgements such that the local environment 
instantiates non-being.  
b) The Origin of Nothingness 
The centrality of nothingness to Sartre‟s project is undeniable but it presents an immediate 
problem. Sartre recognises the need to account for the origin of nothingness in asking, „where does 
nothingness come from?‟.250 That is, how do we ground the in-itself‟s loss of itself as in-itself? 
Moreover, in a related concern we will discuss later, how do we account for our ability to enquire 
after the ground of nothingness if it is already a feature of my enquiry? That is, how can we be sure 
of the accuracy of our observations if they are necessarily conditioned by the object of enquiry? His 
answer leaves much to be desired. Given the preceding discussion of nihilation, non-being and 
négatité, we may already have a sense of the origin of nothingness. This sense may be summed up 
by the argument that if nothingness arises with consciousness then consciousness may also be its 
point of origin. Explicating Sartre‟s answer will determine the validity of that sense.       
Sartre offers specific criteria for the origin of nothingness before repeating the question: 
 
We perceived that Nothingness can be conceived neither outside of being, nor as a complementary, 
abstract notion, nor as an infinite milieu where being is suspended. Nothingness must be at the heart 
of Being, in order for us to be able to apprehend that particular type of realities which we have called 
négatités.
251  
 
Thus it seems that Sartre directly contradicts our claim that his inclusion of nothingness 
reintroduces a rationalist approach which presupposes the treatment of all being(s) in the mode of 
presence at hand. A négatité, Sartre claims, must be imbued with nothingness in the very fact of its 
appearance. But this we contend, simply speaks to the anthropocentric orientation of Sartre‟s 
reliance on Cartesian rationalism. Thus though nothingness is a hard reality of my experience, the 
for-itself‟s law of presence to self, necessitates the permanent possibility of transcending even this 
experience. Thus if négatité should give rise to insecurity this will be because consciousness must 
characterise its experience in respect of the projection of its possibilities. Nevertheless, clearly 
Sartrean nothingness is not independent from being. Négatités are „apprehended‟ only insofar as 
nothingness is „at the heart of being‟ though they cannot be conflated. Sartre reinforces their 
distinction with the assertion that, „Negation is an abrupt break in continuity which can not [sic] [...] 
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result from prior affirmations‟.252 Thus negation cannot be accounted for by appeal to anything 
beyond nothingness. Sartre also insists that consciousness is not conflated with any other entity. In 
fact, this insistence on consciousness‟ unique status is the primary motive for Sartre‟s move away 
from Heidegger.
253
 Furthermore, Sartre makes no effort to account for the origin of consciousness 
by appeal to „prior affirmations‟ because consciousness is not determined by preceding causes.254 
The similarities in the description of nothingness and consciousness begin to outline a mutual 
entailment. If nothingness cannot be accounted for by appeal to anything beyond being then 
nothingness must originate in being. Furthermore, if enquiry presupposes a pre-judicative 
comprehension of non-being then all non-enquiring entities cannot share a relationship with non-
being. Thus nothingness must originate either from itself or from another region of being which 
does not require „prior affirmations‟: 
  
If we wish to pursue the problem further, we must first recognise that we can not grant to 
nothingness the property of “nihilating itself.” For although the expression “to nihilate itself” is 
thought of as removing from nothingness the last semblance of being, we must recognise that only 
Being can nihilate itself; [...] Nothingness does not nihilate itself; Nothingness “is nihilated.”255 
 
We interpret this in respect of the argument about the permanence of non-being as a feature of 
being as such. Nothingness does not nihilate itself because it grounds the experience of being; the 
loss of the in-itself. It is the contextualising matrix establishing the possibility of an encounter with 
being(s). Its origins must therefore be rooted in another region of being which must meet further 
criteria:  
 
We must observe first that the being postulated can not be passive in relation to Nothingness, can not 
receive it; [...] the Being by which Nothingness comes to the world can not produce Nothingness 
while remaining indifferent to that production [...] The Being by which Nothingness arrives in the 
world must nihilate Nothingness in its Being, [...] The Being by which Nothingness arrives in the 
world is a being such that in its Being, the Nothingness of its Being is in question.
256   
 
Sartre‟s first claim here is that the being which originates nothingness cannot be „passive‟. Passive 
reception of nothingness is insufficient for origination. His second claim states that „active‟ 
origination cannot be indifferent in the sense attributed to objects not even „slightly grazed‟ by 
negative judgments. Nothingness indifferently „produced‟ cannot be positively recognised and 
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would thereby take on the character of being impossible to conceive. Thus that which originates 
nothingness must do so actively and be able to positively recognise that action. Finally, Sartre‟s 
reference to the „nothingness of the being‟ which „is in question‟ and which is „the being by which 
nothingness arrives in the world, conflates its action with itself, pointing to his understanding of 
intentional consciousness.257 In order to clarify the origin of nothingness in Sartre‟s project, we may 
point to a notable difference between consciousness as he describes it and Dasein. As we have seen, 
for Heidegger, Dasein describes a comportment which is inherently illuminating of being such that 
both its practical and theoretical engagements disclose an understanding of being(s). For Sartre, on 
the other hand, an account of these engagements is incomplete unless they are grounded by a pre-
judicative comprehension of non-being, that is, by the permanent possibility of negation as a real 
feature of experience. Thus, though Sartre may also attribute an understanding or comprehension to 
human comportment, he insists that this understanding itself is permeated by non-being and is thus 
encountered across a distance. Yet the inherency of nihilation to conscious experience on our 
reading will require that this distancing is nihilated and thus positively recognised and 
consciousness thereby „arrives in the world‟: 
 
[...] man is always separated from what he is by all the breadth of the being which he is not. He 
makes himself known to himself from the other side of the world and he looks from the horizon 
toward himself to recover his inner being. Man is „a being of distances.‟258 
 
The inclusion of nothingness in what is otherwise an account of Da-sein, betrays a subtle shift 
which constitutes the basis of our criticism. The effort to ground experience in the permanence of 
non-being reinforces the presupposition of being that is inherent to rationalist methodology. If the 
encounter with and understanding of beings presupposes their nihilation then their possibility as 
such, there is-ness, or the „ownmost aim of ontological enquiry‟, is accounted for by „nothing‟. In 
other words, if nothingness originates in being but as a permanent feature of reality then our 
understanding of being is limited to the absolute of its nihilation. Thus that which for Sartre grants 
absolute ontological freedom to human experience, perpetual active nihilation meaning that human 
experience is conditioned by nothing, is precisely that which restricts the understanding of being to 
the observation of its thus-ness „and no more‟. In this sense, we return to the assertion of is-ness 
rather than its disclosure.  
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iii) The Centrality of Consciousness   
Sartre‟s concept of being-in-the-world which we understand as a reference to the conscious 
experience of reality as such reflects the primacy of consciousness in his project. This does not refer 
to the empirical reality of an external world but the relationship of consciousness to the conscious 
object of „world‟. As previously explained, the for-itself is the in-itself losing itself as such. Thus a 
negative relationship is established wherein an encounter with being(s) is premised on their loss or 
nihilation. By extension therefore, consciousness‟ relationship to the world, its being-in-the-world is 
grounded in its nihilating activity. In other words, consciousness‟ being-in-the-world is 
characterised by a necessary relationship of nihilation between consciousness and its objects. Mikel 
Dufrenne highlights this point in his paper, „Existentialism and Existentialisms‟: 
 
The necessary connection of the for-itself with in-itself becomes, when the for-itself is understood as 
concrete subject, and the in-itself, enlightened by the for-itself, is understood as the world, the 
relation between man and world. Being-in-the-world is not being a thing among things, it is bringing 
sense to the in-itself, so making that world be.
259
 
 
However, on our reading of Sartre, Dufrenne‟s account risks two inaccuracies by implication. He is 
not guilty of these inaccuracies but his failure to address the subtle distinctions in Sartre‟s argument 
raises the possibility of misinterpretation. First and as we have seen, though non-conscious entities 
are categorised as in-itself, observation and identification of the in-itself presupposes consciousness. 
This is to say that, the non-conscious is „impossible to conceive‟ except in the light of 
consciousness. Second, consciousness is not reducible to the for-itself. The for-itself is presence to 
self because the inherency of nothingness means it evades definition. In this respect, it is the 
antithesis of a „concrete subject‟. Consciousness involves a necessary relationship of both regions of 
being whereby presence to self necessitates an encounter with the in-itself. Perceived objects are 
firmly entities of conscious experience: 
 
We know that there is not a for-itself on the one hand and a world on the other as two closed entities 
for which we must subsequently seek some explanation as to how they communicate.  
 
And,  
 
 Such an error will be avoided if we are willing to maintain that the world appears inside the circuit 
of selfness [...] it is this in terms of which human reality makes known to itself what it is.
260
 
 
Thus in our sense, being-in-the-world refers to the relationship between the nihilated in-itself and 
the for-itself. Sartre is clear that the for-itself and the in-itself do not reflect a traditional 
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subject/object division. The two must communicate through active nihilation. Moreover, the 
nihilated in-itself cannot be abstracted from the „circuit of selfness‟ or what we might otherwise 
refer to as the machinations of consciousness. Hence Sartre‟s definition of human reality in the 
following: 
 
Human reality is its own surpassing towards what it lacks; [...] Human reality is not something which 
exists first in order afterwards to lack this or that; it exists first as a lack and in immediate, synthetic 
connection with what it lacks. [...] Human reality is a perpetual surpassing toward a coincidence with 
itself which is never given.
261
 
 
Here Sartre is unequivocal in the importance of consciousness to his account of being as such. Thus 
human reality is primarily characterised by the law of the for-itself which necessitates the 
unrealisable ideal of self-coinciding. The „lack‟262 of the for-itself is nothingness „brought to the 
world‟ by active nihilation with which it is synonymous. Thus in this respect at least, Sartre indeed 
reduces all of human reality to the ontological description of consciousness. In the same paper, 
Dufrenne notes that Sartre‟s human reality positions „man‟ at the centre of the world: 
 
The world as I live in it has myself as an absolute centre of coordinates because I am involved in it 
and because my presence to it is contingent.
263
 
 
Here Dufrenne‟s account is far less susceptible to inaccurate interpretation. In fact, he may 
understate the case. What we have previously called Sartre‟s anthropocentrism refers to this 
„absolute centring of the self‟. Sartre‟s reduction of human reality to the machinations of 
consciousness shares a striking resemblance to Kantian idealism.
264
 He avoids a simple division of 
his two regions of being but their relationship is undermined by necessitating nihilation for an 
encounter. It is in this sense therefore that we claim, Sartre reads the methodological principle of 
prioritising Dasein into the very constitution of consciousness. As the being in whom nothingness 
originates, necessitating presence to self and insofar as an original nihilation grounding the upsurge 
of the for-itself underpins the possibility of an encounter with being(s), consciousness becomes the 
locus of all ontology and meaning.      
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IV 
Freedom in Being and Nothingness 
 
The problem of anthropocentrism and the reliance on rationalism ultimately render Sartre‟s 
account of human freedom problematic. Our previous chapter has sought to establish the 
relationship between Sartre‟s proof of consciousness and the nothingness that he argues is at the 
heart of being. Thus we claim that „establishing consciousness epistemologically‟ is anchored by 
nothingness which for Sartre, is the necessary pre-requisite for all ontological enquiry if not all 
comportment as such. This „permanent possibility‟ of negation imparts a robust responsibility on 
consciousness which as we will show herein, underpins Sartre‟s argument for freedom as a 
necessary characteristic of conscious experience. Our explication of Sartre‟s account of ontological 
freedom will thus focus on three particular concerns. First, we will provide a definition of precisely 
what we understand Sartre to mean by freedom. This will be preceded by a discussion of what 
Sartre does not mean by freedom and his reasons for rejecting the „free will‟ account. Doing so will 
eliminate the possibility of conflating Sartre‟s freedom with the latter. Second we will offer an 
explication of Sartre‟s argument for the claim that humans are necessarily free. The complexity of 
that argument raises prima facie objections which will also be addressed. In so doing we will 
outline what we understand of the fundamental project which nuances and informs the constitution 
of causes. It is in this particular sense that, for Sartre, human experience cannot but be responsible 
for its choices since they are premised on reasons for action constituted by consciousness‟ 
fundamental project. Finally, we will assess Sartre‟s argument for the claim that humans are 
necessarily free. We contend that the success of the argument will depend on the criteria by which it 
is judged. The argument can be assessed independently of Sartre‟s project or in the appropriate 
context of fundamental ontology as we have explained it. We have argued that understanding any 
particular argument in BN requires understanding it as predicated on the project as a whole. We also 
contend that Sartre‟s argument is successful if and only if other claims integral to his project are 
rejected. To that end we will show that Sartre‟s argument hinges on his interpretation of 
intentionality within the framework of Heideggerian fundamental ontology. Ultimately we will 
argue that Sartre‟s account of ontological freedom based on his interpretation of intentionality is 
inconsistent with the Heideggerian ontology which forms his premises.     
It will be helpful to state a few preliminary points. Our analysis will be restricted to the issue of 
freedom where possible. Nevertheless the holistic structure of Sartre‟s project is such that it will 
require mention of other issues. These will include the mistranslation of „motif‟ and „mobile‟ as 
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„cause‟, the adoption of a fundamental project and the encounter with the world. These issues are 
integral to Sartre‟s argument for necessary freedom and therefore require explication, though 
analysis of his project in the previous chapter means that brief discussion will suffice. Furthermore, 
proposed responses to prima facie objections should not be interpreted as support for Sartre‟s 
argument. Inaccurate objections are dismissed only in order to arrive at a serious criticism which 
approaches the argument appropriately.  
 
i) Sartre’s Definition of Freedom 
Sartre is quite clear in regard to his understanding of freedom. He states that his use of the term 
is both „technical‟ and „philosophical‟. Furthermore, he claims that his account must be clearly 
distinguished from „common sense misunderstandings‟ carrying „historical, political and moral‟ 
connotations; the „technical and philosophical concept of freedom is the only one in consideration 
and means only the autonomy of choice‟. 265 Finally, he distinguishes his account from the 
traditional analytic debate:   
 
Thus at the outset we can see what is lacking in those tedious discussions between determinists and 
proponents of free will. The latter are concerned to find cases of decision for which there exists no 
prior motif, or deliberations concerning two opposed acts which are equally possible and possess 
motifs (and mobiles) of exactly the same weight. To which the determinists may easily reply that 
there is no action without a motif‟ and that the most insignificant gesture [...] refers to motifs and 
mobiles which confer its meaning upon it. Indeed the case could not be otherwise since every action 
must be intentional; [...] But the determinists in turn are weighting the scale by stopping their 
investigation with the mere designation of the motif and the mobile. The essential question in fact lies 
beyond the complex organisation “motif-intention-act-end”; indeed we ought to ask how a motif (or 
mobile) can be constituted as such.
266
 
 
Here and elsewhere Sartre uses motif to refer to the reason for which an agent acts: 
  
Generally by motif we mean the reason for the act; that is, the ensemble of rational considerations 
which justify it.
267
  
 
Barnes' translation of motif as „cause‟ is therefore misleading and will be avoided. By contrast, 
Sartre uses mobile to refer to the desires or fears driving the act:  
 
The mobile […] is the ensemble of the desires, emotions, and passions which urge me to accomplish 
a certain act.
268
 
 
Sartre is uninterested in „common sense‟ notions which hinge on the availability of alternatives 
toward the realisation of a particular end. He also rejects the positions taken up in the analytic 
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debate of his time insofar as they do not appropriately address the „constitution‟ of motifs and 
mobiles. On our interpretation of Sartre, those „tedious‟ analytic discussions are restricted in their 
accounts of freedom because they fail to interrogate the constitution of a cause. That is, they fail to 
address what in conscious experience originates and substantiates a cause, motif (reason for), mobile 
(desires that drive) an act. The analytic account of human freedom will be referred to as „the free 
will account‟ throughout the remainder of this analysis. On this analytic account, whether an agent 
acts freely depends simply on whether they could have acted otherwise than they did. It may be 
informative to contrast Sartre‟s summary of the analytic free will debate with contemporary 
discussions. Of course BN was published in 1943 so these discussions will not be what Sartre had in 
mind. Nonetheless a comparison will benefit our assessment of Sartre‟s argument and its relevance 
to modern thinking on the issue of human freedom.  
a) Sartre vs. the Modern Debate 
Contemporary analytic views on free will fall into a number of sets and sub-sets which in many 
cases share the view that acting freely consists in acting such that one could have done otherwise. 
The clearest division between them is compatibilism and incompatibilism whose positions can be 
deduced from their title. Incompatibilists argue that determinism and free will are mutually 
exclusive: if determinism is true, then an agent could never have acted otherwise, so the agent's 
action cannot be free. For some („hard determinists‟), human action is explained by reference to 
determinism which they consider an absolute governing all events, and accordingly human action is 
never free. Other incompatibilists („libertarians‟) assert that determinism is inapplicable to human 
action, for which a power of spontaneous agent causation must hold. This is exemplified by 
Roderick M. Chisholm in his paper, „Human Freedom and the Self‟.269 Chisholm borrows 
Aristotle‟s assertion that „a staff moves a stone moved by a hand, which is moved by a man‟.270 
Thus though the actions of stone, staff and hand are explained by prior causes, the „prime mover‟ 
i.e. the „man‟, is also the causa sui. By contrast to both forms of incompatibilism, compatibilists271 
argue that determinism and free will are compatible. Like hard determinists and libertarians, 
compatibilists typically accept that freedom consists in it being the case that the agent could have 
acted otherwise. However they argue in various ways that the agent's „being able to have acted 
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otherwise‟ is compatible with determinism. This brief discussion of hard determinist, libertarian and 
compatibilist positions will provide appropriate examples against which we can assess the accuracy 
of Sartre‟s summary and rejection.  
For Sartre, both libertarians and hard determinists are mistaken. He argues that „proponents of 
free will‟ by which he means libertarians such as Chisholm, „render action absurd‟272 by envisaging 
acts that have no prior motif (reason). He also claims that „determinists‟, by which he means hard 
determinists who think of determinism as an absolute leaving no room for human freedom, are 
„weighting the scale‟. For Sartre, the failure to prioritise the experience of a motif, that is, the 
presupposition of what one means by a motif and the ontology of consciousness experiencing motifs 
and mobiles renders the analytic debate schematically inappropriate for a discussion of human 
freedom. Much as for Heidegger the ontological tradition fails to appropriately approach the 
question of being so for Sartre is the analytic tradition equally at fault with regard to human 
freedom. For both „determinists‟ and „proponents of free will‟, the debate is framed so as to exclude 
an account of both the experience of motifs and mobiles and the underlying ontological condition of 
consciousness for whom freedom is a possibility so neither begins appropriately. Crucially, this 
omission is an inherent feature of the free will debate insofar as it assumes the same methodological 
parameters as the ontological tradition: the agent is conceived as disengaged from the context of the 
world, that is, action and freedom are conceived independently of an account of the agents‟ 
relationship to and understanding of the world. Sartre gives an example of action and choice which 
may exemplify the importance of accounting for the experience of motifs and mobiles to 
understanding whether an agent acts freely:  
 
If I accept a niggardly salary it is doubtless because of fear; and fear is a mobile. But it is fear of 
dying from starvation; that is, this fear has meaning only outside itself in an end ideally posited, 
which is the preservation of a life which I apprehend as “in danger”. And this fear is understood in 
turn only in relation to the value which I implicitly give to this life; that is, it is referred to that 
hierarchal system of ideal objects which are values. [...] Motifs and mobiles have meaning only inside 
a projected ensemble which is precisely an ensemble of non-existents.
273
 
 
The point, for Sartre, is not that fear necessitates a certain response which, given the same 
circumstances, could not have been otherwise. Rather, one only experiences the mobile of a fear of 
dying because they have adopted the fundamental stance of valuing their life. It is this mobile, 
combined with the motif that one may starve unless they accept a low salary, which gives rise to the 
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act of accepting the salary. Thus an agent‟s actions are not simply determined by a prior state of 
affairs. Rather motifs and mobiles are coherent or have meaning only within the context of a 
„hierarchal system of ideal objects‟. Sartre also claims that an inappropriately framed debate about 
human freedom is explained in the following way: 
 
[...] this amounts to trying to take the motifs and mobiles as things. We try to confer permanence 
upon them. [...] we take them for constants.
274
 
 
We understand this effort to take „motifs and mobiles as things‟ in terms of what we have referred to 
as the fallacy of the „theoretical approach as such‟275 and the „methodology of rationalist 
disengagement‟.276 In this sense, the effort to treat motifs and mobiles as „things‟ reflects an 
inappropriate characterisation of phenomena as present-at-hand akin to Heidegger‟s critique of 
Descartes on his representation of time. His point, it seems is that trying to „confer permanence‟ or 
presenting beings as „constants‟ is a feature of the rationalist „view from nowhere‟ in order that they 
may be critically observed.
277
  
An example of the free will account described without appeal to motifs and mobiles can be 
found in the libertarian account provided by Chisholm. To his credit, Chisholm identifies a 
distinction in the case of human action exemplified by what he calls „immanent causation‟: 
  
[... ] I shall say that when an agent, as distinguished from an event, causes an event or state of affairs, 
then we have an instance of immanent causation.
278
         
 
For Chisholm, actions originating from humans are a special case distinguishable from an otherwise 
causally determined state of affairs. Nonetheless immanent causation is seemingly initiated ab 
nihilo. Nothing (whether motif or mobile) is given to explain immanent causation other than the 
assertion that „cerebral events cause instances of transeunt causation though these events are caused 
by man‟.279 The absence of an investigation into what Chisholm means by „man‟ and the power to 
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„cause cerebral events‟ makes him prey to Sartre‟s critique. It may be worth noting that Chisholm 
does imply the necessity of a renewed investigation since „there can be no science of man‟: 
 
For at times the agent, if he chooses, may rise above his desires and do something else instead.
280
 
 
But Chisholm‟s failure to address the problem of „man‟ leaves his argument insufficient to satisfy 
Sartre‟s criticism.  
Sartre never addresses the compatibilist position so one is obligated to extrapolate what he may 
say from his comments on hard determinism and libertarianism. That said, for Sartre the very terms 
of the debate are already mistaken insofar as their rationalist approach means they fail to 
methodologically prioritise conscious experience. Compatibilists want to show that it being the case 
that one could have acted otherwise is compatible with determinism rather than interrogating the 
assumption that acting freely consists in acting such that one could have acted otherwise and are 
therefore equally susceptible to Sartre‟s critique. J.M. Fischer refers to the similarity between 
compatibilists and incompatibilists on the basic terms of the free will debate in his paper, 
„Responsibility and Control‟:  
 
In understanding this argument it is important to see that something like the principle of alternate 
possibilities is usually accepted by both compatibilists and incompatibilists.
281
 
 
The „Principle of Alternate Possibilities‟ (PAP) states that an agent is morally responsible for an 
action only if they could have done otherwise but it typically goes hand in hand with the view that 
an action is free only if the agent could have done otherwise.
282
 In a separate paper, Fischer and 
Mark Ravizza in effect argue that an agent may act differently if their motifs and mobiles had been 
different
283
 even if they cannot be accounted for rationally. Sartre may have been inclined to agree 
with a compatibilist account such as this. Nevertheless, it fails to address how acquires given motifs 
and mobiles. In other words, Sartre would ultimately reject this and similar compatibilist accounts
284
 
because they fail to see that mobiles and motifs depend on the symbolic value of  a „projected 
ensemble of non-existents‟. Thus having different mobiles and motifs requires a different projection 
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and the values it produces. Freedom is still restricted to the ability to do otherwise and its 
limitations without ever interrogating what it means for one to be caused to act or to will actions 
and in this respect, there is a disengaged account of freedom.  
We may note that Sartre‟s summary of the analytic free will debate is insensitive to the 
nuances and intricacies of its contemporary positions. Of course Sartre could not have adjusted his 
argument to account for these later developments. Nevertheless, the demand that the ontological 
character of consciousness be investigated prior to determining whether an agent is free is not met 
by the positions we have discussed. Neither the experience of a motif or mobile nor the character of 
the agent experiencing it is addressed. Against this account, Sartre asserts what he calls „ontological 
freedom‟, by which he means a fundamental capacity to distinguish, identify and prefer particular 
comportments and ultimately adopting a certain non-existent state of affairs as an end (projecting 
non-existents) which gives them their value.  
The rejection of the free will account is a significant feature of Sartre‟s own account of 
freedom. Sartre offers two overarching reasons for rejecting an account of freedom as consisting in 
the possibility that the agent could have done otherwise. These are what we will refer to as the i) 
existential and ii) phenomenological:  
i) Existential reason: For Sartre, the „constitution of motif as such can not refer to another real 
and positive existence; that is, to a prior motif.‟285 Rather a motif is constituted as such in 
light of a pre-existing „project‟. For example, if an agent obeys the law because (in its view) 
„the law is authoritative‟, then this consideration is the agent‟s motif (reason) for obeying. 
But the consideration is only constituted as a motif (reason) for obeying because the agent 
has a prior project of seeking order. Thus Sartre asserts that „nothing external to 
consciousness can motivate it‟;286 motivation is determined by consciousness‟ basic 
projects. Freedom on the other hand, is a fundamental characteristic of consciousness, 
subject to neither change nor manipulation. As we understand it, if the character of 
consciousness necessitates that an encounter with being(s) is characterised in terms of its 
possibility, then so long as one has consciousness, one must have ontological freedom:  
 
 [...]we hope simply that we have shown that the will is not a privileged manifestation of 
freedom but that it is a psychic event of a peculiar structure which is constituted on the same 
plane as other psychic events and which is supported [...] by an original, ontological freedom.
287
 
   
We understand this to mean that an account of freedom based on the will [to do otherwise] 
presupposes consciousness‟ relation to being(s) such that one may will any number of 
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alternatives. Willing any alternative requires that being(s) are experienced not as hard 
determinatives necessitating a particular action but in terms of their possibility. Thus one 
may will the acceptance of a „niggardly salary‟ or even their own death for that matter 
precisely because „life‟, that is „my life‟ is experienced quite precisely as a permanent 
possibility in perpetually unstable equilibrium between negation and affirmation. 
Traditional accounts of free will on the other hand, are inherently incapable of 
acknowledging ontological freedom because the methodological parameters of that 
discourse necessitate the presupposition of consciousness‟ relationship to being. The effort 
to determine an agent‟s free will, will not involve discussion of how motif‟s are constituted 
as such or an interrogation of the nature of the agents experience from their perspective as 
an engaged actor in the world.  
ii) Phenomenological reason: Sartre‟s discussion of freedom is intended to explicate two main 
concerns. Firstly, that freedom is a necessary feature of consciousness‟ ontological 
character, which is a necessary prerequisite to particular choices and secondly, that this 
feature is therefore inseparable from consciousness. For Sartre, the account of freedom as 
free will does not offer an ontological account of consciousness as a necessary foundation 
for the discussion of choice. Consequently, the parameters of the free will debate appear 
indifferent to either the ontology of consciousness or a phenomenological account of action. 
But if, as we have seen, the „logical significance‟ of rationalist accounts has little or nothing 
to do with what one can „understand or describe‟ then it will not be surprising to find 
accounts of free will from that tradition that seem removed or disengaged from immediate 
experience. Sartre refers to this oversight as follows: 
  
It is strange that philosophers have been able to argue endlessly about determinism and free 
will, to cite examples in favour of one or the other thesis, without ever attempting first to make 
explicit the structures contained in the very idea of action.
288
       
 
These „structures contained in the very idea of action‟ are founded on the „principle of 
intentionality‟:  that consciousness must be consciousness of something and Sartre clarifies 
this when he states that, „we should observe first that an action is on principle 
intentional‟.289 Therefore, an ontological account of consciousness is necessary in order to 
„make these structures explicit‟. But neither compatibilists nor incompatibilists provide 
such an account. Rather for both, free will depends on the extent to which the law of 
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causality prevents alternate possibilities. For Sartre, the lack of an explicit and prioritised 
ontology renders the account of freedom as free will inappropriate for any discussion 
involving intentional consciousness.  
Sartre‟s claim (to be discussed below) that consciousness entails freedom means that the latter is 
neither fleeting nor subject to change regardless of the objective state of affairs. In other words, for 
Sartre, consciousness‟ characteristic of transcendence means that firstly, no state of affairs could 
determine „man‟s freedom‟ and secondly, that this is because freedom is a permanent feature of 
consciousness inherent to the „reality‟ of non-being. This is how we understand the following: 
 
If we start by conceiving of man as a plenum, it is absurd to try to find in him afterwards moments or 
psychic regions in which he would be free. As well look for emptiness in a container which one has 
filled beforehand up to the brim! Man can not [sic] be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is 
wholly and forever free or he is not free at all.
290
 
 
Sartre emphasises the relationship between consciousness and freedom with the assertion that 
„choice and consciousness are one and the same thing.‟291 His assertion will be assessed in the 
forthcoming section on Sartre‟s argument for the necessity of freedom. For now, a definition of 
Sartre‟s freedom can be inferred from his understanding of intentional consciousness which we 
claim underpins Sartre‟s argument by grounding it in phenomenological ontology. Ontological 
freedom refers to the necessity of transcending intentional objects provided by the permanence and 
pre-judicative comprehension of non-being such that the world is experienced in respect of the 
projection of consciousness‟ possibilities. Thus both the encounter with intentional objects and the 
adoption of a particular project ground Sartre‟s argument in favour of necessary human freedom. 
He does not go to great lengths to separate these two aspects of his argument, though this may not 
be without good reason. It is possible that the holistic structure of his project is preserved by 
explicating the argument without distinguishing between these aspects. Nonetheless we may 
propose a distinction to aid our understanding of his argument. Firstly, on our reading of Sartre, if 
consciousness is always consciousness of some-thing then some distinction between consciousness 
and its thing-ness must be included in that definition. The unfolding of an empty distance between 
perceiver and perceived establishes this distinction but not simply in terms of an external negation. 
Rather the nothingness „unfolded‟ is premised on a pre-judicative ontological non-being such that 
all experience is characterised in terms of its possibility thereby necessitating choice.
292
 
Consciousness‟ encounter with objects is thus premised on a fundamental ontological „distancing‟. 
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Extended analysis of „active nihilation‟ will follow. Our immediate concern is acknowledging 
Sartre‟s claim that alternate possibilities are already implicit to consciousness.  
We cannot understand Sartre‟s argument for ontological freedom without a discussion of what 
he refers to as the „fundamental project‟. After all, active nihilation alone does not account for the 
experience of intentional objects as alternate possible choices: 
 
[human reality is] not something which would first be in order subsequently to put itself into relation 
with this or that end, but on the contrary, a being which is originally a project – i.e., which is defined 
by its end.
293
   
 
For Sartre, consciousness is immediately „defined by its end‟. We understand this „end‟ as a 
reference for the fundamental project, which informs and contours each consciousness‟ particular 
experience of the world in respect of pursuable possibilities. In this sense intentional objects have 
their value as „choices‟ conferred on them in light of an adopted fundamental project. Thus Sartre‟s 
account of the fundamental project will establish freedom in everyday experience but grounded by 
his interpretation of intentionality and the necessity of active nihilation. 
    
ii) The Argument for Necessary Freedom  
Having established a positive definition of what Sartre means by freedom we may now 
explicate his argument that humans are necessarily free. The basic outline of the argument will be 
familiar given the holistic structure of Sartre‟s project and the fact that his argument rests on 
principles previously discussed.
294
 For Sartre, ontological freedom is inherent to consciousness 
insofar the nihilating activity of the for-itself, founded by the pre-judicative comprehension of non-
being, necessitates that consciousness transcend intentional objects so that they are established in 
respect of their possibility,
295
 as previously explained. In short, the objective reality of non-being 
reveals the permanence of negation such that beings can be encountered not simply as hard, opaque 
constants but as possibilities, specifically „my‟ possibilities. As such, there can be no thought which 
is not immediately accompanied by the exclusion of its alternative. This is the sense in which we 
interpret Sartre‟s ontological freedom; the character of consciousness is such that being(s) are 
encountered specifically as non-conditional or non-determinative ontological hypotheses 
necessitating „choice‟, not as a normative or overt description of tangible alternatives but a 
fundamental characteristic of experience. Consciousness as consciousness of what is not already 
includes the possibility of alternatives included in the encounter with intentional objects. 
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a) Intentionality and Active Nihilation 
We have already explained that for Sartre, the argument for ontological freedom i.e. the 
capacity for 'projecting non-existents' and for adopting a certain non-existent state of affairs as one's 
end must be derived from the structure of consciousness. The claim that humans are necessarily free 
must be implicit to the principle of intentionality which we have previously described as the claim 
that „all consciousness must be consciousness of something‟. As Pierre Jacob explains,  
 
Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and 
states of affairs. [...] It derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives from the 
verb intendere, which means being directed towards some goal or thing.
296
 
 
The principle of intentionality
297
 thus refers to the claim that consciousness is always directed 
towards something be it an object in the external world, a group of objects or a particular thought. 
Sartre agrees with this general claim and uses it for the basis of his account of consciousness and 
thus ontological freedom. He states, for example: 
 
All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something.
298  
 
Nonetheless, Sartre goes to some effort in the introduction of BN to distinguish himself from the 
understanding of intentionality described by Edmund Husserl and in particular the noesis-noema 
model.
299
 The model is intended to account for the relationship between the action of directedness 
towards an object (noesis) and the perceived object (noema) as part of the intentional structure of 
consciousness. Sartre claims that Husserl‟s account does nothing to successfully establish a 
connection between these two regions of being which, as we have seen, is the ostensible purpose of 
Sartre‟s project: 
 
But, we are told, Husserl defines consciousness precisely as a transcendence. In truth he does. This is 
what he posits. This is his essential discovery. But from the moment that he makes of the noema an 
unreal, a correlate of the noesis, a noema whose esse is percipi, he is totally unfaithful to his 
principle.
300
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For Sartre, Husserl‟s attempt to arrive at purely mental processes by „bracketing‟ out beings in the 
world undermines a phenomenological relation between consciousness and intentional objects, 
accusing him of „reducing the world to the state of the noema-correlate of consciousness‟.301 He 
claims to resolve this problem by bringing out a „detachment from self‟302 already implicit in 
Husserl‟s idea of intentionality. Thus for Sartre, the general definition of intentionality is adjusted 
by a simple addition: consciousness is consciousness of something which is not itself: 
 
Consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive 
structure of consciousness; that is, the consciousness arises oriented towards a being which is not 
itself.
303    
 
Thus Sartre‟s interpretation of intentionality reinforces his account of nihilation as a medium 
between the two regions of being. His claim that „transcendence is the constitutive structure of 
consciousness‟ on our interpretation refers to the claim that if consciousness must be consciousness 
of something, then consciousness must be conscious of itself as not that thing. Thus for Sartre, the 
principle of intentionality already implies the law of presence to self and the pre-judicative 
comprehension of non-being which ground the upsurge of the for-itself. As we will see, Sartre‟s 
argument for freedom is anchored in this conception of intentionality and non-being such that he 
equates the rejection of this transcendence (the perpetual loss of in-itself as such resulting in 
presence-to-self) with a total misconception of human-being. Thus he claims that, „refusal of 
freedom amounts to the same thing as attempting to apprehend oneself as being-in-itself‟.304  
Of course one may object that distinguishing intentional objects need not require this robust, 
ontological freedom nor does it require that we characterise consciousness as an entity of being-in-
itself. Sartre pre-empts this objection by reference to what he calls the „impossibility of passively 
receiving conscious objects‟305 or the impossibility of spontaneously occurring conscious objects. 
We would do well to recall that the law of presence to self, that is the permanent possibility of 
negation, is premised on an objective nothingness which distances consciousness from its objects. 
Thus the loss of in-itself as such established the conditions for an encounter with being(s). We have 
also outlined Sartre‟s two modes of negation: external and internal where the former refers to 
negative judgments about external objects and the latter refers to negative judgments about the 
conscious agent. Moreover, we have stated that no feature of Sartre‟s project is independent of the 
whole. External negation is predicated on an implicit distinction between the external object and the 
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observer rendering the judgment, two kinds of the triple non-being inherent to negation. Similarly, 
internal negation materialises an encounter with an agent who has particular properties. Thus the 
statement, „I am not tall‟ simultaneously declares an impression of height and an encounter with a 
self constituted as „he-who-could-not-be-tall‟. For Sartre, both internal and external negations 
presuppose nothingness necessary to distance perceiver from perceived and thus establish an 
encounter with both. The crucial feature of Sartrean intentionality then is not directedness towards 
an intentional object but the inherent necessity of a pre-judicative comprehension of non-being. But 
nothingness, Sartre argues, cannot be passively received; rather it must be actively posited. He 
claims that pre-judicative comprehension and active nihilation necessitate transcendence and thus 
the permanent possibility of choice:   
 
We must observe first that the being postulated can not [sic] be passive in relation to Nothingness, 
can not receive it; Nothingness could not come to this being except through another Being – which 
would be an infinite regress. But on the other hand, the Being by which Nothingness comes to the 
world can not produce Nothingness while remaining indifferent to that production – like the Stoic 
cause which produces its effect without being itself changed. [...] The being by which Nothingness 
comes to the world must be its own Nothingness. By this we must understand not a nihilating act, [...] 
but an ontological characteristic of the Being required.
306  
 
As we have seen, Sartre argues that consciousness is the required being. Thus, if consciousness 
cannot be „passive‟ or „indifferent‟ to the ontological characteristic by which nothingness comes to 
the world then consciousness must be actively aware of the matrix of negative relations establishing 
being(s). Intentional objects or perhaps more accurately, intentionally nihilated objects are therefore 
encountered as such by virtue of active nihilation. Sartre reinforces this argument in his analogy of 
the workers‟ revolution of 1830:  
 
This means that he [the worker] will have had to give himself room, to withdraw in relation to it, and 
will have to have effected a double nihilation: on the one hand, he must posit an ideal state of affairs 
as a pure present nothingness; on the other hand, he must posit the actual situation as nothingness in 
relation to this state of affairs. He will have to conceive of a happiness attached to his class as a pure 
possible – that is, presently as a certain nothingness – and on the other hand, he will return to the 
present situation in order to illuminate it in the light of this nothingness and in order to nihilate it in 
turn by declaring: “I am not happy.”307   
 
We do not understand Sartre as saying that the „troubles or suffering‟ of the worker are not 
experienced as such. Nor that a „different state of affairs‟ is empirically impossible prior to 
„conceiving‟ of them. Rather we interpret Sartre‟s claim here in respect of the ontological 
possibility of establishing both „difference‟ and „my happiness‟ such that the present state of affairs 
must be doubly nihilated, contrasting the self and an ideal situation with current circumstances. The 
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feeling that these conditions are intolerable or „requiring revolution‟ is thus dependent on an 
ontological characteristic of the being making the declaration. Only as a characteristic of 
transcendence can self and circumstances be „projected‟, that is, hypothesised across a distance of 
nothingness, establishing the possibilities of revolt/submission.  
Nevertheless, further objections can be raised with regard to the impossibility of passively 
receiving conscious objects. One is what we may call the objection from the possibility of passive 
enquiry. The objection could run as follows: We have shown that the intentionality of 
consciousness entails nihilation and that nihilation means that objects cannot be passively 
perceived. But this assumes that nihilation is active. What if nihilation is passive? Moreover, 
nihilation cannot be active if nothingness comes to the world by a pre-judicative comprehension of 
non-being. At first sight, this presents a serious problem for Sartre‟s interpretation of intentionality 
and consequently, his argument for ontological freedom. By way of resolving the objection, it will 
be helpful to positively state precisely what passive nihilation means. Nihilation we have 
understood as the process by which an encounter with being(s) is constituted as characterised by 
some kind of not-ness. In other words, nihilation describes the encounter with being(s) on the basis 
of a pre-judicative comprehension of non-being. Passive nihilation we therefore understand in terms 
of what Sartre calls „indifference to the production of Nothingness‟. This, on our interpretation, 
would require that nihilation describes an insurmountable ontological absolute, that is, it would 
require the impossibility of nihilating the process of nihilation or put simply, to have nihilation as 
an object of thought. If nihilation refers to a passive condition then all intentional objects (including 
the object of nihilation) cannot be transcended towards their possibilities but are encountered as 
already established. Thus the object of nihilation would be encountered as already nihilated in its 
very appearance. We may explain the impossibility of such a situation by reference to theoretical 
and experiential evidence. To that end, we return to Sartre‟s three ekstases of consciousness:308 i) 
Temporalisation, ii) Presence-to-Self and iii) Transcendence. Our immediate concern is restricted to 
the second which requires that consciousness is always self-aware or immediately „internally 
nihilating‟. As previously stated, Sartrean intentionality states that consciousness must always be 
conscious of something which it is not: something other than its objects. This does not negate the 
possibility of being engrossed in awareness of an external object. He argues that consciousness of 
an object is always accompanied by consciousness of self as such or „non-thetic self-
consciousness‟.309 Moreover, these states are „ontological correlates‟310 insofar as both are examples 
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of intentional consciousness. The difference is what consciousness is directed to and the mode of 
negation. Thus for Sartre, „nothing exists in consciousness which is not consciousness of 
existing‟.311 It will follow therefore that „nothingness‟ could not be an intentional object without 
consciousness‟ active awareness of it as such. Nihilation must be active insofar as the ontological 
character of consciousness requires that it is conscious of nihilation: 
 
This means that by a double movement of nihilation, he [consciousness] nihilates the thing 
questioned in relation to himself [...] and that he nihilates himself in relation to the thing 
questioned[...]
312
 
 
Sartre does not claim that passive nihilation is insufficient for an encounter with objects in the 
world. Rather, passive nihilation is insufficient for intentional consciousness. Passive nihilation 
presupposes the exclusion of internal negation because in that case consciousness could not be 
conscious of itself as consciousness of something it is not. Such consciousness would be restricted 
to an exclusive awareness of objects. We understand Sartre‟s assertion that, „in order to count, it is 
necessary to be conscious of counting‟313 in this regard. An elementary thought experiment is 
sufficient to illustrate the experiential evidence. As stated, passive nihilation requires that the „thing 
questioned‟ and the „self‟ doing the questioning are already nihilated in their relation to each other. 
Thus the „thing questioned‟ is nihilated in relation to self and self is nihilated in relation to the 
„thing‟ but both are already nihilated. Passive nihilation is proven on condition that one can 
successfully think of an object without being aware of so doing. Failure evidences the necessity of 
active nihilation. But active nihilation means that the experience of intentional objects is itself 
active. Thus Sartre‟s assertion that passively received conscious objects are impossible to conceive 
can be taken quite literally.
314
  
Our effort to resolve the objection from passive nihilation reveals a secondary problem of 
greater concern. As stated, for Sartre a pre-judicative comprehension of non-being can and must be 
inferred from the principle of intentionality in order to correct shortcomings in Husserl‟s definition 
as well as Heidegger‟s account of Dasein and being-in-the-world. It is based on the aforementioned 
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„necessity of establishing it [i.e. consciousness] epistemologically‟315 and this is reinforced by his 
appeal to Descartes:  
 
But this consciousness (of being) consciousness must be qualified in some way, and it can be 
qualified only as revealing intuition or it is nothing. Now a revealing intuition implies something 
revealed. Absolute subjectivity can be established only in the face of something revealed; 
immanence can be defined only within the apprehension of a transcendent. It might appear that there 
is an echo here of Kant‟s refutation of problematical idealism. But we ought rather to think of 
Descartes.
316
 
 
In the introduction of BN, subtitled, The Pursuit of Being, Sartre turns to what he calls the 
„ontological proof‟ [of being] derived he says, „not from the reflective cogito‟ but from „the pre-
reflective being of the percipiens‟. This being is what we understand as the „something revealed‟ by 
intuition, namely the „transcendent‟ or the „non-conscious and transphenomenal being‟. Moreover, 
he clarifies that, „we are here on the ground of being, not of knowledge‟. As we have seen, for 
Sartre, the problem inherent to the account of Dasein and Husserl‟s intentionality is the failure to 
acknowledge the „revealed-revelation‟ of non-being inherent to consciousness and thus that „there is 
no being outside of that precise obligation to be a revealing intuition of something‟. In other words, 
it is clear for Sartre that an intentional account of consciousness only makes sense on condition that 
consciousness‟ consciousness of something is established by a transcendence revealing non-being. 
Thus consciousness of something is always and simultaneously consciousness of nothing-ness, the 
permanent possibility of non-being. The risk, on our reading of Sartre, is that failure to 
acknowledge the inherency of non-being to intentionality renders consciousness a thing-in-itself 
and thus deprives it of choice, ontological responsibility and ultimately freedom. Our final chapter 
on Heidegger will seek to explicate his argument for freedom so it isn‟t necessary to assess the 
validity of Sartre‟s concern here. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that Sartre‟s project, as a whole, 
is intended to aid the effort to establish a relation between two regions of being. This relation, we 
now understand, is established by the „revealed-revelation of non-being‟. But insofar as Sartre is 
clear we are here „on the ground of being, not of knowledge‟ then non-being cannot refer to another 
being „outside of consciousness‟ obligation to be a revealing intuition‟. Thus „the transphenomenal 
being of what exists for consciousness is itself in itself‟. The problem, as far as we have understood 
Sartre, seems to be that if the revealed intuition of non-being establishes the relation between the 
two regions of being then what grounds consciousness‟ relation to non-being? The answer, as 
derived from the outline of active nihilation, is the absolute of transcendence and the consequent 
law of presence to self. In other words, for Sartre, the permanent possibility of non-being is an 
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inescapable ontological characteristic of consciousness such that be conscious is already to reveal 
an intuitive grasp of non-being. But this is intuitively dissatisfying since it seems to state that 
consciousness‟ pre-judicative comprehension of non-being is explained simply as a hard fact of 
what it is to be conscious such that the proof of consciousness is already established by its upsurge. 
This what we have referred to as the problem of anthropocentrism in Sartre‟s account; that an 
investigation of active nihilation and the impossibility of passive nihilation reveals that for Sartre, 
„the being of the world‟ is „implied by consciousness‟. Consciousness is thus not simply the 
methodological priority as a point of departure but the focal point, that is, that which grounds 
meaning and thus ontological truth as such. That said, the severity of this problem cannot be 
understood until we have a full account of Sartre‟s argument.   
For Sartre, the whole process of active nihilation inherent to intentionality reflects what he 
calls the „fundamental project‟.317 This is consciousness‟ underlying project to be a particular kind 
of person determining its motifs, mobiles and therefore their perception of the world. The translation 
of motif as „cause‟318 confuses an account of the fundamental project and must therefore be clarified 
first. Moreover, motifs (reasons) and mobiles (motives) are central to Sartre‟s conception of the 
fundamental project so it will serve our purposes to explain their relationship.  
b) „Cause,‟ „Motif‟ and „Mobile‟ 
Previous commentators
319
 have noticed the importance of motif and mobile to Sartre‟s project, 
preferring to use the French rather than a translation. Inaccurate translation does not extend to 
mobile in the 2003 Routledge publication which uses the term „motive‟. Since reason (motif) and 
motive (mobile) can often overlap in colloquial discussion it is important to explicate their 
distinction in Sartre‟s project. 
 For Sartre, motif and mobile are real features of the experience of the world which have their 
meaning conferred on them by an upsurge of a particular consciousness. In that respect, they are 
more flexible than a „cause‟ which describes a determinative relationship to its effects regardless of 
the particularities of consciousness‟ upsurge. Hunger, for example, may be a mobile for eating an 
apple but curiosity, whim or any number of possibilities may be equally valid mobiles. The 
experience of motifs and mobiles is necessary for their designation:  
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In order to be a motif, the motif must be experienced as such. Of course this does not mean that it is 
to be thematically conceived and made explicit as in the case of deliberation. But at the very least it 
means that the for-itself must confer on it its value as motif or mobile.
320
 
 
We understand this to mean that a motif for Sartre is deeply intertwined with everyday experience. 
This does not require that one explicitly consider and acknowledge a motif but that one‟s very 
experience is indicative of their motifs. Thus the for-itself confers value on motifs and mobiles
321
 
insofar as the upsurge of consciousness and the nothingness it brings to the world establishes a 
matrix of values and signifiers which indicate its project. Nevertheless, they are distinguishable 
terms. Motif refers to the explanatory reason for an action, experienced as such by the agent 
committing the action. Mobile on the other hand, is the motive for the action in the sense of the 
psychological state propelling the agent. The motif is defined as follows:  
 
Generally by motif we mean the reason for the act; that is, the ensemble of rational considerations 
which justify it. If the government decides on a conversion of Government bonds, it will give the 
motifs for its act: the lessening of the national debt, the rehabilitation of the Treasury. Similarly it is 
by motifs that historians are accustomed to explain the acts of ministers or monarchs; they will seek 
the motifs for a declaration of war: the occasion is propitious, the attacked country is disorganised 
because of internal troubles; it is time to put an end to an economic conflict which is in danger of 
lasting interminably. [...] We shall therefore use the term motif for the objective apprehension of a 
determined situation as this situation is revealed in the light of a certain end as being able to serve as 
means for attaining this end.
322
 
 
And the mobile is defined in these terms: 
 
The mobile, on the contrary, is generally considered as a subjective fact. It is the ensemble of the 
desires, emotions, and passions which urge me to accomplish a certain act. The historian looks for 
mobiles and takes them into account only as a last resort when the motifs are not sufficient to explain 
the act under consideration. [...] The ideal rational act would therefore be the one for which the 
mobiles would be practically nil and which would be uniquely inspired by an objective appreciation 
of the situation. The irrational or passionate act will be characterised by the reverse proportion.
323
 
  
Thus we have the objective motif and the subjective mobile. „Cause‟ was rejected above as a 
translation of motif because common usage implies a relationship of necessity with its effects, 
leaving little room for the kind of freedom Sartre wants. But it seems that Sartre‟s definition of 
motif as the „objective apprehension of a determined situation‟ suggests a similar necessity between 
a situation and its apprehension. Furthermore, the definition of mobile as a „subjective fact‟ 
characterised by its overwhelming irrationality and passion „urging consciousness to accomplish a 
certain act‟, also gives the impression of restricting ontological freedom. These restrictions on 
ontological freedom are relieved by the claim that motif and mobile are constituted as such in light 
                                                          
320
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) p.459 
321
 Ibid., p.459 
322
 Ibid., p.468 
323
 Ibid., pp.468-469 
104 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
of a preceding project. This is to say that Sartre grounds motifs and mobiles in the projection of 
possibilities inherent to the three ekstases of consciousness.  
Even though motif and mobile can be distinguished in the sense of their objectivity and 
subjectivity, it is clear from Sartre that they are equally dependent on consciousness‟ project for 
their meaning. Motif and mobile are thus „correlative‟ terms in respect of their parallel relationship 
to consciousness‟ project. This „correlation‟ exemplifies the difference between motif /mobile and 
„cause‟: 
 
Thus motif and mobile are correlative, exactly as the non-thetic self-consciousness is the ontological 
correlate of the thetic consciousness of object. Just as the consciousness of something is self-
consciousness, so the mobile is nothing other than the apprehension of the motif insofar as this 
apprehension is self-consciousness. But it follows obviously that the motif, and the mobile, and the 
end are the three indissoluble terms of the thrust of a free and living consciousness which projects 
itself toward its possibilities and makes itself defined by these possibilities.
324
 
 
We understand this to mean that motif and mobile are correlative insofar as both are characteristics 
of Sartrean intentionality. Thus if, as Sartre has it, consciousness must be consciousness of 
something it is not, then the apprehension of the „ensemble of rational considerations‟ (motif) is 
simultaneously the „ensemble of desires, emotions and passions‟ (mobile). Crucially the entire 
organisation of action (motif, mobile and end) are grounded ultimately in the projection of 
possibilities inherent to the ontological condition of consciousness. Thus though motif is the 
objective apprehension of a situation and mobile the subjective condition urging action, both must 
be experienced as such by the prior projection of a given end. The reputation of a given institution 
for example, becomes a motif for enrolment in light of the end of successfully achieving a doctorate. 
Equally, ambition and determination become mobiles urging action only in light of that end. Sartre 
exemplifies this ontological correlation in the following passage: 
 
 If Clovis is converted to Catholicism, then inasmuch as so many barbarian kings are Arians, it is 
because Clovis sees an opportunity of getting into the good graces of the episcopate which is all 
powerful in Gaul. And so on. One will note here that the motif is characterised as an objective 
appreciation of the situation. [...] Nevertheless this objective appreciation can be made only in the 
light of a presupposed end and within the limits of a project of the for-itself toward this end. In order 
for the power of the episcopate to be revealed to Clovis as the cause of his conversion (that is, in 
order for him to be able to envisage the objective consequences which this conversion could have) it 
is necessary first for him to posit as an end the conquest of Gaul.
325
 
 
Motif and mobile are equally distinguished from „cause‟ by virtue of their ontological correlation.     
 
     
                                                          
324
 Ibid., p.471 
325
 Ibid., p.468 
105 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
c) Nihilation of the Self and the Fundamental Project 
It will now be important that we understand what Sartre means by an „end‟ which points to a 
fundamental project. Our explication of his argument in favour of necessary human freedom will 
also involve discussion of consciousness‟ adoption of a particular fundamental project. Finally, it 
will be necessary to determine the effect of a fundamental project on motif and mobile and whether 
they do in fact restrict ontological freedom. The discussion of the fundamental project will therefore 
be separated into two concerns: 
1. How it is possible for consciousness to have a fundamental project? 
2. How can Sartre account for the adoption of a particular fundamental project over any other?    
1. Sartre makes a distinction between an everyday end and a fundamental project. An end 
refers to intentional action, so conscious agents may have any number of everyday ends at any 
given moment. This is how we understand the following:  
 
We should observe first that an action is on principle intentional. The careless smoker who has 
through negligence caused the explosion of a powder magazine has not acted. On the other hand the 
worker who is charged with dynamiting a quarry and who obeys the given orders has acted when he 
has produced the expected explosion; he knew what he was doing or, if you prefer, he intentionally 
realised a conscious project.
326
 
 
Thus for Sartre, „action‟ refers exclusively to deliberate projects. In so doing, Sartre can focus his 
argument on those actions for which moral responsibility is an inherent concern. There is also a 
difference between realising a conscious project and its intention. Realising a project refers to overt 
actions taken toward that project. The intention of a project refers to the goal to be realised by the 
action. For example, obeying orders to explode a quarry may reflect an intentional project but it is 
not therefore the realisation of a fundamental project. Everyday projects only point to a fundamental 
project. Clovis‟ conversion to Christianity was a project much as was conquering Gaul and both 
quite intentional. Nonetheless, these projects are adopted in light of a fundamental project which, in 
the case of Clovis, may be to be the kind of being that is powerful, dominant, feared, respected etc. 
Thus all deliberate or intentional action can be deciphered in a hermeneutic exercise as a 
manifestation of this fundamental ontological directedness in terms of the kind of being a conscious 
agent wants to be. Situating actions in the context of their implied meanings will therefore be 
revealing of that project. This is how we understand the following:  
 
The problem is indeed to disengage (dégager) the meanings implied by an act – by every act – and to 
proceed from there to richer and more profound meanings until we encounter the meaning which 
does not imply any other meaning and which refers only to itself.
327
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The fundamental project is therefore the „meaning which refers only to itself‟. It is consciousness‟ 
primary intention, realised and pointed to by everyday ends.  
Sartre claims that particular ends are rationalised by the fundamental project, revealed by 
extracting the „meanings implied by actions‟. In much the same way, motif and mobile have their 
value conferred on them by the end which expresses a fundamental project. We may return to 
Sartre‟s account of consciousness‟ nihilating faculty to explain the possibility of a fundamental 
project: 
 
It [human reality] has to be this nothingness, as we have seen, in multiple dimensions; first, by 
temporalising itself – i.e., by being always at a distance from itself, which means that it can never let 
itself be determined by its past to perform this or that particular act; second, by rising up as 
consciousness of something and (of) itself – i.e., by being presence to itself and not simply self, 
which implies that nothing exists in consciousness which is not consciousness of existing and 
consequently that nothing external to consciousness can motivate it; and finally, by being 
transcendence – i.e., not something which would first be in order subsequently to put itself into 
relation with this or that end, but on the contrary, a being which is originally a project – i.e., which is 
defined by its end.
328
 
 
These three „dimensions‟ (previously referred to as „ekstases‟) are not listed in chronological order. 
For Sartre, the three ekstases occur simultaneously and immediately. The second ekstasis is 
particularly informative regarding the possibility of a fundamental project. This ekstasis is also 
referred to as „reflection‟ whereby, „the for-itself tries to adopt an external point of view on 
itself‟.329 As we have seen, the reality of being-for-itself is that which „rises up as consciousness of 
something and (of) itself‟. Self-conscious awareness „rises up‟ as a result of the nihilation of the in-
itself which grounds and supports the for-itself.
330
 The cumulative effect of the ekstases concluding 
in transcendence necessitate a fundamental/ontological self-awareness or an effort to grasp oneself 
but at a distance from oneself. Consequently a projection self is cast across the horizon of this 
distance one form of which is the „temporalisation of oneself‟. Consciousness thus reflects on the 
in-itself which it is and which is subject to it. Presence to self, the loss of a unified whole, thus 
originates „human reality‟ as a project to become a certain kind of being: the possibility of a 
fundamental project. This is how we understand the following: 
 
Motifs and mobiles have meaning only inside a projected ensemble which is precisely an ensemble of 
non-existents. And this ensemble is ultimately myself as transcendence; it is Me in so far as I have to 
be myself outside of myself.
331
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2. Though the upsurge of consciousness in its three ekstases accounts for the possibility of a 
fundamental project in Sartre‟s account, it does not explain the adoption of a particular fundamental 
project. In other words, the necessity that consciousness is originally a project does nothing to 
explain pursuing one project over another. Furthermore, if motif and mobile have their value 
conferred on them by fundamental project, they cannot explain why it is adopted. This issue goes to 
the core of Sartre‟s account of choice as suggested by John E. Atwell in his paper, „Sartre‟s 
Conception of Action and His Utilization of Wesensschau‟ as well as other commentators:332 
 
Sartre finds himself faced with a serious problem: how to explain a particular “upsurge” rather than 
an alternative one. He admits, for instance, that Clovis might have found in the “objective” situation 
a motif for any number of actions; so the question arises, “Why did he find a motif for converting to 
Christianity? [...] Unless this can be answered, it seems that Sartre is committed to the very 
capriciousness he wishes to reject.
333
 
 
It is important to note that Atwell‟s explicit concerns are restricted to the motif for a particular end 
such as converting to Christianity. Nonetheless, the „threat of capriciousness‟ in the motif for a 
particular end is equally applicable to the adoption of a fundamental project. Sartre does not provide 
an explicit answer to this problem but it can be extrapolated from what has already been discussed.  
One may interpret this to mean that a particular „upsurge‟ may result from an objective 
apprehension of a determined situation requiring that consciousness become a certain kind of being. 
For example one could argue that prior apprehension of oneself as „inferior‟ or „weak‟ may give 
motif for a fundamental project that changes that situation. Thus a particular fundamental project is 
adopted as a response to an objective apprehension. But this betrays the assumption that a given 
motif is causally related to an action whereas for Atwell (and here we agree) they can only be 
logically related: 
 
Sartre wholly rejects, therefore, the doctrine of mental causation as it applies to action; for he 
maintains, in effect, that so-called “mental causes” are logically related to actions rather than 
causally related. To explain why someone did something is, on his view, to cite the agent‟s end, or 
motif, or mobile, hence something logically connected with his doing it, and as a consequence 
something which, by definition, cannot be the cause of his doing it.
334
 
 
We would add that the threat of capriciousness itself is only possible if one fails to take those 
contexts into account, which is to say that one has „missed the point‟.335  
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We may recall that for Sartre, „human reality [consciousness] is originally a project‟. Therefore 
consciousness immediately arises with a fundamental project: the fundamental project and 
consciousness occur simultaneously. Sartrean intentionality requires that consciousness must rise up 
as part of the „plenum‟336 of being which includes the fundamental project. Since consciousness is 
always consciousness of something which it is not, consciousness is immediately confronted by a 
project to determine itself.
337
 On our interpretation of Sartre, consciousness is caught in a permanent 
crisis of self-identification. If consciousness must be a project it is because consciousness must be at 
a distance from itself, that is, in transcendence towards its possibilities. The inability to establish a 
pre-existing cause determining that consciousness adopts a particular project is necessitated by the 
ekstasis of transcendence. In this sense the threat of capriciousness is more observation than 
criticism. Sartre‟s account of choice rests on the principle that consciousness is originally 
„capricious‟ but develops reasons for acting and motive thereafter. Capriciousness, far from 
rendering choice meaningless, is quite precisely what allows consciousness to confer meaning onto 
its ends. It functions as a confirmation of Sartre‟s project: 
 
If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will 
not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human 
nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. [...] Man is nothing else 
but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism.
338
 
 
Sartre fails to address the threat of capriciousness because he simply does not see it as a threat. The 
fundamental project cannot point to a prior project to provide it meaning in much same way that 
„the constitution of a motif cannot refer to another real and positive existence, a prior motif‟. 339 
Sartre makes this point clear in the introduction to BN where he tends to avoid the „eclecticisms‟340 
attributed to his writing in later chapters: 
 
This self-determination of consciousness must not be conceived as a genesis, as a becoming, for that 
would force us to suppose that consciousness is prior to its own existence. Neither is it necessary to 
conceive of this self-creation as an act, for in that case consciousness would be conscious (of) itself 
as an act, which it is not. Consciousness is a plenum of existence, and this determination of itself by 
itself is an essential characteristic. It would even be wise not to misuse the expression “cause of self,” 
which allows us to suppose a progression, a relation of self-cause to self-effect. It would be more 
exact to say very simply: The existence of consciousness comes from consciousness itself.
341
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This we understand to mean that therefore consciousness neither originates its project nor does it 
deliberately create and maintain a project. As a „plenum of existence‟ consciousness refers almost 
to an accidental composition perpetuating itself. Thus Atwell is correct to state that what Sartre calls 
„one‟s choice of self‟ is ultimate „and being ultimate it is no more explainable than any other 
ultimate‟.342 In this sense, we understand efforts to explain the „choice of self‟ in terms of empirical 
non-existence; impossible to conceive. On our interpretation of Sartre, intentionality founded by a 
pre-judicative comprehension of non-being constitutes an absolute such that any effort to ground 
consciousness must return to consciousness. As the locus of meaning, the enquiry, its constitution, 
symbolic values and aims are ultimately an expression of consciousness‟ nihilating activity. 
Therefore there can be no causal account to explain the adoption of a particular fundamental project 
which would not undermine the robust ontological freedom Sartre wants since that freedom is 
bound by the same absolute condition of consciousness. Nevertheless, the idea that the fundamental 
project rises up by virtue of nothing also severs any attempt to provide an account of the being of 
consciousness. If the choice of self is ultimate, then there can be no account of self which is not 
already reflective of a fundamental project. Taking Sartre at his word, if Clovis‟ conversion to 
Christianity is not explained by the influence of divine grace but indicates a project to be feared, 
respected and powerful then Sartre‟s proposal of non-being at the heart of being is not an expression 
of his meditation on the question of being but is ultimately explained by an ulterior, private motive. 
Of course one may argue that Sartre‟s argument still allows for the possibility that one may have a 
fundamental project which involves performing ontological enquiry and doing so adequately. In 
other words, this would be to say that conceding the disingenuousness of Clovis‟ conversion need 
not necessitate invalidating the possibility of taking sincere steps to salvation. But on our reading of 
Sartre, this would still be missing the point. The ultimacy of choice of self and the absolute of pre-
judicative comprehension of non-being mean that the very criteria by which we determine 
adequacy, accuracy, significance and value of either Clovis‟ conversion or Sartre‟s proposal are 
themselves constituted by our individual fundamental projects. In this respect, far from establishing 
a relationship between two regions of being, Sartre‟s inclusion of nothingness necessitates that all 
ontology is ultimately grounded in the particular constitution of the enquirer. Phenomenological 
ontology on Sartre‟s terms therefore does not describe the most appropriate means by which to 
approach the question of being but explains the redundancy of the question given the absolute 
capriciousness of my being. Nevertheless, Sartre‟s argument for ontological freedom is accounted 
for precisely by the ultimacy of one‟s choice of self since it therefore imposes a robust ontological 
                                                          
342
 John E. Atwell, Sartre‟s Conception of Action and His Utilization of Wesensschau, Man and World, Vol.5 
No.2 (1972) p.148 
110 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
responsibility on consciousness as such. It is in this sense that we claim accepting Sartre‟s argument 
for freedom requires abandoning his claim that it is based in fundamental ontology. 
d) „Constitution‟ of the World Such as it is 
The final „subordinate notion‟343 in Sartre‟s hierarchy of action and the explication of choice as 
a feature of ontological freedom is what we will refer to as constituting the world such as it is: 
 
[...]to act is to modify the shape of the world; it is to arrange means in view of an end; it is to 
produce an organised instrumental complex such that by a series of concatenations and connections 
the modification effected on one of the links amène (causes) modifications  throughout the whole 
series and finally produces an anticipated result. But this is not what is important for us here. [...] For 
an act is a projection of the for-itself toward what it is not, and what is can in no way determine by 
itself what is not.
344
 
 
We understand this as reflective of two key and related points. Once again, Sartre emphasises his 
claim that „what is can in no way determine by itself what is not‟. Insofar as, for Sartre, all acts are 
principally intentional then all acts are founded by non-being originating in the for-itself and this is 
„what is important‟ for us to recognise. Sartre‟s other point on modifying the shape of the world is 
nevertheless contextualised by the projection of the „for-itself‟. Thus, on our interpretation the 
modification of the shape of the world refers to the objective reality of nothingness and the 
determinative effect the for-itself has on its experience. Constitution of the world such as it is, in 
this respect at least thus refers to the fundamental project of the for-itself, determining 
consciousness‟ experience of the world. That said, Sartre distinguishes overt action, i.e. 
„modification of the world‟ from action as a „projection of the for-itself‟ but these are not 
independent kinds of action. For Sartre, objective apprehensions of overt action are impossible 
without nihilation. Modifying the world presupposes the whole structure of nihilation, the 
fundamental project its consequent motifs and mobiles.  
Though one may distinguish the apprehension of a determined situation from its constitution as 
a motif in the light of an end, objective apprehensions cannot arise independently of those ends. For 
Sartre, the apprehension of a situation is influenced by preceding ends. Thus the perception of the 
Catholic Church‟s power does not happen to occur to Clovis before constituting it as a motif for 
conversion to Christianity. Its power is apprehended in light of the decision to conquer Gaul. 
Conversion consolidates Clovis‟ position in order to achieve the preceding end. Objective 
apprehensions are concurrent to the constitution of motifs so consciousness‟ objective apprehension 
of the world is simultaneously its constitution of the world such as it is. Crucially, both 
apprehension of a „fact‟, such as the power of the Church and a motif, such as this same power as a 
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reason to convert to Christianity, are devoid of meaning in the absence of the subject‟s fundamental 
project. Sartre provides an example which will illuminate what we are referring to as 
consciousness‟ constitutive capacity: 
 
In a sense, certainly, man is the only being by whom a destruction can be accomplished. A 
geological plication, a storm do not destroy – or at least they do not destroy directly; they merely 
modify the distribution of masses of beings. There is no less after the storm than before. There is 
something else. Even this expression is improper, for to posit otherness there must be a witness who 
can retain the past in some manner and compare it to the present in the form of no longer. [...] If a 
cyclone can bring about the death of certain living beings, this death will be destruction only if it is 
experienced as such. In order for destruction to exist, there must be first a relation of man to being – 
i.e., a transcendence; and within the limits of this relation, it is necessary that man apprehend one 
being as destructible. [...] Thus it is man who renders cities destructible, precisely because he posits 
them as fragile and as precious because he adopts a system of protective measures with regard to 
them.
345
 
 
Of course Sartre is not defending the notion that geological catastrophes are the responsibility of 
their victims.
346
 The point is rather that destruction is constituted as such in light of a project which 
valued what is now destroyed. The formation of the planets, the evolution of the species or the 
volcanic eruption of Mount Vesuvius, acquire their meaning from consciousness which constitutes 
them as „the Big Bang‟, „natural selection‟ or „the destruction of Pompeii and Herculaneum‟. Thus 
the constitution of what we colloquially refer to as the world such as it is does not describe the 
ability of consciousness to manifest a rock in orbit around the Sun but its ability to confer meaning 
onto that rock such that it is „the world‟. By equal measure therefore it will follow that creation also 
demands that „there must be first a relation of man to being‟ since modifying the distribution of 
masses of beings could also lead to building cities. The point seems to be that the symbolic values 
and hermeneutic signifiers which comprise our everyday experience presuppose „man‟s 
transcendence‟. Of course if man renders cities destructible where they would otherwise be merely 
redistributed, then the transcendence of the for-itself and consciousness‟ fundamental project refer 
exclusively to the appearance of things and not in their redistributive mode, that is, not in 
themselves. If, on the other hand and as Sartre states, „the appearance is the essence‟ then on our 
reading, he is compelled to either embrace Kantian transcendental idealism (and thus abandon 
fundamental ontology) or abandon all efforts to describe being(s) without a presupposed perceiver. 
Moreover, given the ultimacy of the fundamental project as a necessary feature of consciousness, 
Sartre‟s appeal to „destruction‟ as a „geological plication‟ becomes necessarily incomprehensible. 
He implicitly acknowledges this in the phrase, „even this expression is improper‟ since on our 
reading, it is impossible to conceive of the world without presupposing oneself as the perceiver. In 
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this sense, there can be no description of „destruction‟ that has not already had its meaning 
conferred onto it. After all, a „geological plication‟, a „redistribution of beings‟ and „destruction‟ are 
all premised on a „relation of man to being‟. Thus presumably, „destruction‟ will to some extent be 
dependent on the orientation of my fundamental project which may find opportunity in despair.           
The constitution of the world is an inherent feature of the fundamental project in Sartrean 
freedom. He offers an example from the fundamental project of inferiority, realised in the 
constitution of the world as the motif for fatigue: 
   
I start out on a hike with friends. At the end of several hours of walking my fatigue increases and 
finally becomes very painful. At first I resist and then suddenly I let myself go, I give up, I throw my 
knapsack down on the side of the road and let myself fall down beside it. [...] [C]ould I have done 
otherwise without perceptibly modifying the organic totality of the projects which I am; or is the fact 
of resisting my fatigue such that instead of remaining a purely local and accidental modification of 
my behaviour, it could be effected only by means of a radical transformation of my being-in-the-
world – a transformation, moreover, which is possible? In other words: I could have done otherwise. 
Agreed. But at what price? [...] Let us note first that fatigue by itself could not provoke my decision. 
As we saw with respect to physical pain, fatigue is only the way in which I exist my body. [...] It is 
only on this plane that the fatigue will appear to me as bearable or intolerable. It will never be 
anything in itself, but it is the reflective For-itself which rising up suffers the fatigue as intolerable. 
[...] The way in which I suffer my fatigue is in no way dependent on the chance difficulty of the 
slope which I am climbing or on the more or less restless night which I have spent; these factors can 
contribute to constituting my fatigue itself but not to the way in which I suffer it. [...] That a certain 
passionate and tense way of struggling against the fatigue can express what is called an inferiority 
complex we shall not deny. But the inferiority complex itself is a project of my own for-itself in the 
world in the presence of the Other. [...] To give in to fatigue, for example, is to transcend the path by 
causing („à faire‟) it to constitute itself in the meaning of “a path too difficult to traverse.” [...] Thus 
the inferiority complex is a free and global project of myself as inferior before others; it is the way in 
which I choose to assume my being-for-others [...]
347
 
   
That the degree of the slope traversed and the conditioning of one‟s body contributes to fatigue is 
central to understanding the constitution of the world. The onset of fatigue does not determine its 
experience as „intolerable‟, „painful‟ or „motivating‟. It is, as Sartre says, only the way „I exist my 
body‟. Similarly, the rising power of the Catholic Church does not determine its use as motif for 
converting to Christianity. Rather the intolerability of fatigue i.e. its counting as a reason to stop 
walking is conferred onto the walk up a slope only in light of a fundamental project. Thus one may 
feel physical fatigue but the question of tolerance or difficulty is indicative of transcendence and a 
projection of the possibility that this slope is „intolerable‟ or otherwise. If difficulty is not an 
empirical measure but an experiential appraisal constituted by the conscious agent involved then it 
will follow therefore that all intentional action is an expression of consciousness‟ fundamental 
project. This is how we understand the following: 
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This way of yielding to fatigue and of letting myself fall down at the side of the road expresses a 
certain initial stiffening against my body and the inanimate in-itself. it is placed within the compass 
of a certain view of the world in which difficulties can appear “not worth the trouble of being 
tolerated”; or, to be exact, since the motive is a pure non-thetic consciousness and consequently an 
initial project of itself toward an absolute end (a certain aspect of the in-itself-for-itself), it is an 
apprehension of the world (warmth, distance from the city, uselessness of effort, etc.) as the cause 
(„motif‟) of my ceasing to walk.348 
 
All acts are therefore understood by their end which reveals an underlying fundamental project. In 
this respect, consciousness is presented by Sartre as an organised whole, always self-aware and 
always expressing its projects. This is what Sartre refers to as the „ascending dialectic‟ which is 
„practiced spontaneously by most people‟ and that „it can even be established that in knowledge of 
oneself or of another there is given a spontaneous comprehension of this hierarchy or 
interpretations‟.349 The brevity of his claim here does not detract from its plausibility in our 
estimation. If internal negation necessarily proceeds from intentional consciousness as 
consciousness of something which it is not, then the self may be intuitively aware of the 
fundamental project expressed by all actions. This may be what Sartre means by his assertion that, 
„in a certain way, we can say that human reality is surprised by nothing.‟ „By the very nature of 
one‟s project‟ one may „reserve temples for unknown gods‟ or „create a certain margin of 
indetermination‟ in anticipation of the „unpredictable‟. 350 To a certain extent, the nature of the 
fundamental project may already include anticipation of otherwise „unpredictable‟ events.   
We may draw three conclusions from our outline of the constitution of the world such as it is. 
First is its inherency to the fundamental project and therefore nihilation and choice as necessary to 
consciousness. For Sartre, neither the constitutive capacity of consciousness nor the way the world 
is constituted can be accounted for by appeal to empirical occurrences prior to action. Constitution 
must happen in light of a fundamental project. Furthermore, similarity with the „intentional 
structure‟ of motif and mobile reflects the ontological character of intentional consciousness. 
Second, is the idea that all action presupposes and is directed to satisfying a fundamental project. 
For Sartre, this is even true of actions that seem detrimental to the agent involved. Constitution of 
the world may express a fundamental project to experience the limitations of one‟s body while 
walking up an arduous slope or the scale of one‟s ambition in the conversion to Christianity. In 
either case, whether by appeal to Wesensschau,
351
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of spontaneous intuition, all actions can be rationalised when seen in the context of a fundamental 
project. Finally, understanding what Sartre means by „modifying the shape of the world‟ where the 
point is not to dispute an empirical account of the world but to explicate conferring meaning onto 
occurrences as such. In light of these conclusions and Sartre‟s overall account of action, we may 
state that for Sartre, intentionality grounded in non-being establishes a robust ontological freedom 
on consciousness. If all human comportment in the world is indicative of a fundamental project, that 
is, if it is ultimately indicative of transcendence establishing a relation to being(s) in terms of 
possibility, then experience as such is the responsibility of consciousness. As we have seen, this 
does not mean to say that consciousness creates reality as such but that the symbolic values and 
hermeneutic signifiers of all experience and indeed experience as such, originates in the 
fundamental nihilation which grounds the for-itself in the loss of the in-itself as such. It is on the 
basis of the ultimacy of this characteristic of consciousness that Sartre proposes the necessity of 
ontological freedom; not the freedom to choose or will as one wishes but the freedom to transcend 
being(s) toward the projection of possibilities constituting the world. It is on the same basis that we 
therefore claim that the success of Sartre‟s argument for ontological freedom will depend on the 
validity of his interpretation of intentionality in the framework of Heideggerian fundamental 
ontology.  
 
iii) An Assessment of the Argument 
We may now state that ontological freedom refers to the „autonomy of choice‟, a feature of 
intentional consciousness. As explained, this is Sartre‟s idea that consciousness is always 
consciousness of something which it is not, necessitating the transcendence of the for-itself and the 
permanent reality of non-being. The resulting law of presence to self establishes consciousness‟ 
ontological responsibility since nihilation must be active. Its autonomy reflects the claim that the 
fundamental project is an ultimate which cannot refer to a prior existence but arises out of absolute 
nothingness. Sartre‟s argument for ontological freedom is thus supported by the impossibility of 
passive nihilation and the necessity of active nihilation. Choice therefore is not an observation of 
external alternatives but a symptom of consciousness‟ active nihilation. Furthermore, Sartre argues 
that the adoption of a particular project will influence the apprehension of alternatives available to 
an agent, constituting them as motifs or mobiles for a given action. Finally, he argues the upsurge of 
a particular fundamental project is simultaneous to nihilation such that to be conscious is always to 
be engaged in a project. Conscious experience is thus the ontological responsibility of 
consciousness which on our reading, is to say that consciousness is the ontological origin of 
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meaning. In this sense then, ontological truth is itself bound up in the fundamental project and the 
upsurge of the for-itself. Thus for Sartre, the mobile, the act, and the end are all constituted in a 
single upsurge: 
 
Each of these three structures claims the two others as its meaning. But the organised totality of the 
three is no longer explained by any particular structure, and its upsurge as the pure temporalising 
nihilation of the in-itself is one with freedom. It is the act which decides its ends and its mobiles, and 
the act is the expression of freedom.
353
 
 
If „it is the act which decides its ends‟ and „the act is the expression of freedom‟ and if in the 
preceding outline we have correctly interpreted action in Sartre‟s project as fundamentally 
intentional, then freedom here refers simply to the ontological necessity of transcendence. 
Ontological freedom thus describes the character of consciousness as the in-itself losing itself as 
such and bound by presence to self, necessitating adoption of a fundamental project. He summarises 
it at the outset of his discussion of freedom: 
 
It [human-reality] is free because it is perpetually wrenched away from itself and because it has been 
separated by a nothingness from what is and from what will be. It is free, finally, because its present 
being is itself a nothingness in the form of the “reflection-reflecting”. Man is free because he is not 
himself but presence to himself.
354
     
 
As we have seen, the law of presence to self simply describes the perpetual loss of the in-itself as 
in-itself establishing the upsurge of the for-itself. Nevertheless, Sartre‟s claim that freedom is 
entailed by the nihilating faculties of consciousness may be more of a hindrance than a help. 
Although Sartre infers ontological freedom from active nihilation and his interpretation of 
intentionality, this also means that criticism of the argument for necessary freedom can be 
generalised across the project as a whole. The entirety of Sartre‟s project can arguably be 
understood as an attempt to associate ontological freedom with active nihilation and intentional 
consciousness. As Sartre himself states: 
 
Thus freedom as the requisite condition for the nihilation of nothingness is not a property which 
belongs among others to the essence of the human being. [...] What we call freedom is impossible to 
distinguish from the being of “human reality”. Man does not exist first in order to be free 
subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free.
355
 
 
Here we understand the „nihilation of nothingness‟ as a reference to active nihilation or the 
impossibility of passive nihilation. On our reading therefore, every aspect of Sartre‟s project is 
geared toward establishing the freedom of human reality. Thus it will follow that criticism of 
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Sartrean intentionality will undermine his argument for ontological freedom. Our assessment of 
Sartre‟s argument for necessary freedom will reflect this problem: it is successful on condition it 
abandon the premises shared with Heidegger‟s fundamental ontology. We have seen that Sartre‟s 
appeal to Descartes and the inclusion of nothingness to address concerns with Husserl and 
ultimately Heidegger is intended to establish consciousness epistemologically and to infer an 
ontological freedom from there. Sartre‟s explicit aim to establish a relationship between his two 
regions of being while avoiding metaphysical dualisms can only be achieved by necessitating a 
permanent and irreconcilable distance from being(s). If, as Sartre states, human reality is 
perpetually „wrenched away from itself‟ by virtue of a fundamental nihilation grounding the for-
itself in non-being, then the ontology of consciousness is itself and of necessity reducible to the 
expression or the act of a particular upsurge. As the locus of meaning, consciousness ultimately 
bears the responsibility for ontological truth itself such that an enquiry into what being(s) are as 
such will reveal not the truth of being(s) but the fundamental project which confers their value and 
that of the enquiry itself. This, on our reading, is expressed in the necessity of transcendence which 
anchors Sartre‟s argument for ontological freedom. In this respect, Sartre effectively substitutes an 
understanding of the possibility of being(s) by an existential analytic of consciousness. In other 
words, in establishing transcendence as an ontological absolute, consciousness is bound to itself as 
the „reflection-reflecting‟ perpetually re-affirming only its own freedom.  
Before explicating this problem further it is important that we distinguish it from the criticism 
of everyday experience. Asserting the necessity of alternatives inherent to consciousness obligates 
Sartre to account for the difficulty of directing consciousness towards new projects. In other words, 
„conceiving of a different state of affairs‟, the necessary predicate for a workers revolution in 1830, 
should already be possible given ontological freedom. Declaring the situation „unbearable‟ need not 
require great effort. Sartre‟s discussion of the „inferiority complex‟ offers a solution. He claims that 
inferiority is not undermined by the possibility of an alternative project. The difficulty of a given 
task and the consequent experience of inferiority are already inherent to the adopted project: 
 
If I question one of my companions, he will explain to me that he is fatigued, of course, but that he 
loves his fatigue; he gives himself up to it as to a bath;[...]
356
 
 
Both fatigue and inferiority, disclose a particular conscious project. In this case, acquiescence to 
fatigue confers meaning onto the task, reflecting a project of inferiority. Thus difficulty in adopting 
new projects does not qualify as evidence against Sartre‟s argument. It reflects a project of 
difficulty, constituting the experience of transition. 
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We have stated that Sartre‟s seeming substitution of an understanding of beings instead of 
establishing the permanent transcendence of the for-itself is problematic particularly in respect of 
his effort to establish consciousness epistemologically and the distancing inherent to nihilation. We 
have also discussed Sartre‟s anthropocentrism and the contingency of ontological truth on 
consciousness.
357
 Therein human reality is reduced to the constitutive powers of consciousness 
rendering the experience of the world little more than an expression of a fundamental project. 
Moreover, Sartre‟s attempt to explicate an epistemic proof of consciousness betrays a predilection 
for metaphysical dualisms and he is acutely aware of this risk:  
 
The reduction of consciousness to knowledge in fact involves our introducing into consciousness the 
subject-object dualism which is typical of knowledge.
358   
 
He continues to assert that failing to include knowledge in an ontology of consciousness invites the 
risk that „we always bump up against a non-self-conscious reflection and a final term‟.359 This is 
what he otherwise refers to as the danger inherent to Heidegger‟s ontology which he claims portrays 
consciousness as „thing-like, blind in-itself‟.360 It is our contention that this is only a risk on 
condition of misinterpreting the „non-self conscious reflection‟ of Heidegger‟s account.361 All these 
issues converge in Sartre‟s argument for necessary freedom: i) the substitution of fundamental 
ontology for an existential analytic, ii) anthropocentrism and iii) the fallacy of „establishing 
consciousness epistemologically‟, are inherent to the argument from active nihilation.  
i) In our discussion of the threat of capriciousness, we agreed with Atwell‟s reading that as an 
„ultimate the fundamental project is no more explicable than any other ultimate‟. More to 
the point, its ultimacy means that nothing but consciousness itself can originate a 
fundamental project. This ultimacy is precisely what, on our interpretation of Sartre, 
guarantees ontological freedom since choice and action are constituted in light of a 
fundamental project and that must be the responsibility of consciousness. Nevertheless, we 
contend that the same ultimacy demands that Sartre replace a Heideggerian analysis of 
being by an existential analytic of consciousness. Since, as Sartre argues and as we have 
explained, consciousness must rise up as a fundamental project and thus must originate 
itself, then any ontological enquiry can only reflect that fundamental project. The problem 
of course is not merely having the project of performing ontological enquiry but that 
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therefore the most authentic enquiry is bound by the law of presence to self to reveal 
nothing but the enquiring consciousness. In discussion of Clovis‟ conversion to Christianity 
we states that of course, one may still interpret Sartre‟s argument as allowing for the 
possibility of a fundamental project which involves performing ontological enquiry and 
adequately. But this strikes us as missing the point since the choice of self is an „ultimate‟ 
and the pre-judicative comprehension of non-being refers to an absolute. The combination 
of these mean that the adequacy, accuracy and value of an ontological enquiry is equally 
determined or constituted by the upsurge of the for-itself as a fundamental project. On our 
reading, the prioritisation of Dasein and consciousness reflected a methodological principle 
establishing a factical hermeneutics that served the dual purpose of avoiding rationalist 
disengagement and compelling a direct confrontation with the understanding inherent to 
everyday comportment. The ultimacy of the fundamental project, far from grounding 
comportment in being, abandons any such effort in favour of an existential analytic of 
consciousness: 
 
Consciousness is in fact a project of founding itself; that is, of attaining to the dignity of the in-
itself-for-itself or in-itself-as-cause. But we can not [sic] derive anything further from this. [...] 
Ontology here comes up against a profound contradiction since it is through the for-itself that the 
possibility of a foundation comes to the world. In order to be a project of founding itself, the in-
itself would of necessity have to be originally a presence to itself – i.e., it would have to be 
already consciousness. Ontology will therefore limit itself to declaring that everything takes place 
as if the in-itself in a project to found itself gave itself the modification of the for-itself.
362
 
 
It is this „profound contradiction‟ which we claim is not inherent to ontology, as Sartre 
asserts, but to the substitution of ontological truth by an existential analytic of 
consciousness. If, as Sartre states, it is „through the for-itself that the possibility of a 
foundation comes to the world‟ then it will indeed be the case that ontology is necessarily 
restricted to beginning from the hypothetical, „as if‟. Moreover, if as we have seen, the for-
itself is fundamentally supported by the loss of the in-itself as such, that is, if it is indeed 
grounded in non-being (i.e. in not being its objects) then enquiry into its possibility can only 
reinforce the whole upsurge. Enquiry into the ground of consciousness is thus always-
already re-routed to consciousness‟ project to found itself. This is at the core of what we 
have referred to as the impossibility of passive nihilation under-pinning Sartre‟s argument 
for ontological freedom. It is in this sense that we argue that Sartre‟s argument for freedom 
substitutes the ambition to develop Heidegger‟s fundamental ontology by an existential 
analytic of consciousness bound by the presence to self which characterises it.  
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ii) This emphasis on the significance of consciousness in what is otherwise an investigation 
into being(s) as such also results in what we have referred to as anthropocentrism. Therein 
the absolute character of the for-itself demands that all ontology begin and end with 
consciousness such that it originates the interpretive matrix of values and signifiers that 
make up human experience. This is no more apparent than in the combined accounts of the 
constitution of the world and consciousness as the origin of nothingness. In respect of the 
former and as we have seen, for Sartre the upsurge of the for-itself necessitates that the 
totality of symbolic values and hermeneutic signifiers are constituted across the projection 
of its possibilities. This, in part, established consciousness‟ ontological responsibility 
insofar as all meaning is contingent upon the upsurge of the for-itself as a project 
conditioned by nothing „external to‟ itself. The very possibility of an encounter with 
being(s) is thereby contingent on active nihilation which simultaneously mediates the 
encounter and establishes transcendence of the for-itself. In very direct terms therefore, 
Sartre‟s project is anthropocentrically oriented to the detriment of an effort to pursue an 
ontology which otherwise restricts the prioritisation of consciousness to a methodological 
principle. Sartre‟s statements about consciousness as „its own nihilation‟ will serve to 
summarise the problem in respect of the origin of nothingness:  
 
Thus consciousness holds within itself its own being-as-consciousness, and since it is its own 
nihilation, it can refer only to itself; but that which is annihilated in consciousness [...] is the 
contingent in-itself. The in-itself can not provide the foundation for anything; if it founds itself, it 
does so by giving itself the modification of the for-itself.
363
 
 
On our reading, Sartre here reinforces two related claims central to his argument for 
freedom and his project as a whole. Moreover, though our current concern is the question of 
anthropocentrism, these claims are indicative of the dualism that persists in Sartre‟s project. 
Thus we understand the first claim on consciousness‟ being-as-consciousness and the 
nihilation at the heart of the „contingent in-itself‟ as a reference to the ultimacy of the 
fundamental project and the absolute character of the transcendence of the for-itself. In this 
respect, as „its own nihilation‟ consciousness is bound to a reflection of itself in all its 
comportments such that even what is nihilated is the in-itself in its mode of contingency on 
consciousness. As we have argued, this necessitates that ontological enquiry therefore, that 
is the possibility of establishing ontological truth, is rendered impossible since any effort to 
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ground the loss of the in-itself as in-itself must refer only to consciousness. In other words, 
enquiry cannot surmount the limitations of the original nihilation establishing the upsurge 
of the for-itself. Thus on one hand, the in-itself is inexplicable without the for-itself, since it 
„cannot provide the foundation for anything‟ and on the other, the two regions of being only 
appear on condition of nihilation. But this problem is clear almost from the outset: 
  
Consciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure “appearance” in the sense that it exists only to 
the degree to which it appears. But it is precisely because consciousness is pure appearance, 
because it is total emptiness (since the entire world is outside it) – it is because of this identity of 
appearance and existence within it that it can be considered as the absolute.
364
 
 
„This identity of appearance and existence‟ we understand in the sense that consciousness is 
appearance. One can say that consciousness is only insofar as it appears and primarily to 
itself. By equal measure therefore and in our estimation it follows that consciousness would 
cease to exist as such were it no longer apparent principally to itself. In one respect this 
merely reinforces the claim that consciousness is necessarily both intentional (always 
engaged in directedness) since its existence presupposes its presence to itself and 
transcendent (directedness characterised by a pre-judicative non-being) since presence to 
self presupposes a nihilation not permitting of absolute identification with the self. In 
another respect, the absolute-ness of consciousness, that is, its appearance grounded in 
transcendence necessitates that consciousness can only understand itself by appeal to 
nothing. In other words, even consciousness enquiry into itself can only be pursued across 
an ontological distance establishing an appearance in respect of possibilities, that is, as a 
pro-ject. On our reading therefore, Sartre‟s anthropocentric orientation is such that 
consciousness is necessarily severed from an understanding of even itself, much less the 
„entire world‟ which is „outside it‟, other than as a phantasmic expression of its own 
nothingness. But this, we contend, is a risk inherent to Sartre‟s effort to establish a 
Cartesian epistemic proof of consciousness.   
iii) We have previously acknowledged that Sartre‟s interpretation of intentionality is intended 
to adjust an error expressed by Heidegger‟s Dasein. For Sartre, the failure to establish 
consciousness epistemologically to supplement the ontological account risks an ethical 
ambiguity or worse the loss of accountability. He therefore appeals to Descartes and the 
„pre-reflective cogito‟ to address this concern. To that end it will be helpful to note that 
Sartre does not want to argue for an epistemic basis for consciousness and its primary mode 
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of self-reflection as such. This is how we interpret his criticism of what he calls the 
„knower-known dyad‟: 
 
But if we accept the law of the knower-known dyad, then a third term will be necessary in order 
for the knower to become known in turn, and we will be faced with this dilemma: either we stop 
at any one term of the series – the known, the knower known, the knower known by the knower, 
etc. In this case the totality of the phenomenon falls into the unknown; that is, we always bump 
up against a non-self-conscious reflection and a final term. Or else we affirm the necessity of an 
infinite regress (idea ideae ideae, etc.), which is absurd.
365
  
 
The problem he identifies is simple: a „self‟ confirmable by what is „known‟ raises the 
question of who knows. One of only two options are therefore available and neither is 
particularly helpful in respect of disclosing the knower: either assert a „non self-conscious 
reflection and a final term‟ that is a prime-knower, unknown as it were or accept the 
absurdity of an infinite regress of knower-known relations. Thus Sartre argues that it will be 
necessary to identify „an immediate, non-cognitive relation of the self to itself‟366 which he 
calls the „condition of the Cartesian cogito‟: 
 
Thus reflection has no kind of primacy over the consciousness reflected-on to itself. Quite the 
contrary, it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection possible; there is a 
pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito.
367
 
 
We interpret this „non-reflective consciousness‟ or the „pre-reflective cogito‟ to be a 
correlate of the pre-judicative comprehension of non-being established by the loss of the in-
itself as itself thus supporting consciousness‟ ekstasis of transcendence and presence to self. 
We nevertheless contend that Sartre‟s appeal to Descartes firstly risks rephrasing the 
presupposition of the „I‟ in the cogito and secondly reconstituting rationalist ontologies of 
disengagement. In respect of our first concern we may return to Sartre‟s argument that in 
the „knower-known dyad‟, „the totality of the phenomenon falls into the unknown‟. In 
respect of Descartes therefore the epistemic certainty of the „I‟ is anchored in the perfection 
of God and thus „bumps up against‟ a „final term‟ which will not permit of self-conscious 
reflection. The totality of the „knower-known dyad‟ is thus presupposed in the assertion of 
absolute. Nevertheless, Sartre‟s non-reflective consciousness is not on our reading, 
sufficient to evade this problem but only internalises the ultimacy which grounds the 
Cartesian cogito in the transcendence of the for-itself. In similar terms therefore, „the 
totality falls into the unknown‟ since reflection, that is the appearance of consciousness to 
itself, is bound by the original nihilation establishing its upsurge. It is in this respect that we 
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express the second concern that Sartre risks reconstituting rationalist ontologies of 
disengagement. The internalisation, that is, the ontologising of the Cartesian model in terms 
of the „pre-reflective cogito‟, on our reading at least, enshrines the detached „view from 
nowhere‟ as a necessary characteristic of the condition of experience as such.              
In light of these three concerns, we claim that the ultimacy of the fundamental project 
constitutes a substitution of fundamental ontology by an existential analytic of consciousness. 
Moreover, we argue that the general anthropocentric orientation of Sartre‟s project ultimately 
undermines the very possibility of ontological truth that was ostensibly guiding his investigation. 
Finally „establishing consciousness epistemologically‟, far from overcoming the „embarrassing 
dualisms‟ inherent to ontologies of disengagement which obstructs being from appearance, merely 
internalises the rationalist model by characterising conscious experience in terms of transcendence 
predicated on „pre-reflective‟, „permanent‟, „objective‟ and thus absolute non-being. On our reading 
and as we have seen, these are all internal features of Sartre‟s argument for necessary freedom. 
While we contend that it does provide a defensible account of the impossibility of passive nihilation 
or the necessity of self-aware autonomy, this is still insufficient for an argument in favour of 
freedom derived from a fundamental ontology of consciousness and being(s) as such. If, as our 
explication has sought to demonstrate, Sartre establishes a robust freedom from his interpretation of 
intentionality grounded by non-being then it will follow that the success of his argument will 
depend on the validity of intentional-nihilating consciousness within the framework of fundamental 
ontology. It is in this respect that we argue an assessment of Sartre‟s argument reveals that its 
success is directly proportional to the abandonment of its primary concern: an ontology of 
consciousness which avoids the problems inherent to disconnected dualisms, progressing a 
Heideggerian fundamental ontology which achieves this by conceiving the prioritisation of human 
experience as a methodological principle. Thus, though Sartre bases his project on the critique of 
what we have referred to as rationalism and the disengaged approach to enquiry, his effort to 
establish consciousness epistemologically and by appeal to nothingness recapitulates that model and 
obfuscates an argument in favour of a primordial, ontological freedom.  
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V 
The Ontological Primordiality of Freedom 
 
Our analysis of Heidegger‟s view of freedom will, in the main, be restricted to two texts: 368 
The Essence of Human Freedom
369
 (EHF) and The Essence of Truth
370
 (ET), taken from lecture 
courses delivered at the University of Freiburg from the summer of 1930 to the winter of 1931. Far 
from being a peculiarity in Heidegger‟s thought, we will argue that careful explication of these texts 
reveal the importance of freedom to his project as a whole. We will offer an interpretation of 
Heidegger‟s account in respect of fundamental ontology and the question of being much as we have 
explicated the relationship between Sartre‟s account of freedom to his project. Our analysis of 
Sartre ultimately revealed what, on our reading at least, is a serious though often misdiagnosed 
weakness in his argument. In short, we contend that Sartre‟s effort to establish consciousness 
epistemologically as an anchor for his argument in favour of freedom in fact undermines his 
ontological premises, severely weakening his attempt to establish freedom as a non-dualistic and 
necessary feature of experience. More to the point, we have argued that the degree to which Sartre‟s 
argument fails is directly attributable to the degree of his dependence on a Cartesian model of 
consciousness. The problem of course is not the appeal to Descartes as such but what we have 
referred to as the „ontologising‟ of the Cartesian model which reinforces the „detached view from 
nowhere‟ of rationalist, that is, disengaged methodology. Rather than correcting an oversight in 
Heidegger‟s account of Dasein, as was his ostensible concern, Sartre subverts its fundamental 
premises. The success of Heidegger‟s argument in favour of freedom will therefore depend, in part, 
on avoiding similar rationalist characterisations and presuppositions. On our interpretation, the 
complexity of the two texts under consideration herein is partly due to Heidegger‟s effort to do just 
that and thus discards the vigour of his approach in favour of „feeling his way forward‟. This is how 
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we understand his claim that „definition is what is least suitable for grasping an essence‟.371 In his 
paper, „The Destiny of Freedom in Heidegger‟, Hans Ruin notes that Heidegger‟s,  
 
[...] abyssal freedom as the transcending opening toward the world is not a philosophical principle in 
any conventional sense. It is something lived and experienced, which at the same time in itself 
withdraws from a conceptual grasp.
372
 
 
Insofar as the measure for conventional philosophical principles is the traditional discourse then 
„abyssal freedom‟s‟ „withdrawal from a conceptual grasp‟ reflects the concern to avoid if not 
destroy those conventions as explained in our analysis of BT.
373
 A second complicating factor is, as 
it were, self inflicted. Our commitment to an accurate comprehension necessitates our analysis 
works within the parameters established by fundamental ontology. It is precisely that context which, 
as we will show, provides the fundamental premises for Heidegger‟s view of freedom. Of course we 
do not claim that Heidegger‟s view of freedom can be read as a simple extension of his fundamental 
ontology. Rather, he suggests that the „leading question of metaphysics‟, namely „What are beings?‟ 
(„ηί ηò ον‟),374 is „grounded‟ in the question about the essence of freedom:  
 
[...] what now emerges is that the problem of freedom is not built into the leading and fundamental 
problems of philosophy, but, on the contrary, the leading question of metaphysics is grounded in the 
question concerning the essence of freedom.
375
  
 
Ruin reiterates the significance of freedom to Heidegger‟s project by reference to Günter Figal‟s 
1988 work, „Martin Heidegger. Phänomenologie der Freiheit‟:  
 
For Figal the entire analysis of Dasein as disclosedness and eventually as truth can be reinterpreted 
as a way of understanding what it means for Dasein to be free, and thus freedom can inversely be 
described as Heidegger‟s most fundamental concern.376  
 
We will not argue that freedom is Heidegger‟s „most fundamental concern‟. Rather that freedom 
becomes the most appropriate means of addressing and engaging with the question of being. „The 
entire analysis of Dasein‟ is a step in addressing the question of being, whether or not it „can be 
reinterpreted as a way of understanding what it means for Dasein to be free‟. As we have seen from 
our reading of BT, Dasein‟s experience is grounded by a primordial relationship to and thus 
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understanding of being. It is our view that EHF and ET represent an effort to advance that argument 
by firstly seeking to establish the „radicalism‟ of Dasein‟s primordiality and secondly 
phenomenologically
377
 disclosing an account of freedom inherent to it. Of course the problem of 
freedom will differ from explicating the premises of fundamental ontology but these differences do 
not constitute a change or turn in thinking. Heidegger himself is clear in this regard:  
 
Once again, it is all important to see the problems, the method and the direction of questioning, and 
not just the content of the questions. The approach and the direction of the problem, and the field of 
its solution, are not formal and external to the content, but these alone determine whether the genuine 
substantiality in the content is philosophical. [...] It is characteristic of all vulgar conceptions of 
philosophy to see only material for learning and knowing.
378
 
 
Given these complexities our analysis will address these texts individually beginning with an 
explication of the argument in EHF followed by ET. It is our contention that EHF is an effort to 
evidence the profundity of Dasein‟s relationship to being by analysis of Kantian metaphysics. The 
argument, broadly speaking, is that even though Kantian thinking represents significant progress 
with respect to the question of being, the rationalist presupposition of the primordiality of causality 
confirms the „insufficient radicalism‟ of Kant‟s approach. For Heidegger, this requires an 
ontological interrogation into freedom, the enquirer and the ground from which the question is 
raised, namely the world. This is what he refers to as „going-to-the-roots‟ in the first chapter of 
EHF: 
 
Or does philosophy‟s concern with the whole mean something else? Does it signify that it goes to 
our own roots? And indeed, not by occasionally applying to our own case, in a moral way, 
philosophical discussions and propositions which we have supposedly understood, thus gaining 
edification from philosophy. Ultimately we only understand philosophy if the questioning goes to the 
root of what is questioned. [...] The character of philosophy as inquiring into the whole remains 
fundamentally inadequate as long as we do not grasp the „going-after-the-whole‟ as a „going-to-the-
roots‟.379 
    
To that end, ET reframes Dasein‟s relationship to being and its manifestation in the inherent 
confrontation with the question of being as „αλήθεια‟ (aletheia; unhiddenness or „truth‟). Therein 
the understanding characterising Dasein‟s relationship to being endows there-being with the 
possibility for revealing or disclosing being as such and from itself. It is this primordial 
comportment to aletheia which necessitates a prerequisite interpretative space or freedom as an a 
priori feature of all enquiry and experience as such. In a sense therefore EHF and ET provide 
respectively negative and positive definitions of freedom. The first delineates what freedom is not; 
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the second, what it is. BT explains the necessity of „destroying‟ traditional ontology by revealing its 
shortcomings before „restating‟ its fundamental questions. Similarly, EHF provides an extended 
analysis of Kant‟s account of freedom in order to pinpoint specific and serious problems therein. 
Only then can the problem of freedom „achieve true concreteness‟ by being „restated‟ in ET. To that 
end, our first concern is EHF focussing on four main issues:  
a) „Negative Freedom‟ and „Freedom-From‟   
b) „Positive Freedom‟ and „Freedom-For‟ 
c) Kant‟s „Two Ways to Freedom‟  
d) The „Insufficient radicalism‟ of Kant‟s view  
Two final points require our attention. First, Heidegger is clear that his interests are restricted 
to the freedom of human beings: 
 
With the topic „the essence of human freedom‟ we strictly bind ourselves to the examination of one 
particular question (freedom) which for its part is related to one particular being (man) within the 
totality.
380
 
 
The „totality‟ is what Heidegger refers to as „the world‟, the ground of which „is what we commonly 
call God.‟381 His „examination‟ of human freedom is not abstracted from „the totality‟ nor its ground 
but is quite precisely from „within‟ it. This will not include discussion of „possible alternatives‟, 
„determinism‟, „coercion‟, „the fulfilment of one‟s desires‟ or any other such traditional concerns. 
Criticism, therefore, must address Heidegger‟s argument on its own terms.382  
Second, the accuracy of Heidegger‟s interpretation of Kant is of little concern. Our focus is 
restricted to Heidegger‟s view of freedom, not its relationship to Kant. Nor are we interested in our 
own critique of Kant. Despite his interest in Kant‟s metaphysical account of freedom, Heidegger is 
critical of his failure to provide a thorough ontological interrogation. ET proposes a fundamental 
shift in the Kantian approach as a platform for a challenge to the traditional discourse as a whole 
and in so doing, establishing our primary claim that an account of freedom as a necessary feature of 
experience demands a radically different methodological approach.     
 
i) The Essence of Human Freedom 
a) Negative Freedom and Freedom-From 
Heidegger begins by adopting a curious approach to the problem of freedom that warrants 
attention. His lecture on the essence of human freedom is simultaneously delivered as a general 
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introduction to philosophy. This presents an immediate problem, stated in the „preliminary 
considerations‟:  
 
To attempt an introduction to philosophy by way of the question of human freedom, to seek an 
understanding of philosophy in general by immediately diverting into a particular question: this is 
clearly an impossible undertaking.
383
 
 
He later explains, 
  
For philosophy is surely not exhausted by the treatment of this one problem. Beside this there are 
questions concerning the essence of truth, human knowledge, the essence of nature, history, art, and 
whatever else is commonly listed when one gives an overview of philosophy.
384
 
 
Simply put, the generality of an introduction to philosophy contradicts the particularity of an 
enquiry into the problem of freedom. The opening ten pages are dedicated to addressing this 
apparent contradiction. In so doing, Heidegger outlines the underlying premises of his view of 
freedom. One such premise is that arriving at the essence of freedom is contingent upon 
understanding the question of the essence of freedom as an instance of the essence of the question 
of beings in general rather than in abstraction from that question: the particular question as an 
instance of the general question. Here we understand the essence of beings in general as a reference 
to what we have previously called the is-ness of all beings: 
 
Yet we [humankind] are also acquainted with that in which, despite every distinction and difference, 
all things agree. Everything we know is known as something that is, and everything that is we call a 
being [ein Seiendes]. To be a being [Seiendes zu sein] is what everything we have mentioned, 
primarily and in the last instance, has in common.
385
 
 
For Heidegger, restricting ontological interrogation to a being‟s particularity necessitates exclusive 
analysis of its distinguishing features. Of course this does not prohibit the discussion of individual 
beings. The point is that such discussions often leave implicit the presupposition that it is possible 
to abstract (to disengage) from the common. We have previously discussed abstraction as an 
impediment to ontological interrogation and its inherency to traditional ontology,
386
 particularly in 
respect of Dorothea Frede‟s problem of the „theoretical approach as such‟.387 The same 
methodological approach which presupposes abstracting the ontical from the ontological and which 
allows the philosopher to legitimise adopting an objective perspective, would also abstract the 
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question of freedom from the question of the essence of beings in general. This is how we 
understand Heidegger‟s argument that freedom must be understood in terms of what it „has in 
common‟ with „everything we know as something that is‟: 
  
Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is; in Reality; in presence-at-hand; in 
subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the „there is.‟388  
 
In this respect, understanding the particular as an instance of the general describes the appropriate 
means by which to address the particular. Heidegger gives an example of this in regard to 
mathematics and „the calculation of differentials‟:  
 
And yet how do we begin, for example in mathematics? We do not start with the theory of 
differential equations but with the calculation of differentials, i.e. we treat this topic in particular and 
not mathematics as a whole, never the mathematical as such. [...] So in all the sciences: we begin 
with the particular and concrete, not in order to remain and get lost at this level, but so that we can 
proceed to the essential and universal.
389
 
 
As a particular kind of mathematics, the „calculation of differentials‟ introduces principles that refer 
to mathematics as such. Moreover, it is quite precisely the actual calculation, as opposed to the 
theory, of differentials that verifies its relation to mathematic principles. Thus for Heidegger, an 
engagement with the question of human freedom in this respect of its relation to philosophical 
enquiry as such, will be informative of the „essential and universal‟.   
Despite this, simply insisting on „looking from the perspective of commonality‟ or enquiring 
into the essence of freedom in the context of the essence of beings in general is insufficient to 
resolve the apparent contradiction between giving an introduction to philosophy and an account of 
the essence of freedom. In fact, it is at risk of perpetuating the problem. After all, an account of the 
essence of something presupposes its possibility. An explanation of essence is available so 
speculation is unnecessary: 
 
Three things belong to the clarification of essence: 1. what-being, what it (freedom) as such is. 2. 
how this what-being is in itself possible. 3. where the ground of this possibility lies.
390
 
 
The questions pertaining to the „clarification of essence‟ are indicative of the approach Heidegger‟s 
enquiry into the essence of freedom will take. Given the attention paid to the word „is‟ in BT, one 
ought to be careful in its interpretation. As Heidegger explains: 
 
What we are treating, therefore, is the essence of a relationship. We do not seek to establish and 
prove such a thing as a fact.
391
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So the first clarification of essence does not refer to the fact of an essence of freedom. Rather, it 
refers to the „negative‟ relationship implicit in difference e.g. the difference between a general 
introduction to philosophy and the particular question of the problem of freedom. The second and 
third questions expand the question of the essence of freedom from, „what „is‟ freedom?‟ to „what 
must be the case such that freedom is?‟. In this respect, Heidegger reflects the methodological 
adjustment he makes to the question of being in BT and discussed earlier.
392
 The enquiry into the 
essence of freedom contains a methodological directive to approach the nature of beings in relation 
to, or in terms of what they have in common with, being in general. 393 In EHF, Heidegger reiterates 
his claims from BT
394
 about the problem of presupposition; a reminder of this methodological 
contiguity: 
 
We all understand being and yet we do not grasp it, i.e. we are not able to explicitly define what we 
mean by it. We operate within a preconceptual understanding of being. We thereby refer to the 
puzzling fact that already, and precisely in our everyday existence, we understand the being of 
beings.
395
 
  
Clearly and in the least, Heidegger‟s work on freedom progresses out of the methodological 
premises introduced by BT. On that basis, the assertion of an essence may, suggests a resolution to 
the apparent contradiction with which we began: enquiry into essence refers to what relates a 
general introduction of philosophy to the particular problem of freedom in respect of what they 
have in common. We have stated that a brief explication of Heidegger‟s underlying premises will 
relieve us of a lengthy analysis. It also serves a secondary, equally important function. Failing to 
acknowledge those premises tends to result in irrelevant or short-sighted criticism of the 
„rationalist‟ kind identified earlier.396 Marvin Farber‟s paper, „Heidegger on the Essence of Truth‟ is 
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a good example of such a criticism. He takes Heidegger to task for his „pretentious verbiage‟397 and 
operating „arbitrarily with regard to matters of fact‟: 
 
Speculative philosophers should be given unlimited freedom to reconstruct “absolutes” to their 
heart‟s content. But they should not be allowed to operate arbitrarily with regard to matters of fact, 
and especially history. One kind of history does indeed begin with the posing of the question of the 
nature of existence. But there are other kinds of history – economic, political, and on a larger scale, 
biological, geological and astronomical.
398
 
  
Farber takes exception to Heidegger‟s assertion that, „only where the quest for what-is-as-such is 
preserved does history begin‟. The problem of course is that like the enquiry into essence, it is not 
intended to establish a fact. Only by ignoring the context and therefore the particular 
methodological approach is Farber justified in his appeal to geological, astronomical and biological 
„history‟. This is especially concerning since Farber attended Heidegger‟s lectures delivered at the 
University of Freiburg
399
 which discuss the term and the context. Unfortunately, Farber‟s paper 
does not refer to Heidegger‟s explanation from the 1935 lecture published as, „An Introduction to 
Metaphysics‟. 400 Our observation of the methodological contiguities indicated by the enquiry into 
essence will be helpful in avoiding similar errors in regard to the question of the essence of 
freedom.  
Heidegger now reverses his position about viewing the question of the essence of freedom as a 
particular question to be addressed in the context of the question of the essence of beings in general: 
 
We ourselves began by indicating that freedom is a particular property of man and that man is a 
particular being within the totality of beings. Perhaps that is correct. The question concerning the 
essence of freedom is nevertheless not a particular question. But if this is so, if the topic of these 
lectures is not a particular question, then we are not at all in a position to set out from a particular 
question in order to arrive at something universal.
401
 
 
Heidegger‟s original apparent contradiction was in the relation between the particularity of the 
question of the essence of freedom and the generality of an introduction to philosophy. A new 
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contradiction is now introduced whereby although we must arrive at the general by means of the 
particular, the question of the essence of freedom is not a particular question. Heidegger attempts to 
resolve this new contradiction by explaining the i) un-scientific particularity of the question of the 
essence of freedom and ii) by exploring the understanding of the term „freedom‟.  
Heidegger argues that the rationale for pressing forward „from the treatment of a particular 
problem to the universality of philosophical knowledge‟402 rests on an implicit presupposition that 
philosophical enquiry proceeds according to the methodological principles of science: 
  
Such is the situation, provided that philosophy too is a science and as such remains bound by the 
guiding principles of scientific method. But this assumption is erroneous.
403
 
    
But for Heidegger and in our own view, it is not at all clear that philosophy should be understood as 
a science.
404
 Of course one may argue that it must be possible to describe all observable occurrences 
by reference to the general laws of science insofar as they determine the principles of empirical 
reality. The question is whether such an approach is the most appropriate to the subject of study.
405
 
Heidegger explains the necessity of identifying an appropriate methodology, that is, one that has „a 
genuine origin in the phenomenon itself‟, towards the conclusion of the ET: 
 
It was an error of phenomenology  to believe that phenomena could be correctly seen merely 
through unprejudiced looking. But it is just as great an error to believe that, since perspectives are 
always necessary, the phenomena themselves can never be seen, and that everything amounts to 
contingent, subjective, anthropological standpoints. From these two impossibilities we obtain the 
necessary insight that our central task and methodological problem is to arrive at the right 
perspective. [...] It is not because we must view it from some perspective or other that the 
phenomenon gets blocked off from us, but because the perspective adopted most often does not have 
a genuine origin in the phenomenon itself.
406
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For Heidegger, whether a scientific methodology is appropriate to philosophical enquiry and 
freedom is, in the very least, debatable. Furthermore, Heidegger argues that the „totality of beings‟ 
have been „divided into different domains‟ and „distributed among the particular sciences‟.407 Thus 
the combined fields of physics, chemistry and biology describe all phenomena in the material 
universe. Therefore philosophical enquiry cannot refer to a domain not already under study by one 
or another branch of science. It is either superfluous in its entirety or, as Heidegger claims, 
philosophy „can only concern itself with all beings, and indeed precisely as a whole.‟408 Philosophy 
is not compelled to adopt an alternative methodology simply because science has already divided 
and distributed the totality of beings. On the contrary and as already mentioned, enquiring into the 
essence of freedom already requires looking from the perspective of commonality with the „is-ness‟ 
of „everything we know‟: 
  
This difference and distinctiveness of the question concerning human freedom, namely that it leads 
into the totality of beings, marks it out as a specifically philosophical question.
409
 
  
Two points are worthy of note in this regard. Firstly, Heidegger‟s identification of what he thinks of 
as appropriately philosophical methods and concerns. If what „marks out‟ the „question concerning 
human freedom‟ as „philosophical‟ is its inclination to „totality‟, then philosophical concerns are 
specifically those which „leads into the totality of beings‟. Thus the second point of note: 
philosophy and philosophical enquiry are „marked out‟ or raised up to the level of an exclusive 
concern with „totality‟. By inference therefore, the exclusive concern for particularity is specifically 
un-philosophical.  
Of course this does not resolve the contradiction with which we began. The enquiry into the 
essence of freedom is still a particular pursuit within the general field of philosophy. It is not the 
same as aesthetics, theology, ethics or any other identifiable philosophical pursuit. Therefore 
philosophy can still be shown to rely on scientific methodology insofar as it also divides fields of 
study. Heidegger explains that though the question of the essence of human freedom and the 
essence of truth, for example, are indeed different, „both these questions inquire into the totality and 
thus have a necessary connection with the most general question concerning the essence of beings 
as such.‟410 These are self evidently different questions and will therefore involve a different set of 
problems and will find different solutions.
411
 Nonetheless, insofar as both questions pertain to 
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essence, both questions will have a necessary relationship to the question of being. Conversely, an 
appropriately scientific enquiry must be restricted to the concerns of its particular region of study: 
 
For not only in a quantitative but also in a qualitative sense, no science has the breadth of horizon to 
encompass the unitary whole which is intended (albeit unclearly and indefinitely) by the question of 
freedom.
412
 
       
Heidegger‟s reference to the „quantitative and qualitative sense‟ does not seem to us to be a 
rhetorical device intended to add emphasis. It offers a simple account of the fundamental difference 
between the appropriate methodological approach of scientific and philosophical enquiry. In other 
words, the quantitative and qualitative senses in which science does not „encompass the unitary 
whole‟ „intended by the question of freedom‟. Though Heidegger fails to expand on what he means 
by these distinctions we may offer our own account:  
i) Quantitative: Science cannot quantitatively „encompass the unitary whole‟ insofar as it is 
exclusively concerned with empirical reality. Enquiry is scientific only insofar as it involves 
repeatable observation and experimental evidence. In this respect, the scientific method 
reflects the exclusive concern of science. Clinical observation, testing and proof, for 
example, are antithetical to the question of the relationship between all things and the 
unitary characteristic they have in common. Conversely, this, for Heidegger, is the main 
concern of philosophy: what is shared in common by all things. Enquiry into essence 
therefore characterises all properly philosophical pursuits. Of course these pursuits are not 
exhausted by enquiring into essence
413
 but the objects of all philosophical pursuits share the 
condition of „is-ness‟.  
ii) Qualitative: Scientific methods are qualitatively inappropriate insofar as they do not require 
that the enquirer establish their relationship to the totality of all beings prior to the 
investigation of particular beings. On the contrary, science demands objectivity and 
restricting the relationship between enquired and what is enquired after to „disengaged‟ or 
clinical observation. Insofar as the enquiry into the essence of freedom is concerned with 
the totality of beings and what they have in common, it must be primarily concerned with 
establishing the relationship between enquirer and the totality of all beings. This is how we 
understand Heidegger‟s aforementioned, „going-to-the-roots‟.414 Moreover, we interpret this 
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as a rephrasing of BT‟s argument that ontological enquiry must begin by enquiring after 
Dasein.                 
For Heidegger, enquiry into the essence of freedom addresses a particular question only insofar 
as it offers a particular perspective on the totality of beings. This is to say that although the enquiry 
into the essence of freedom is concerned with the totality of beings, it is enquired after by a 
particular enquirer who cannot be „disengaged‟ from their contextualising interpretive-matrix of 
everyday experience. In this respect, we interpret Heidegger‟s contrast of science and philosophy or 
more broadly, the particular and the general as a way of reframing his argument for a hermeneutics 
of facticity and fundamental ontology. After all, the question can be raised (and has been 
previously) as to how an analytic of Dasein in its everyday comportments is revealing of being as 
such. The point of course is that the enquiry and its methodology are not intended to reveal being 
but to allow the pre-ontological understanding of being to come to the fore, from itself. Further, the 
criticism that difference in perspective reduces the enquiry into the essence of freedom to a regional 
enquiry is simply not one we consider credible. It relies on the false claim that the fact of 
perspectives necessitates their separation. That is, it implies that the questions, „how are you 
doing?‟ and „how do you do?‟ or the phrases, „ice‟ and „frozen water‟ are fundamentally different. 
We see no reason for attempting to invalidate the concept of a synonym. Heidegger addresses the 
necessity of a perspective or what he refers to as a „standpoint‟, in the early stages of the ET: 
 
It should be said, however, that even to make a beginning with philosophy one must have rid oneself 
of the illusion that man could pose, let alone solve a problem, without some standpoint. The desire to 
philosophise from the standpoint of standpointlessness, as a purportedly genuine and superior 
objectivity, is either childish, or, as is usually the case, disingenuousness.
415
 
       
Nevertheless, the new contradiction may have been easier to understand had Heidegger included a 
distinction of category. Thus the question of the essence of freedom could be thought of as a 
linguistic particularity and reference to the totality could be its conceptual context. Still, the new 
contradiction is negatively reconciled by the non-scientific methodology of philosophical enquiry 
into the essence of freedom. It must sustain an understanding of what freedom has in common with 
the totality of phenomena. Explicating the „is-ness‟ or essence of a particularity necessitates a 
discussion of its relationship to the whole.  
Our second means of reconciling the new contradiction involves a direct analysis of freedom as 
such. The first offered a negative reconciliation of the new contradiction: that the enquiry after the 
essence of freedom is not a particular question in the sense that a regional scientific question is 
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particular. It will therefore be necessary that we explain how Heidegger understands the essence of 
human freedom itself and in what sense it relates to philosophy as a whole.  
Heidegger‟s second subsection to his „preliminary considerations‟ refers to the „Specific 
Character of Philosophical as Distinct from Scientific Questioning‟. Therein he describes a 
traditional definition of freedom:  
 
Among the definitions of the essence of freedom one has always come to the fore. According to this, 
freedom primarily refers to autonomy. Freedom is freedom from [...] This definition of the essence of 
freedom as independence, the absence of dependence, involves the denial of dependence on 
something else. One speaks, therefore, of the negative concept of freedom, more succinctly of 
„negative freedom‟.416 
  
We would do well to firstly address Heidegger‟s assertion that freedom has commonly been 
understood as independence before explicating „freedom-from‟ or „negative freedom‟. A brief 
overview of the philosophical discourse on freedom will suffice though it should be reiterated that 
our concern is restricted to Heidegger‟s view of freedom not his understanding of other accounts. In 
other words, Heidegger‟s freedom is not contingent upon his analysis of alternative readings. 
Though EHF is largely dedicated to analysis of Kant, there is no mention of any other author on the 
issue of freedom. His claim about „freedom-from‟ will be satisfied if freedom has been understood 
as autonomy at all. If the claim is false, then Heidegger will be engaged in an exercise of futility. If 
accurate, it will reinforce the criticism of the presuppositions implicit to traditional methodology 
and the need to sincerely reconsider the approach to the problem of freedom. A previous chapter 
acknowledged and assessed a similar claim made by Sartre.
417
 Their similarity comes as no surprise. 
The extent of Sartre‟s reliance on Heidegger‟s fundamental premises has already been discussed. 
Sartre‟s version of the claim states that, „proponents of free will are concerned to find cases of 
decision for which there exists no prior cause („motif‟)‟.418 Of course, these claims are not identical. 
Autonomy and independence are not wholly synonymous with the absence of a prior cause 
(„motif‟). It is worth noting that Sartre‟s claim comes 12-13 years after Heidegger‟s lecture on the 
issue. The discourse on free will would have developed in that time and this may account for 
improved terminological competence. Be that as it may, claims of this nature are not unfamiliar and 
do not require extensive analysis. Both Sartre and Heidegger find that the traditional discourse 
assumes that freedom consists in freedom-from. That is to say that one is free insofar as one is 
independent from any causal power external to the agent. In both cases this assumption is targeted 
for criticism.  
                                                          
416
 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom (New York: Continuum, 2002) p.4 
417
 See, Freedom in Being and Nothingness; Sartre‟s Definition of Freedom, p.87 
418
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Oxon: Routledge, 2003) p.458 
136 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
A previous discussion of prominent authors from the contemporary free will debate
419
 
concluded that the assumption is accurate despite the brevity of Sartre and Heidegger‟s accounts. 
For his part, Chisholm fails to provide an account of how „Immanent causation‟ occurs and stops 
his investigation into the causal chain at „man‟. He neither explains the power to „cause cerebral 
events‟ nor what one ought to understand by „man‟ to whom this power is attributed. Therefore, in 
effect, he defines freedom as the absence of external causation. Similarly we found that Fischer and 
Ravizza‟s accounts are restricted to the limitations of an agent‟s ability to will or do otherwise. No 
attempt is made to explain what it means to be the kind of being for whom „causes‟ are limiting or 
the experience of a „limitation‟ in the process of „willing‟. Freedom is debated on the basis of 
whether and to what degree one is liberated from the „coercive‟ forces of determining events and/or 
occurrences. It is therefore indeed the case that, at least in these few instances, freedom (free will) is 
predicated on autonomy or independence from causal powers. Further, it is the case that such a view 
of freedom is an implicit presupposition insofar as no discussion of its validity arises. Nonetheless, 
Heidegger‟s analysis of „freedom-from‟/„negative freedom‟ does not seem to be driven by the 
desire to criticise incomplete accounts but to arrive at a fundamental understanding of the 
relationship between freedom and autonomy/independence.   
Freedom as autonomy implies that one is free on condition that their actions cannot be 
accounted for by reference to any external causal power.
420
 Freedom as autonomy coincides with 
the absence or non-presence of such forces. Heidegger highlights a problem with such negative 
propositions in the ET. The principle he describes is applicable to freedom though the subject 
therein is „un-truth‟: 
   
There is an old doctrine of logic according to which negation presupposes something capable of 
being negated, thus something already affirmable, affirmed, thus affirmation. To want to begin with 
negation, whether this is a detour or not, therefore infringes against the most elementary law of 
logic.
421
 
          
To clarify, freedom understood as autonomy requires that action cannot be accounted for by appeal 
to determining and coercive forces. But to claim that these forces are indeterminate at least in this 
instance, is to imply their efficacy in all other cases. Presumably these forces do not negate 
themselves which raises the question of the relationship between freedom as autonomy and the 
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forces it negates. For Heidegger, common interpretations of freedom have failed to adequately 
account for the relationship between the independence of a free human and what they are 
independent of. Moreover, by failing to consider a prerequisite relationship between free-
independence and external causal powers, „freedom-from‟ is incomplete yet presented as the 
original concept. Accounts of freedom as „freedom-from‟ are problematic only insofar as they 
presuppose a negative relationship that is left uninterrogated. In this respect, freedom understood as 
„freedom-from‟ begins „with negation‟ and thereby „infringes against the most elementary law of 
logic‟. Omitting an explication of its relationship to the totality of beings impedes an appropriately 
philosophical account of the essence of freedom. This is how we understand Heidegger‟s assertion 
that, „this negative freedom of man is fully defined by specifying what man is independent from, 
and how such independence is to be conceived.‟422 The „from-what‟ of independence or autonomy, 
he argues, can be reduced to „two essential directions‟: 
1. The first and most common in contemporary discourse is „independence from nature‟. Here 
autonomy requires that human action cannot be accounted for by reference to determining laws: 
 
By this we mean that human action as such is not primarily caused by natural processes; it is not 
bound by the lawfulness of natural processes and their necessity.
423
 
         
This is what Heidegger now more broadly refers to as „independence from the world‟. „World‟, he 
goes on to explain, is to be understood as „the unitary totality of history and nature‟.  The grandiose 
language must not distract us from the familiarity of this position. Chisholm‟s rationale is derived 
from the Aristotelian „prime mover unmoved‟. Both require an origination of causal effects exempt 
from its determining laws. Chisholm opens his essay
424
 with a reference to a chain of causality 
beginning with „man‟ and concluding in the movement of a stone. The argument implied by the 
quote and developed by Chisholm is that, though the stone‟s movement can be causally accounted 
for by the staff and the staff by the hand, the man moving the hand originates the causal chain. Yet 
Chisholm fails to recognise that the „power of origination‟ is both logically and empirically 
impossible in the absence of the world, the staff, the stone and the hand. The causal world remains a 
necessary predicate no matter what powers he attributes to „man‟. It is implicitly posited at the point 
of asserting human autonomy but a discussion of the relationship between the autonomous power of 
origination and the causal world is absent. It is our contention that the same holds for any account 
which depends on the attribution of powers that render human action or human will independent 
from nature. Another such account underpins the aforementioned „principle of alternate 
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possibilities‟. It is the claim that free will requires the ability to have done otherwise than what one 
actually does. On this account, freedom is contingent on the absence of external causal powers 
determining a particular possibility even though the agent has no control over whether alternative 
actions are available.
425
 In this respect, freedom is little more than a reference for a particular kind 
of causal event wherein an action can be achieved by more than a single means. That is, those 
events when the agent is presented with the possibility of acting other than they might. If the agent 
cannot determine whether they have the ability to do otherwise, then free will is contingent on the 
external causal powers which afford the agent that possibility.
426
 On our interpretation of this 
account of freedom, autonomy refers only to those cases in which external causal powers are not as 
restrictive on action as they may otherwise be.  
2. Heidegger refers to the second „essential direction‟ of the „from-what‟ as „independence 
from God‟. „God‟ is defined in the opening page of EHF: 
  
[...] the ground of the world is what we commonly call God. 
 
The attached footnote adds, 
  
„World‟ and „God‟ are here intended as noncommittal words for the totality of beings (the specific 
totality of nature and history: world) and for the ground of the totality (God).
427
 
 
Freedom-from „God‟ is therefore freedom-from „the ground of the totality of beings‟. This second 
„from-what‟ demands further disambiguation. After all, it is unclear that this is implied by the 
traditional definitions of freedom. John D. Caputo provides a clearer definition of „ground‟ („God‟) 
in his paper „Being, Ground and Play in Heidegger‟.428 His analysis of „The Essence of Ground‟, 
explains that Heidegger‟s reference to „founding‟ is not dissimilar to his use of „ground‟ whereby 
the former „is the process by which Dasein lays the ground of metaphysics [...]‟. The clarity and 
relevance of Caputo‟s explication warrants a lengthy quotation though our focus is restricted to 
elucidating the „independence from God‟: 
 
To “found” means to give a reason for what is founded, to explain it, to give it intelligibility. 
Heidegger here is employing the well-known philosophical sense of the word „ground‟ as „reason‟. 
[...] What Heidegger means by “founding” can be explained as follows. A being is a phenomenon, 
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that which appears and presents itself as a being. Being is that which renders the appearing of the 
appearance possible. To “found” the being is to bring it forth as a being, to render it intelligible and 
manifest as a being. Founding is clearly identical with the comprehension of Being, for a being is 
manifest only because it is understood in its Being. Founding is accordingly “ontological truth” 
itself, illuminating the being in terms of its „reason‟ or „why‟ (Being). It does not explain the being in 
terms of another being, but is rather the condition of possibility of the manifestness of all beings.
429
 
     
It may be helpful to break Caputo‟s analysis down into its claims in order to shed light on what it 
means for the „independence from God‟: 
a) „Ground‟ should be interpreted as the „reason‟ for the appearance of a being or its „why‟. In 
other words, the „ground‟ of a being is that which explains its appearance.  
b) Being430 makes the „appearing of the appearance‟ possible for beings.  
c) Therefore „reason‟ must refer to „the condition of possibility of the manifestness of all 
beings‟.  
In this respect, „founding‟ refers to ontological analysis which seeks to explicate beings in terms of 
their relationship to being in general. We therefore interpret „founding‟ as another reference for 
what we have understood of enquiring into the essence of freedom. „Independence from God‟ thus 
describes an account of freedom which is removed from an explication of beings in respect of what 
they have in common. This, we contend, echoes Heidegger‟s critique of traditional ontology in BT, 
which abstracts beings from their relationship to being in general. He develops his criticism into the 
distinction between the „occurrence of a question‟ and a „genuine asking‟: 
 
The totality of beings does indeed demand asking this elementary question as to what beings are as 
such. This leading question of Western philosophy is not wrongly posed, but is not even posed at all. 
At first sight, to be sure, this is an outrageous and presumptuous statement. [...] The question was 
asked by Plato and Aristotle and can be readily identified in their writings. [...] How then can we 
maintain that this question has not been posed? Plato and Aristotle did, in fact, ask this question. To 
be sure, but if we merely ascertain that this question, along with a certain answer, occurs in their 
works, does this mean that they really and genuinely pose the question? From the fact that this 
question, still more their answers and their various implications, occur again and again in the 
subsequent history of philosophy, can we conclude that this question was genuinely posed? Not at 
all. To once again ask this question of Plato and Aristotle – the question, in brief, of Western 
philosophy – means something else, namely to ask more primordially than they did.431 
 
To „really and genuinely‟ ask the question „as to what beings are as such‟ is therefore to „ask more 
primordially‟. We understand Heidegger‟s reference to the primordial in two particular but related 
senses. First, Heidegger is concerned to arrive at an understanding which unveils the philosophical 
premises of our most fundamental assumptions about freedom. The primordial, in this sense, is 
what grounds the traditional discourse on freedom. Thus we understand the primordial to be 
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interchangeable with „ground‟. Second, the primordial is therefore the origin of other derivative 
accounts of freedom. For Heidegger, this adds weight to the critique of traditional accounts of 
freedom. Their failure to acknowledge and address an original understanding of freedom means 
their accounts are necessarily incomplete.
432
 It is in this respect that we understand freedom-from 
„God‟ not as freedom-from reason as such but from „founding‟. As Heidegger argues at the outset 
of BT, the problem is not the lack of ontological discourse but that „is-ness‟ remains an „a priori 
enigma, veiled in darkness‟ and it is therefore necessary to „raise the question again‟.433  
Both freedom-from „World‟ and freedom-from „God‟ point to a fundamental philosophical 
concern. In each case, the „from-what‟ of autonomous or independent freedom implies the totality 
of phenomena or their ground: 
  
World and God are not just accidentally or contingently represented in the negative concept of 
freedom, but are essentially included in it. If negative freedom is the topic, then world and God 
necessarily belong to the topic as the „from what‟ of independence. [...] If freedom becomes a 
problem, albeit initially only as negative freedom, then we are necessarily inquiring into the totality 
of what is.
434
 
      
Thus the apparent contradictions raised by Heidegger‟s can be reconciled. Consequently, 
Heidegger‟s preliminary view of the essence of freedom can be reduced to three key points: 
i) An account of freedom must not ask the particular question of the essence of freedom in the 
regional, scientific sense of particularity. Rather, enquiry after the essence of freedom must pertain 
to what is held in common by all beings and therefore their relationship to being in general.  
ii) This essential insight is necessary to „found‟ the problem of freedom in order to arrive at 
„ontological truth‟.  
iii) Genuinely asking after the problem of human freedom will involve a renewed analysis of 
the „leading question of metaphysics‟, the question of being.  
The claim that the problem of human freedom is a particular philosophical question without being a 
question about a particular kind of entity relies, on Heidegger's distinction between science and 
philosophy. This particular philosophical question „thematizes the totality of what is, World and 
God‟.435 Of course Heidegger‟s „preliminary considerations‟ only orientate thinking on the issue in 
accordance with the fundamental principles of his project. It is in this sense that we argue in favour 
of reading EHF as an extension of fundamental ontology. The three key points we take from these 
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preliminary considerations reflect the prioritisation of Dasein and the methodological directive to 
establish a hermeneutics of facticity as the appropriate point of departure for enquiry. He applies 
these principles to the analysis of freedom in two large phases. First, he presents an analysis of 
Kantian freedom as an example of „positive freedom‟ or „freedom-for‟. Kant is of special interest 
because he „brings the problem of freedom for the first time explicitly into a radical connection with 
the fundamental problems of metaphysics‟436 though Heidegger will ultimately reject Kant‟s 
account for failing to take this „radicalism‟ far enough. His explication and criticism of Kant will 
develop our understanding of Heidegger‟s own position. Second, Heidegger attempts a direct 
application of his methodological approach to the problem of freedom. This, in our view, is the total 
content of ET, founded by EHF. The explication of „freedom-for‟ will be broken down into two 
further sections: transcendental and practical.     
b) Positive Freedom and Freedom-For 
An alternative to negative freedom is positive freedom. Heidegger presents Kant‟s account as 
the best example of such an alternative. His interpretation and defence of Kant‟s view of freedom 
will underlie much of his own position. Though he ultimately rejects the Kantian view, he adopts 
much of its reasoning: primarily the principles of transcendental freedom and „being a law unto 
oneself‟. The main criticism of Kantian freedom will be that it remains couched in causality. For 
Kant, human freedom must be a kind of causality because, he assumes, the latter must be of greater 
primordiality in that it is a fundamental prerequisite for experience. For Heidegger, the 
metaphysical prioritisation of causality over freedom inverts the relationship of freedom to being. 
Moreover, in respect of the aforementioned „old doctrine of logic‟, the inversion is contingent on a 
prerequisite comportment to and understanding of being which, crucially, remains entirely 
uninterrogated. This, on our reading, sums up the charge of „insufficient radicalism‟. Heidegger‟s 
primary claim will be that freedom is the ground of human experience, not the reverse. It is initially 
posited as part of a hypothetical argument at the conclusion of part one of EHF: 
  
Freedom is not some particular thing among and alongside other things, but is superordinate and 
governing in relation to the whole. But if we are seeking out freedom as the ground of the possibility 
of existence, then freedom must itself, in its essence, be more primordial than man. Man is only an 
administrator of freedom, i.e. he can only let-be the freedom which is accorded to him, in such a way 
that, through man, the whole contingency of freedom becomes visible.
437
 
 
ET is, in the main, an attempt to substantiate this claim. Explication will therefore be reserved for 
later analysis but understanding that claim includes the path taken to arrive at it. To that end, three 
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main areas of concern pertain to Heidegger‟s interpretation of Kant and his own view of freedom. 
These are: 
 Kantian Positive Freedom  
 Causality and Freedom 
 The Two Ways to Freedom 
Heidegger lists these concerns in order of their progression: 
  
So our view of the problem of freedom broadens out. The individual moments of this broadening can 
again be indicated: practical freedom (autonomy) – transcendental freedom (absolute spontaneity) – 
exemplary causality – causality (causation) as such – being moved as such – beings as such.438 
  
A discussion of what Heidegger calls, „the Question Concerning the Being of Beings‟439 in the first 
half of EHF is deliberately omitted here. Much of the content reiterates arguments from BT which 
have already been addressed at length.
440
 Suffice it to say, Heidegger restates the „preconceptual 
understanding of being‟441 and philosophical enquiry‟s obligation to disclose this understanding: 
what he now refers to as „the birth of philosophy from the Dasein in man‟.442 Thus for Heidegger, 
philosophy is „awakened as a primal activity‟ by humankind‟s pre-conceptual understanding of 
being. Philosophical enquiry is therefore a fundamental characteristic of Dasein: the being for 
whom „Being is an issue‟.443 Of course this does not refer to formal philosophy but the basic activity 
of ontological identification and understanding or the necessary prerequisite for the formalisation of 
philosophical enquiry. One point from Heidegger‟s reiterations is worthy of discussion even if 
briefly. Heidegger evaluates Kant's conception of freedom in the light of his critique of the 
understanding of being (Sein) as „constant presence‟, an understanding that he attributes to the 
ancient Greeks. He derives „constant presence‟ from the colloquial Greek, ουζία (being). Everyday 
possessions such as a house, chair etc are all referred to as „ουζία‟ which, Heidegger argues, 
indicates that the Greeks had a pre-theoretical understanding of being (ουζία )as „constant presence‟ 
or „enduring constancy‟.444 The exact meaning of „constant presence‟ in Heidegger‟s account points 
to what differentiates him from Kant. To that end, it is important to note that „constant presence‟ 
should not be understood as a form of permanent appearance. As a synonym (or etymological root) 
of being (ουζία), „constant presence‟ refers to that which makes the „appearing of the appearance 
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possible‟. In fact, Heidegger concedes that the Greeks had a different word for presence (παρουζία) 
in the sense of phenomenal appearing but asserts that his „thesis‟ „does not rest on such 
considerations.‟ 445 Rather, constant presence refers to that which „remains‟ regardless of appearance 
and „disappearance‟. Heidegger explains this by reference to „change‟ and „becoming‟: 
  
Change in colour, for example, is conceived as the disappearance of one colour and the appearance 
of another. In the case of processes, i.e. of what we call „becoming‟ in the narrower sense – a white 
piece of chalk becoming a red piece of chalk – there is something which underlies this change: ύπο, 
something remains: μένον. [...] In absence it is not essence but presence which is lacking; thus 
„essence-hood‟, οςζία, at bottom means presence. The Greeks understood beingness in the sense of 
constant presence.
446
 
 
„Constant presence‟ does not refer to the ontical characteristics of beings or the symptoms of 
appearance, in this case, the „red‟ or „white‟ of the chalk. „Appearance‟, „disappearance‟ and 
„change‟ all presuppose „something which underlies‟ them, namely „essence-hood‟: the condition of 
the possibility of appearing. Kant‟s account of freedom will assume an understanding of being as 
„constant presence‟ as it relates to causality. In Heidegger‟s reading, Kant argues that freedom is 
grounded in causality which is the underlying law of human experience. This is the sense in which 
Heidegger sees a „radical connection‟ between Kant and the „fundamental problems of 
metaphysics‟.  
As we have seen, freedom-from necessarily implies a broader freedom often left 
uninterrogated. A fundamental account is indicated by considering what one is free from: the „from-
what‟. This requires a working definition of positive freedom: 
 
Freedom in the positive sense does not mean the „away-from...‟, but rather the „toward-which‟; 
positive freedom means being free for..., being open for..., thus oneself being open for..., allowing 
oneself to be determined through..., determining oneself to...This means to determine one‟s own 
action purely through oneself, to give to oneself the law for one‟s action.447 
  
Of course Kantian freedom falls into two categories: transcendental (cosmological) and practical. In 
order for Heidegger to justify his preference of Kant‟s account of freedom, it is therefore necessary 
to first show that his two kinds of freedom are not forms of positive and negative freedom. Rather, 
that they are both forms of positive freedom. 
The definition of practical freedom taken from the „Critique of Pure Reason‟ presents 
Heidegger with the first obstacle to interpreting both kinds of freedom as positive: 
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Freedom in the practical sense is the will‟s independence of coercion through sensuous impulses‟. 
Freedom in the practical sense is independence, which is precisely how we characterised negative 
freedom.
448
 
    
„The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals‟ clarifies that this only provides a „negative 
explanation‟ which alone „affords no insight into its essence‟.449 A positive account is therefore 
necessary: 
  
The positive concept of freedom means autonomy of the will, giving laws unto oneself. [...] practical 
freedom itself divides into negative and positive.
450
 
 
Of course the positive aspect of practical freedom does not discount the negative. But for Kant, as 
Heidegger presents him, practical freedom understood as independence is „inadequately essential‟. 
Far from „countering‟ the negative, the positive aspect of practical freedom gives it greater 
primordiality. The essence of practical freedom is not described by independence or autonomy 
alone. The division of practical freedom into negative and positive reveals its grounding in 
„absolute spontaneity‟, derived from the „transcendental idea‟ of freedom.451 The negative or „from-
what‟ of practical freedom, refers to „independence of coercion through sensory impulses‟. The 
positive or „for-what‟ of practical freedom, refers to autonomy as the ability to „give a law unto 
oneself‟. The latter suggests a relationship to „absolute spontaneity‟: 
  
Autonomy is a kind of absolute spontaneity, i.e. the latter delimits the universal essence of the 
former. Only on the basis of this essence as absolute spontaneity is autonomy possible. Were there 
no absolute spontaneity there would be no autonomy. The possibility of autonomy is grounded in 
spontaneity, and practical freedom is grounded in transcendental freedom.
452
 
 
The relationship of „independence of coercion through sensory impulses‟ and autonomy is grounded 
in transcendental freedom. Thus for Heidegger, practical freedom cannot be understood as negative 
and transcendental freedom, positive. Rather, as it‟s „for-what‟, autonomy grounds practical 
freedom in „self-legislation‟ and therefore, „absolute spontaneity‟.  
Transcendental (cosmological) freedom must also be shown to be an instance of positive 
freedom. To that end, Heidegger quotes Kant‟s definition of transcendental freedom as, „the power 
of beginning a state spontaneously‟: 
 
[...]„Such causality will not, therefore, itself stand under another cause determining it in time, as 
required by the law of nature. Freedom in this sense is a pure transcendental idea.‟453 
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Three points can be identified from this definition, all of which will, to some extent, be discussed in 
the remainder of this chapter. First, transcendental freedom is a kind of causality which is to say 
that ultimately, transcendental freedom is grounded in causality. This will be the root of 
Heidegger‟s critique of Kant. Second, transcendental freedom is a kind of causality which itself is 
uncaused: it does not „stand under another cause‟. In this sense, it is prior to time and space and 
cannot therefore be experienced or assessed by criteria based in the a posteriori. Finally, 
transcendental freedom refers to an „idea‟ which is to say that it refers to reason‟s conception of 
freedom. As Derk Pereboom points out in, „Kant on Transcendental Freedom‟: 
 
Kant‟s theory is not ambitious: he maintains that it cannot be established theoretically – i.e., on the 
basis of any evidence available to us – that we have this sort of freedom, or even that it is 
metaphysically possible that we do. Rather, he claims only that our conception of our being free in 
this sense involves no inconsistency, and that the legitimacy of a belief that we have this kind of 
freedom must rely on practical reasons.
454
 
      
„Absolute spontaneity‟, in this respect, refers to the origin of ideas though this does not, in our 
estimation, undermine the ambition of „Kant‟s theory‟. Whether or not Kant, „claims only that our 
conception of being free‟ „involves no inconsistency‟, transcendental freedom is an a priori, 
presupposed by experience. Nevertheless, this definition also presents an immediate problem. The 
issue in this case is not validity but whether transcendental freedom constitutes a separate category 
at all. Heidegger defines it as, „the power of the self-origination of a state.‟455 He sums up the 
problem with the question, „Is absolute spontaneity not the same as autonomy?‟456 He answers: 
   
Absolute spontaneity is the faculty of the self-origination of a state; autonomy is the self-legislation 
of a rational will. Absolute spontaneity (transcendental freedom) is not a matter of the will and the 
law of the will but of the self-origination of a state; autonomy, on the other hand, concerns a 
particular being to which there belongs willing, ππᾶξιρ. They are not the same, and yet both pertain 
to that which has the character of self.
457
 
 
The difference is subtle but significant. Autonomy (the positive aspect of practical freedom) is 
logically impossible absent absolute spontaneity but absolute spontaneity does not require 
autonomy. Thus, „The possibility of autonomy is grounded in spontaneity, and practical freedom is 
grounded in transcendental freedom.‟458 A more pressing concern presents itself at this point for our 
argument that Heidegger succeeds where Sartre does not. The similarities between this 
interpretation of Kant and a previous example are hard to miss. Heidegger argues that Kant‟s 
                                                          
454
 Derk Pereboom, Kant on Transcendental Freedom, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 73, 
No. 3 (2006) pp.537-567, p.538 
455
 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom (New York: Continuum, 2002) p.16 
456
 Ibid., p.18 
457
 Ibid., p.18 
458
 Ibid., p.18 
146 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
account makes a preceding „spontaneity‟ which „originates a state‟ necessary for the possibility of 
practical freedom. Chisholm‟s argument also required „self-origination‟ in order to start a causal 
chain: what he calls, „Immanent causation‟. Moreover, the implicit and uninterrogated reliance on 
causality has been the main focus of our criticism of Chisholm. Heidegger‟s interpretation of Kant 
will be subject to the same criticism in the absence of a thoroughgoing interrogation of the 
relationship between the faculty of absolute spontaneity and causality. To that end, Heidegger 
explains that Kant‟s transcendental freedom is itself a kind of causality: „the causality of freedom‟: 
  
From this it is clear that what is genuinely problematical in absolute spontaneity is a problem of 
causality, of causation. Accordingly, Kant sees freedom as the power of a specific and distinct 
causation.
459
 
  
Thus transcendental freedom refers to a kind of causation which „lies outside what is experientially 
accessible‟.460 This marks a major difference with Chisholm‟s account. In this case, freedom is not a 
power attributable to a particular being, affording it the ability to interfere with or start a causal 
chain. The „Experientially inaccessible‟ causality involved in the „self-origination of a state‟ already 
constitutes a kind of freedom. In Heidegger‟s interpretation of Kant, causality does not pose a 
problem for freedom nor limit an agents‟ ability to will or do otherwise. Causality or more precisely 
causation as such, grounds transcendental freedom. The „radicalism‟ of Kant‟s approach is evident: 
freedom is not understood in terms of „choices‟, „willing‟ or „doing‟ but in terms of a certain kind of 
causality which is their implicit presupposition: 
 
The question of spontaneity, of beginning and letting follow on, is the question concerning the cause 
[Ursache]. This, the causation [Ursachesein] of a cause (causa), is what Kant calls „causality‟ 
[Kausalität] (the causality of causa). In this sense he speaks pointedly of the „causality of a cause‟. 
This does not mean „cause of the cause‟, but rather the causation of a cause, i.e. that and how a cause 
is a cause.
461
 
   
Unlike previous examples, Kant‟s account of freedom confronts what one means by a cause such 
that it „is‟. Nevertheless, Heidegger‟s first criticism suggests this as the limit of Kant‟s account. In 
an introductory discussion of the problem of movement, Heidegger refers to philosophy‟s failure to 
make progress with this problem and says that Kant is equally at fault: 
  
Since Aristotle, who was the first and last to grasp the philosophical problem, philosophy has not 
taken a single step forward in this area. On the contrary it has gone backward, because the problem is 
in no way grasped as a problem. Here too Kant completely fails. That the problem of causality was 
central for him makes this all the more remarkable. It is easy to see that the problem of the essence of 
movement is the presupposition for even posing, not to speak of solving, the problem of causality.
462
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Kant‟s failure to „problematise‟ causality renders his account of freedom similar to the negative 
concept of freedom in its inadequacy. Grounding freedom in causality raises questions about the 
possibility of causality and its relationship to freedom but Kant falls short of „genuinely posing‟ that 
question. Nor does he offer an explanation for the fact that human beings are the only entities for 
whom such a question is possible.
463
 Heidegger summarises this issue and the necessity of 
„problematising‟ causality in the following way: 
 
Once the problem of freedom is understood in a metaphysical sense, controversy with Kant is not 
only unavoidable, but must stand in the forefront. Once freedom is understood as a metaphysical 
problem, the question is already raised as to whether freedom is a kind of causality, or whether, on 
the contrary, causality is a problem of freedom.
464
 
 
Heidegger‟s concern is that Kant‟s methodological approach to the problem „obscures‟ a 
fundamental ontology of both freedom and causality: 
 
[...]the problem is considered in terms of the category of causality, but without making causality 
itself problematic through a radical discussion of the ontological problem it involves.
465
 
  
Kant‟s assumption of the primordiality of causality and therefore its presupposition of a 
comportment to and understanding of being remains, as Heidegger says of all ontology that has not 
clarified the meaning of being, „blind and perverted from its ownmost aim‟.466 He develops his 
criticism through an explication of causality and Kant‟s two ways to freedom. 
The essence of practical and transcendental freedom has been identified as autonomy and 
absolute spontaneity respectively. Furthermore, transcendental freedom refers to the „self-
origination of a state‟ so that transcendental freedom is grounded in causality. Kantian 
transcendental freedom differs from other accounts insofar as it is a kind of causality. Nevertheless, 
it is not at all clear how causal freedom (freedom grounded in causality) can allow for the „self-
origination of a state‟. Heidegger quotes Kant‟s definition of „what causality means as such‟ as it 
relates to the „existence of appearances‟ and their „accessibility to us‟ for clarification: 
 
„Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows 
according to a rule‟.467 
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Therefore the „self-origination of a state‟ must also follow that which precedes it „according to a 
rule‟. Two possibilities exist: either Kantian „origination‟ involves a peculiar definition or causality 
must include room for the creation of a state which does not „follow something according to a rule‟.  
Heidegger makes two points on causality as it relates to freedom for Kant:  
1. Causality is a necessary condition for the experience of nature. 
2. „Natural‟ is more primordial than „free‟ causality. 468 
1. Heidegger explains that Kant‟s account of causality describes the rule which „binds a 
multiplicity of apprehensions in succession‟. Causality does not provide the rule for the fact of 
phenomena but their experience as such. The argument is explained at length but can be reduced to 
a simple point: 
  
But if the temporal succession of apprehensions is to have a necessity, time itself, wherein every 
being encountered in experience is located, must indicate how the perception of something objective 
– the binding character of the succession of apprehensions – is possible. Can time itself do this? Does 
it involve a lawfulness in respect of succession? It does indeed, for I can arrive at a later time only by 
way of an earlier time. While I can think of something which comes later without attending to its 
character as later-than, I cannot conceive it precisely as later except by reference to what preceded it. 
The earlier time necessarily determines the subsequent time. The subsequent time cannot be without 
the earlier time. But does the reverse apply? Time is an irreversible succession, i.e. it has a definite 
direction.
469
 
   
Heidegger also states that the rule of „irreversible succession‟ is only applicable to the „perception 
of events or present occurrences‟ and not to „indeterminate perceptions‟. The distinction is 
exemplified by analogy of the difference in perception between a standing house and a ship sailing 
downstream. The house has „properties and determinations which do not involve any succession‟. 
Whether perceived from bottom to top, left to right or vice versa the house does not involve a 
temporal succession: „It does not have the character of an event.‟470 The sailing ship is quite 
different in this regard. It is perceived further downstream from one moment to the next. Moreover, 
the order of successive apprehensions is „bound down‟ but a problem arises from this distinction. 
Both house and ship are apprehensions in time. The experience of their apprehension is not 
atemporal though their particular properties differ. The distinction invalidates the claim that 
causality is a „necessary element of the whole that makes experience as such possible.‟471 Heidegger 
offers a weak solution: 
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It is true that the succession of apprehensions is not bound to an objective succession of appearances, 
for the house is not an event. [...] On the other hand, the succession of apprehensions still has a 
binding character. [...] In the construction of the house, the roof comes last, and in the completed 
house it remains at the top. In other words, the succession of apprehensions is arbitrary only against 
the background of the binding character of the ordered constellation of elements making up the 
present house.
472
 
     
The problem here is that this requires that causal perception of the house is predicated on familiarity 
with its construction.
473
 The confusion is caused by Kant‟s distinction and exacerbated by 
Heidegger‟s failure to fully explicate the issue. We may propose a simple solution provided by 
analysis of the gaze itself. Thereby „one could only arrive at a certain view of the house by way of 
an earlier view‟. Of course this would obligate Kant to account for the perceiver of house and ship: 
 
In his discussion of the Analogies, Kant repeatedly emphasises that „absolute time is not an object of 
perception‟, that „time itself cannot be‟. „Now time itself cannot be perceived.‟ „Time cannot be 
perceived in itself, and what precedes and what follows cannot, therefore, by relation to it, be 
empirically determined in the object.‟ What is the ultimate reason for this? Kant did not and could 
not expressly provide the reason, for he lacked a metaphysics of Dasein.
474
 
   
For Heidegger, Kant needs to substantiate the argument that transcendental freedom is grounded in 
causality by providing a „metaphysics of Dasein‟. The lack of such an account leaves the argument 
incomplete since analysis of what it means for one to experience time and how that relates to the 
„self-origination of a state‟ is necessary to determine the greater primordiality of causality over 
freedom. Put another way, freedom refers to absolute spontaneity specifically with respect to 
reason, as previously stated. The very ability to raise the question of its possibility (its „what‟ and 
„how‟ being as in the „clarifications of essence‟) undermines the claim that it is of greater 
primordiality. Suffice it to say that the „self-origination of a state‟ remains problematic in the 
absence of a „metaphysics of Dasein‟.  
2. Heidegger‟s criticism that Kant lacked „a metaphysics of Dasein‟ introduces an underlying, 
fundamental problem. In this case, a „metaphysics of Dasein‟ is absent because Kant assumes that 
causality, causation as such, must be the most fundamental condition of experience. Therefore the 
perceiver of house and ship must conform to the laws of causation without need for further enquiry. 
Heidegger states that for Kant, 
  
It [causality] is a relation which does not just occur in time, but which is determined in its relational 
character as a temporal relation, as a mode of being-in-time. „Succession‟ is a relation which 
represents in advance, and as such makes possible the experience of intra-temporal occurrences, i.e. 
succession is pre-represented in and for all experiential representation (perception and thought). This 
relation is temporal in the sense that causality (as causation) means: running ahead in time as 
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determining letting follow on such that what runs ahead is itself an event that refers back to 
something earlier that determines it.
475
 
 
Kant‟s causation accounts for the „possibility of experiences‟, „perception and thought‟ including, 
one assumes, the thoughts necessary to make and investigate his own claim. What Heidegger calls 
„the fundamental metaphysical problem underlying his [Kant‟s] interpretation of freedom as a kind 
of causality‟,476 is exacerbated by a contradiction in a further distinction between „natural causality‟ 
and „causality through freedom‟. Kant‟s account of causality as a „determined‟, „relational‟ 
„succession‟ puts it in tension with transcendental freedom insofar as it describes the „absolute 
spontaneity‟ of „experiential representation‟. The greater primordiality of causality that Kant argues 
for, should restrict „perception and thought‟ to only that which „refers back to something earlier that 
determines it‟. Heidegger summarises the problem as follows: 
 
If the definition of causality in general is oriented to the causality of nature, where nature means the 
being-present of that which is present (whether physical, psychical or whatever else), then the way of 
being of causation becomes characterised as being-present. If the causality of freedom is defined in 
terms of this universal causation, then freedom (as being-free) itself takes on the fundamental 
characteristic of being-present. But freedom is the fundamental condition of the possibility of the 
acting person, in the sense of ethical action. Thus the existence of man, precisely through the 
characterisation of freedom as causality (albeit as one kind thereof) is conceived basically as being-
present. This turns freedom into its complete opposite.
477
 
 
For Heidegger, Kant infringes on the possibility of absolute spontaneity by grounding freedom in 
causality. He cannot „treat the causality of freedom primordially and in its own terms‟ because the 
primordiality of causality is assumed. A previous chapter explains Heidegger‟s claim that, 
„existentia is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially 
inappropriate to entities of Dasein‟s character.‟ 478 Beings whose mode of being is presence-at-hand 
are beings for whom, „their Being is „a matter of indifference‟; or more precisely, they „are‟ such 
that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite.‟479 Heidegger‟s 
criticism of Kant, summarised in the following, is based on these claims: 
  
Kant‟s orientation of causation to being-present, which he equates with actuality and existence as 
such, means that he sees freedom and being-free within the horizon of being-present. Since he fails to 
pose the question concerning the particular way of being of beings which are free, he does not 
unfold the metaphysical problem in a primordial manner.
480
 
 
                                                          
475
 Ibid., p.131 
476
 Ibid., p.134 
477
 Ibid., p.133 
478
 See, Heidegger‟s Fundamental Ontology, Dasein and the Question of Being; A Positive Understanding of 
Dasein, p.41 
479
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) pp.67-68 
480
 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom (New York: Continuum, 2002) p.134 
151 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
„Orientating‟ freedom to causality implicitly restricts its ontological definition to the „fundamental 
characteristic of being-present‟. Absolute spontaneity and the „self-origination of a state‟ cannot 
therefore describe powers attributed to „man‟, allowing a disruption of the causal process (e.g. 
Chisholm). As Heidegger concludes, they are descriptions of a relational character between beings 
that are present-at-hand: 
 
Every transition from one state to another, which states might exist in two instants, still happens in a 
time between the instants and thus belongs to the entire time of alteration. For this reason every 
cause of an alteration testifies to its causation during the whole time of the alteration. In other words, 
the action of matter is continuous. There is no such thing as a sudden occurrence which breaks out 
from prior nothingness.
481
 
 
Strangely, „origination‟ cannot imply a „point of origin‟ since „the action of matter is continuous‟. 
Thus every „origination‟ testifies to its causation. Failing to address the being of praxis (ethical 
action) amplifies the problem inherent to the assumption of the primordiality of causality. 
Following Heidegger‟s explication of Kant‟s two ways to freedom will help us determine the extent 
of the problem and therefore the ground Heidegger marks out for his own position. 
c) Kant‟s Two Ways to Freedom  
Cosmological (Transcendental) Freedom: 
Heidegger states that the first way to freedom is arrived at „by way of the problem of the 
possibility of experience as the question of the possibility of metaphysics.‟482 Freedom as a 
„cosmological idea‟ „arises in the context of the problem of world, understanding „world‟ in Kant‟s 
sense as the „totality of appearances‟ (nature and cosmos), thus the totality of present beings as 
accessible to finite human knowledge.‟483 The „totality of present beings‟ is not a reference to each 
and every present being. Neither Kant nor Heidegger claims that „finite human knowledge‟ has 
access to an a priori inventory of beings. It refers to the fact of the totality: that which „binds‟ all 
present beings in the common fact of their present-ness. Furthermore and as previously stated, 
cosmological (transcendental) freedom involves the „self-origination of a state‟ and „experientially 
inaccessible causation‟. This is non-empirical causation or the causation of pure reason: 
 
One thing may be assumed in advance: if freedom belongs in the context of the problem of world, if 
the world is the totality of appearances in their succession, and if the experientially accessible unity 
of appearances is determined by natural causality, then freedom is forced into close connection with 
natural causality. [...] In brief, we can say that freedom is a distinctive mode of natural causality.
484
 
 
Heidegger later clarifies that, 
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Freedom is a non-empirical (intelligible) kind of causality.
485
 
   
The first way to freedom must therefore involve the intelligibility (transcendence) of „world‟. This 
is how Heidegger understands Kant‟s reference to „ideas‟.  He states the following with respect to 
„reason‟: 
 
[...]the faculty or power of representing something in its origin and outcome, i.e. in its „principles‟. 
Reason unifies these principles through concepts of reason, or as Kant calls them, „ideas‟. According 
to Kant, the idea is „the concept provided by reason – of the form of the whole – insofar as the 
concept determines a priori not only the scope of its manifold content, but also the positions which 
the parts occupy relatively to one another‟.486 
 
We may therefore understand Kant‟s first way as causal reasoning towards a metaphysical „idea‟ of 
world. Heidegger identifies two concerns central to Kant‟s argument for transcendental freedom: i) 
the sense in which the representation of present beings or their „unification‟ in „ideas‟ involves the 
„self-origination of a state‟ and ii) Kant must show that the causality of reason does indeed „come 
into unity‟ with natural causality.  
i) Heidegger quotes what Kant calls, „reason‟s principle of unconditioned unity‟ in order to 
state the first problem: 
 
Thus the principle of reason is „that if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and 
consequently the absolutely unconditioned (through which alone the conditioned has been possible) 
is also given.‟487 
  
The „conditioned‟ is what Heidegger also refers to as „what appears in appearance‟, namely 
„occurrences, alteration, the succession of events‟. These are the sum of experienced „corporeal 
nature‟ which is „given‟. Kant‟s claim is that the laws which constitute corporeal nature are equally 
present (given) to reason as is their ground or that which is absolutely unconditioned: 
  
During our discussion of the principle of causality we saw that, in its dynamical meaning, this relates 
to events, i.e. the sequential occurrence of appearances. Thus what reason refers to here is precisely 
the unity and completeness of this sequence.
488
 
  
For Heidegger, Kant requires that human reason must „found‟ the conditioned: to provide an 
account of the ground of what appears. Given that the conditions are causal, reason is compelled to 
return „not just to something prior as its own particular cause, but to the absolute beginning of the 
sequence.‟489 Reason thus „represents‟ an origin which is free because it logically precedes 
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(transcends) causal conditions. The „principle of reason‟ therefore is the return to an origin or first 
cause which produces all subsequent events in nature. The „self-origination of a state‟ does not 
therefore refer to a spontaneous creation of a first cause resulting in a succession of natural events. 
The representation and unification of present beings in ideas only endeavours „to extend it beyond 
the limits of the empirical‟.490 Rather, „self-origination‟ posits an origin within the limits of its 
empirical „finitude‟. In Heidegger‟s interpretation, Kant finds that reason is inferior to „the 
understanding‟: 
 
In its representing (i.e. in its concepts) reason is only seemingly superior to the understanding as the 
genuine faculty of concepts. [...] Kant emphasizes that it is only from the understanding that pure 
transcendental concepts can arise: „Reason does not really generate any concept. The most it can do 
is to free a concept of understanding from the unavoidable limitations of possible experience, and so 
to endeavour to extend it beyond the limits of the empirical, though still, indeed, in terms of its 
relation to the empirical.
491
 
 
Thus insofar as reason is restricted to the empirical, at least in Heidegger‟s reading, the return to 
„the unity and completeness‟ of a causal sequence does not „generate any concept‟ of origin. That is 
attributed to „the understanding‟.492  
ii) Kant must also explain how the coincidence of natural and free causality is possible where 
„coincidence‟ refers to their producing the same effects. He refers to it as the „inner dissension of 
pure reason‟.493 It is explained by analysis of what is later called the „permanent and necessary 
antagonisms‟, „essential to human reason itself‟.494 This is the dissension between the causality of 
freedom as necessitated by „pure human reason‟ and the empirical laws of nature. Heidegger 
summarises the problem by quoting Kant‟s thesis and antithesis of this third antinomy: 
 
1. „Causality in accordance with the laws of nature is not the only causality from which the 
appearances in the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to 
assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.  
2. „There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of 
nature.‟495 
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In Heidegger‟s interpretation of Kant, the problem of coinciding causalities is symptomatic of a 
fundamental dissension evident in all human reasoning. In trying to understand the world as a 
causally related totality, reason is forced both to assert and to reject the existence of a first cause. 
Heidegger summarises Kant‟s way of resolving the antinomy. Both thesis and antithesis depend on 
an implicit presupposition of the kind previously attributed to traditional ontology: 
 
The Thesis asserts freedom as unconditioned causality, as the primordial origin subject to no further 
conditions. We can thus take the Thesis as saying that the ordered series of causes, considered in its 
totality, is finite. Clearly then, the Antithesis would say that the series of the regressive synthesis of 
conditions is infinite. [...] This kind of opposition is called a simple contradiction. To understand the 
antagonism in this way (i.e. in accordance with common reason) presupposes that nature is a thing-
in-itself, i.e. that nature is given to us absolutely and is known absolutely. This presupposition 
overlooks the fact that as the fundamental concept of appearances, nature cannot possess absolute 
existence. Since nature is not being-in-itself it cannot be said to be either finite or infinite. The 
presupposition of both thesis and antithesis is false. [...] Both Thesis and Antithesis are based on an 
illusion, and indeed, as we saw, on an illusion necessary to common reason.
496
 
   
Thus both thesis and antithesis presuppose the „is-ness‟ of nature as a „thing-in-itself‟. In order to 
present a final resolution to the third antinomy, Heidegger reminds us of the „universal ontological 
concept of action‟, namely, „The relation of the subject of causality to the effect‟.497 Of course these 
relations differ and are what Kant refers to as their „character‟, of which there are two kinds: 
„empirical‟ and „intelligible‟: 
 
The empirical character is that lawfulness of causation which is empirically accessible in 
experience, as appearance. It is causation in its „how‟ as belonging to appearance, i.e. the causality of 
nature. The intelligible character – we can already guess – is the mode of causation of causality from 
freedom.
498
 
   
Any appearance which „shows itself for human knowledge‟ does not also empirically reveal „what it 
is in itself‟.499 Nonetheless, that the ontological condition of the appearance is unknown is 
understood. This is what Heidegger refers to as the „transcendental object which must underlie the 
appearances.‟500 A site of coincidence for two kinds of causality is provided by the availability of 
both „characters‟ of causal relation to the „rational living being‟.501 Heidegger finds evidence in 
Kant‟s notion of „pure-apperception‟: „actions and inner determinations which [man] cannot regard 
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as impressions of the senses‟.502 Here the „transcendental object‟ is pointed out by the „„I‟-being‟ in 
all references to oneself such as, „„I‟ am writing‟ or „„I‟ think‟. The causal character of this relation 
is that of the „ought‟ which is not derived from mere appearance but from a concept. Praxis (action 
of „the ought‟) is grounded in the „pure causality‟ of reason which imposes an „ought‟ „from itself‟: 
 
Where, as with man, action occurs in unity with nature, reason possesses an empirical as well as an 
intelligible character. [...] The essential universal metaphysical ground of the possibility of the unity 
of the two causalities lies in the fact that appearances are determinable as both intelligible and 
sensible.
503
 
  
In Heidegger‟s reading of Kant, reason is itself a „kind of causality‟,504underlying all human action 
but this is causality of an „intelligible character‟: a non-empirical causality with „no before and 
after‟.505 If all human action (empirical causality) is therefore predicated on reason (intelligible 
causality) then human action describes the coincidence of two kinds of causality bringing about the 
same effect. The „I‟ of pure apperception points to the „ought-governed action‟506 which 
characterises the causality of reason. The permanence of the „I‟ in all action necessitates this 
coincidence of empirical and intelligible causality.  
Practical Freedom: 
Kant‟s second way to freedom is shorter but no less problematic. This is due, in part, to the fact 
that the transcendental is the ground of the practical: they are not entirely separate. The first way 
accounts for the possibility of freedom, the second will explicate its actuality. This is the freedom of 
human beings not of any other entity or freedom as such. It follows therefore that actual freedom 
must be revealed in the features which distinguish human beings: 
 
Now what is distinctive to man is his personality. [...] In what does the personality of a person 
consist? We can understand this if we consider the personality as distinct from the humanity and 
animality of man. All these elements go together to define the full essence of man. To be sure, the 
traditional definition of man recognises only two elements: homo animale rationale, man as the 
animal endowed with reason. [...] But humanity in this specific sense does not exhaust the essence of 
man, which is realised and genuinely defined only in his personality. This makes man not just a 
rational being but a being capable of accountability. Such a being must be capable of self-
responsibility. The essence of person, the personality, consists in self-responsibility.
507
 
 
We can identify two problems here though Heidegger only concerns himself with the second. The 
former can be accounted for with ease but the latter requires closer attention. First, in the interest of 
clarity it is important that one understand how self-responsibility follows from personality and 
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rationality. As a „genuine definition of humanity‟, „personality‟ cannot provide an explanation but a 
solution is inherent to the argument about reason as a kind of causality. Kant‟s „pure apperception‟ 
is a feature of human experience and action which refers to what Heidegger calls the „„I‟-being‟.508 
Any „actions and inner determinations‟509 involving an „„I‟-being‟ necessarily imply self-awareness. 
In this respect, the experience of action is always self-referential and must therefore include a sense 
of accountability.
510
 One is aware of themselves and their actions in such a manner as to be „capable 
of self-responsibility‟: responsibility to and from the self. In our interpretation therefore, „persons‟ 
are self-responsible insofar human experience and action involves „pure apperception‟.  
The second problem is whether a demonstration of practical (actual) freedom is at all possible: 
 
It is only in and from experience that we can decide about the actual practical freedom of human 
beings. Accordingly, the concept of practical freedom is an „empirical concept‟. But Kant denies this: 
„This [practical] freedom is not an empirical concept.‟ „We could not prove freedom to be actual in 
ourselves and in human nature.‟ Practical freedom cannot be proved „as something actual‟. This 
means, then, that the actuality of practical freedom is not a problem; as with cosmological freedom 
we can inquire only into its possibility. [...] It is impossible to demonstrate practical freedom as 
something actual; to demonstrate the possibility of practical freedom is unnecessary. The second way 
to freedom thus loses all point and sense.
511
 
           
Proving freedom is a difficult issue if for no other reason than that it is not a quantifiable, empirical 
phenomenon. In much the same manner, ethical action cannot be proven as „something actual‟. 
Action(s) can be proven and can reflect the characteristics of what can be considered „ethics‟ but the 
actuality of praxis, as a kind of action, is beyond the bounds of empiricism. This does not require 
abandoning discussion of the actuality of freedom. Nor does it require improving empirical 
analysis. Appropriately philosophical discussions of freedom simply require an equally appropriate 
methodology: 
 
The problem of actual freedom is thus to demonstrate its actuality. But this is something different to 
pointing out, from experience, some actual case of being-free. It means demonstrating the kind of 
actuality of freedom and its mode of intuitive validation. [...] When Kant says that „we could not 
prove freedom to be actual in ourselves and in human nature‟, this means only that freedom cannot 
be experienced in the manner of a natural thing. [...] The reality of freedom requires another kind of 
actuality than that exhibited by natural objects, i.e. the reality of freedom is not an objective 
reality.
512
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Thus the „actuality‟ of freedom is not negated by its impossibility as a „natural thing‟ much as the 
intangibility of ethics does not negate its „actuality‟. Proof is given by the direct experience of self-
responsible action or what Heidegger refers to as the „facticity‟513 of pure reason. The first way to 
freedom accounted for the necessity for reason of the transcendental (the „idea‟) of freedom. 
Therein reason arrives at freedom by „representing‟ it in its „principles‟. Similarly, practical 
concerns are experienced by their „representation‟ in „concepts‟. Ethical action or praxis is 
determined by these „concepts‟: 
 
The will is „a power to act according to concepts‟. A concept is the representation of something, 
being able and willing to act according to what is thus represented. For example, the determining 
instance may be the representation of the scientific education of man. What is represented in this 
representation can determine an action. An effect that is determined in this way is will-governed, i.e. 
praxis.
514
 
  
But this describes a general idea of practical reason. In other words, „representations‟ are „obtained 
through experience of actually present human beings with definite characteristics.‟515 Practical 
freedom must be shown to be „pure‟ in the sense that it is „determined a priori‟ if it is indeed 
grounded in „self-origination‟ and transcendental freedom. It is to that end that Heidegger proposes 
the hypothesis that, „if will can determine its own causation‟516 then „will-governed determining is 
intrinsically „addressed‟ to itself.‟517 As a non-empirical causality which can respond to and „bring 
about‟ its „representations‟, will (reason) must refer to itself for the „determining ground for its 
willing‟.518 The ground (why) of willing cannot be derived a posteriori because it presupposes 
reason. For Kant, praxis evidences practical freedom because will (the determining force of human 
action) is a law unto itself, grounded on the transcendental idea of freedom: 
 
It thus emerges that the basic law of the pure will, of pure practical reason, is nothing else than the 
form of law-giving. [...] The ethicality of action does not consist in realising so-called values, but in 
the actual willing to take responsibility, in the decision to exist within this responsibility.
519
 
       
The proof of practical freedom is therefore provided by the very „decision for responsibility‟: the 
necessary predicate for the experience of praxis. Understood in this sense, the argument is 
consistent with the earlier claim that proof does not refer to an empirical object but the direct 
experience of freedom: the experiential understanding of what one means by freedom or those 
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experiences which give rise to the „conviction of absolute responsibility‟. Kant‟s shift of focus to 
the phenomenological is also a central feature of Heidegger‟s project as we have understood it. 
Nonetheless his interpretation simultaneously reveals Kant‟s „insufficient radicalism‟. The problem 
of a thorough ontological interrogation persists.520 Heidegger paraphrases Kant‟s views to address 
the concern that the proof of practical freedom leaves it a victim to whim or being „totally 
indeterminate‟: 
  
If this willing of the pure will transcends the contingency of empirical action, this does not amount to 
becoming lost in the empty abstraction of a valid form of lawfulness, such that what one is to do 
remains totally indeterminate. Rather, this transcending is the coming into operation of genuine 
concrete willing, concrete because it wills willing and nothing else besides.
521
 
  
Continuing to paraphrase Kant, Heidegger later adds, 
 
[...]in the phenomenological searching out of our consciousness for the presence of the categorical 
imperative, we have from the very beginning gone astray concerning the kind of factuality 
characteristic of this fact.
522
 
 
On our reading of Heidegger, grounding the categorical imperative in pure will, that is „will that 
wills willing and nothing else besides‟, constitutes an instance of what we have referred to as 
ontologising rationalist methodology or rationalist disengagement. In this respect, Kant‟s radicalism 
consists in its attribution of an ontological value to practical comportment or praxis. His 
insufficiency is therefore rooted in its failure to properly interrogate the pure will and the 
primordiality of causality. Crucially, this problem cannot be revealed, let alone understood, by 
employing the same methodology. Sustaining „essential insight‟ and evidencing practical freedom 
necessitates practically engaging in praxis and determining the facticity of pure will. Still 
interpreting Kant, Heidegger says the following to this end: 
 
But willing what precisely? Again, this seductive question already leads us astray from actual 
willing. The question looks as if one is making an effort to actually will, for one is seeking 
something that can be willed. But in this way willing is closed off to precisely the one who at that 
moment is supposed to will. Willing what? Everyone who actually wills knows: to actually will is to 
will nothing else but the ought of one‟s existence.523 
  
The simplicity of the final assertion is deceptive. His emphasis on „actual‟ willing implies an 
opposing category such as „insincere‟ willing. This suggests that „knowledge‟ of „actual‟ willing is 
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not always self-evident and therefore that the reference to „everyone‟ need not imply a majority. 
Heidegger is clear that the demand for proof of practical freedom requires that one „will the ought 
of one‟s existence‟ and not merely the ends of one‟s intentions. Its explicit concern is the self-
ascription of responsibility as a fundamental characteristic of one‟s existence. 524 „Insincere‟ willing 
therefore involves assuming a „critical distance‟ from the analysis of practical freedom, already 
presupposing the ontological condition of the being whose freedom is in question. The argument 
which will form the basis of Heidegger‟s own view of freedom is best understood in this sense. For 
Heidegger, Kant approaches this view of freedom in the account of „the actual willing of the pure 
ought‟: 
 
The proof of the practical reality of freedom consists in nothing else than in understanding that 
freedom exists only as the actual willing of the pure ought. [...] We can now derive the essence of 
freedom from the character of the factuality of the fact of practical freedom: practical freedom is 
self-legislation, pure will, autonomy. Freedom now reveals itself as the condition of the possibility of 
the factuality of pure practical reason.
525
 
  
d) „Insufficient Radicalism‟ 
The last sentence introduces a hypothesis that will be the underlying premise of Heidegger‟s 
argument in ET. It follows from Heidegger‟s inversion of the relationship between freedom and 
causality at the basis of Kant‟s account. Thus for Heidegger, rather than freedom being a kind of 
causality, causality is in fact a kind of („a problem of‟) freedom and that therefore „...the question 
concerning the essence of human freedom is the fundamental question of philosophy, in which is 
rooted even the question of being.‟526 If the „factuality‟ of causal reason is contingent on praxis then 
causality is experientially subordinate to freedom: it is conditioned by freedom. The hypothesis is 
simultaneously reinforced by a thorough understanding of Kant‟s view of freedom and two critical 
problems at the root of his argument. 
The first problem is this: Heidegger argues that, „The actuality of freedom is not interrogated in 
a properly metaphysical sense, not as a problem of being.‟527 The „is-ness‟ of will-governed action 
is presupposed leaving unanswered the problems of what one might mean by „human will-governed 
action‟ (praxis), how it relates to human-beings as the animale rationale and in what it originates. 
The second problem is in regard to transcendental freedom. Kant enquires into the possibility of 
freedom but only in the context of natural causality: 
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This makes it look as if the possibility of freedom is a problem only insofar as freedom is a kind of 
causality. Once freedom is conceived in this fashion, the question of its possibility can concern 
nothing else but the compatibility of this causality with natural causality.
528
 
   
Heidegger‟s main criticism derives from a combination of these two problems: both 
transcendental and practical freedom „neglect the question of the ontological character of what is 
placed in question as possible and actual‟.529 Kant‟s metaphysics are intended to provide an 
analysis of freedom which accounts for both its actuality and possibility. Nonetheless, Heidegger 
finds that the „ontological character‟ or the „is-ness‟ of the object of Kant‟s analysis is almost 
entirely ignored such that the relationship between freedom and causality is assumed without 
further ado. What is ostensibly under analysis is implicitly conceded without interrogation and from 
the outset. The discourse on freedom will remain „insufficient in its radicalism‟ so long as causality 
and „the ontological problem it involves‟530 are not problematised in a manner appropriate to the 
task. Heidegger‟s conclusion to EHF is worthy of note as regards his „destruction‟ of Kantian 
metaphysics. He claims that Kant‟s account of causality suggests that, „Freedom is the condition of 
the possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings, of the understanding of being‟.531 His 
failure to acknowledge his own implications exemplifies the problem with Kant‟s account. For 
Heidegger, understanding causality as a „character of the objectivity of objects‟532 requires 
comporting oneself towards being such that one already acknowledges the „binding character of 
their so- and that-being‟.533 In order to approach objects as such one must first have already 
acknowledged their that-ness. This „originary self-binding‟ „amounts to giving a law unto 
oneself‟.534 Practical freedom similarly necessitates „the ought‟ of pure will, revealing self-
responsibility. This is the „originary self-binding‟ of oneself to one‟s being-in-the-world and the 
„objectivity of objects‟. It is precisely this „comportment‟ to being, implicit in Kant‟s understanding 
of causality, which „is only possible where freedom exists‟.535 Freedom, therefore, is a necessary 
pre-requisite for the understanding of being. Of course this alone is insufficient to satisfy our 
concern to find an account of freedom that does not suffer from the same limitations of a 
„rationalist‟ approach. There is ample room for misunderstanding and confusion if for no other 
reason than that Heidegger begins by positing Kantian causality precisely in order to undermine its 
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premise. For Heidegger, Kant misconstrues the „two ways to freedom‟ as categories of causality 
because of its implicit ontological prioritisation: his own account will not.  
 
ii) The Essence of Truth 
Heidegger‟s 1930 lecture entitled, „On the Essence of Truth‟ (hereafter OET) 536 was published 
as an essay in 1943. He also gave Winter semester lectures in 1931/32 entitled, „The Essence of 
Truth: on Plato‟s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus‟ (thus far and hereafter, ET)537 not published until 
1988. Much of ET involves summaries of ideas and arguments found in BT and EHF and detailed 
analysis of passages from Plato. We intend to draw on both OET and ET for this final analysis. 
Insofar as our interests remain centred on Heidegger‟s view of freedom, we will restrict discussion 
of his interpretations to those areas of particular pertinence. Three issues need to be explicated to 
that end. First, we intend to provide an account of what truth has to do with freedom. Second, we 
will address and explicate precisely what we should understand of freedom as Heidegger sees it. 
Finally, we will provide a brief discussion of what this means for Heidegger‟s project as a whole, 
the majority of which will be reserved for the conclusive chapter. It was suggested at the outset of 
this chapter that EHF and ET function as a direct application of „destruction and restatement‟ 
necessitated by fundamental ontology. If the former can be appropriately characterised as an 
exercise in the destruction of traditional metaphysics, exemplified by Kant, then the latter is the 
completion of the overall process. In regard to the problem of freedom and on our reading, EHF 
investigates Kant‟s two ways to freedom with the intention of identifying the specific insufficiency 
of his metaphysics. Therein rationalist disengagement underlies the conception of a pure will 
characterised by a primordial causality. A contention is implicit throughout the majority of EHF 
and hypothesised by the end, that sincerely problematizing, that is, interrogating the being of the 
pure will and its comportment to causality will reveal a more primordial freedom. In other words, it 
will reveal that freedom is not a property of a particular agent but is rather the „condition necessary 
for the understanding of beings‟. This, we contend, summarises Heidegger‟s argument in favour of 
freedom in ET. The comportment to causality exemplified by Kant, is revealing of a relationship to 
and therefore an understanding of greater primordiality, that is, an understanding that causality is 
contingent upon. This understanding which as we have seen, characterises the hermeneutic facticity 
of experience is reframed in ET as aletheia or unhiddenness, disclosure and truth. As we will show, 
for Heidegger, Dasein‟s concern for and understanding of being invites a confrontation with 
ontological truth. The understanding of being implicit in all of Dasein‟s comportments, although 
                                                          
536
 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, On the Essence of Truth (New York: Harper San Francisco, 1993 - org. 
1943, translated by John Sallis) p.111 
537
 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth (New York: Continuum, 2002) 
162 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
not necessarily conceptually graspable, describes a capacity for disclosure of being. Freedom 
therefore refers simply to that which grounds the possibility of such disclosure. Much less an 
attribute of any agent or class of agents, freedom is an a priori necessity for the understanding 
inherent to experience as such.   
a) Truth and its relationship to Freedom 
ET begins in much the same manner as the previously discussed EHF. Heidegger‟s „preliminary 
considerations‟ are intended to address and ultimately reject common sense notions of truth in 
favour of an „essential‟ account. Just as particular instances of „free action‟ or moral responsibility 
were of no interest to EHF, so are particular truths irrelevant to the concerns of ET. The primary 
concern was and remains their essence: their „universal what-being‟.538 Both ET and OET open with 
a brief analysis of the „usual concepts of truth‟. By appeal to what Heidegger calls „self-evidence‟, 
he arrives at a working definition of truth as it relates to propositional statements and matter: 
  
The true, whether it be a matter or a proposition, is what accords, the accordant [das Stimmende]. 
Being true and truth here signify accord, and that in a double sense: on the one hand, the consonance 
[Einstimmigkeit] of a matter with what is supposed in advance regarding it and, on the other hand, 
the accordance of what is meant in the statement with the matter.
539
 
  
Thus truth, at least in its „usual conception‟, refers to accordance or correspondence.540 For 
Heidegger, this provides a working definition though it does not exhaust the concept of „truth‟: it is 
more appropriately a description of „propositional truth‟.  The essence of propositional truth, 
Heidegger says, is in the „correctness‟ of statements where „correctness‟ refers to the relationship 
between „knowledge‟ (what is known and expressed in a proposition) and „matter‟ (what one knows 
about and reflected by a proposition). For Heidegger, the problem is that „correctness‟ and 
„correspondence‟ are presupposed as the essence of truth , independently „of the interpretation of 
the essence of the Being of all beings‟.541 The point, therefore, is to firstly investigate the nature of 
the relationship between propositional statements and matter in order to determine the essence of 
their „correspondence‟. Heidegger offers an initial explanation in respect of the statement, „the coin 
is round‟: 
 
Here the statement is in accordance with the thing. Now the relation obtains, not between thing and 
thing, but rather between a statement and a thing. But wherein are the thing and the statement 
supposed to be in accordance, considering that the relata are manifestly different in their outward 
appearance? [...] The essence of the correspondence is determined rather by the kind of relation that 
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obtains between the statement and the thing. As long as this “relation” remains undetermined and is 
not grounded in its essence, all dispute over the possibility and impossibility, over the nature and 
degree, of the correspondence loses its way in a void.
542
 
   
The relationship between „statement‟ and „thing‟ is commonly referred to and understood as that of 
„correctness‟. In that sense, „the coin is round‟ relates to matter insofar as the proposition refers to 
something true about the coin. For Heidegger, the statement is true in the strict sense that it is 
„correct‟ though self-evidence conceals naïveté in this case. „Correctness‟ in this regard refers to a 
tautological relationship between statements and matter. In other words, what is true about the coin 
must already be understood in order for the statement to be „correct‟. The „correctness‟ (truth) of a 
statement can only be determined by comparison with what is already assumed to be true about 
matter. In this case, we will have agreed to what „round‟ means so when we say „the coin is round‟ 
we only confirm the accordance of „round‟ to itself. Thus the apparently self-evident account of 
truth as an „accordance‟ between a statement and a „thing‟ reduces to tautological observations, 
each referring to the other and none offering a meaningful description. More importantly, this 
material investigation of a self-evident or „usual conception‟ reveals an understanding of truth 
presupposed by a propositional statement. In our view, Heidegger‟s two texts on truth under 
consideration move in slightly different directions at this juncture. These differences are a response 
to the theoretical and methodological demands of particular phases of the argument, not a change in 
thought.  
ET begins an etymological analysis of truth as αλήθεια (aletheia) whereas OET offers a brief 
and complex account of an „open region‟ and „open comportment‟ before declaring an essential 
relationship between truth and freedom. In the interests of clarity, OET does make reference to 
aletheia on four occasions but provides no extensive account. The term is simply introduced in a 
broad definition: 
 
To let be – that is, to let beings be as the beings which they are – means to engage oneself with the 
open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it 
were, along with itself. Western thinking in its beginning conceived this open region as ta aletheia 
the unconcealed.
543
 
 
Further allusions to aletheia in OET reinforce its significance to Heidegger‟s account of freedom. 
„Openness‟ may therefore be understood as shorthand for the detailed analysis of aletheia. 
Explication of one will therefore shed light on what Heidegger means by the other and how they 
relate to freedom. „Preliminary considerations‟ in ET provide a short description of aletheia 
sufficient for our purposes at this point. Heidegger uses a basic definition as a platform for an 
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interpretation of Plato‟s cave allegory: „understanding it as a clue to the essence of unhiddenness 
(αλήθεια)‟.544 As stated, we will turn to that analysis as and when necessary. For the moment it will 
serve to note that for Heidegger, aletheia or unhiddenness essentially differs from the „usual 
conceptions‟ of truth: 
 
What then do the Greeks call αλήθεια; (unhidden, true)? Not assertions, not sentences and not 
knowledge, but the beings [das Seiende] themselves, the totality of nature: the human world and the 
work of God.
545
 
 
Putting to one side the difficulties inherent in translation, Heidegger‟s interpretation is explained by 
its correlation with his project. The concern therein is to arrive at an „explicit concept of being‟ by 
means of a particular method chosen to avoid theoretical obstructions. His analysis of traditional 
ontology and the methodology he adopts are validated by this understanding of aletheia. „Truth‟ 
itself now coincides with the aim of phenomenology: „to let beings show themselves from 
themselves‟ which is the formal understanding that Heidegger ultimately dismisses for the 
phenomenological, as explained earlier.
546
 The implied association of truth with phenomenology 
points to their mutual grounding in the interpretive matrix of relations of Dasein‟s experience: 
 
Although we do not want to fixate on a mere word-meaning, we must still bear in mind that the word 
for truth, α-λήθεια, does not stand for some arbitrary and irrelevant thing, but is a word for what man 
wants and seeks in the ground of his essence, a word, therefore, for something ultimate and primary. 
[...] Instead, must not this word, if it is a word for what constitutes the ground of human Dasein, 
derive from a primordial experience of world and self? Is αλήθεια then not a basic and primal 
word?
547
 
   
This „primordial experience of world and self‟ occurs in the „unconcealed and open region‟ of 
aletheia. The essence of truth therefore does not refer to the „correctness of assertions and 
propositions‟ as they relate to „things‟ but the metaphysical space that makes an encounter with 
beings possible. Understood as such, Heidegger‟s otherwise difficult account of „open comportment 
in an open region‟ refers to the appropriateness of one‟s approach in the primordial investigation of 
being(s). „Comportment‟ [Verhalten] is that which „accomplishes that bearing [Verhaeltnis] in the 
relationship between presentative statement and thing‟.548 In other words, it offers a term to account 
for the presupposed understanding between any particular statement and beings. For Heidegger, this 
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extends to „All working and achieving, all action and calculation‟549 such that comportment does 
not describe a deliberate or proactive action in the effort to understand beings but precisely that 
prerequisite way of engaging with things necessary for such actions. „Open comportment in an open 
region‟ may therefore be understood quite simply as the relation between enquirer, enquiry and 
what is enquired after in the ontological encounter with beings: the possibility of truth (aletheia).  
An obvious problem presents itself to us at this point: Heidegger‟s account of truth seems to 
imply the impossibility of untruth. Describing aletheia (truth) as the site of a „primordial experience 
of world and self‟ or the metaphysical space reserved for an ontological encounter with beings, 
undercuts the possibility of falsehood or error. Heidegger does offer an account of untruth 
presumably in order to address precisely such a problem though he does not explicitly say so. 
Nonetheless, our familiarity with this kind of criticism affords us the opportunity for clarification 
before returning to Heidegger. First, an earlier explication of being-ontological required that a 
distinction be made between the „priority‟ and „primacy‟ of Dasein.550 This was done in anticipation 
of the possibility that one may misinterpret the ontico-ontological priority of Dasein to the question 
of being. It was resolved that such a reading involved terminological and ontological contradictions 
in the account of Dasein and fundamental ontology and could not therefore be sustained. Similarly, 
open comportment and the primordial understanding of beings do not require the absence of 
untruth. Rather open comportment based on a primordial understanding offers an account of the 
very possibility for what is „self-evidently‟ referred to as untrue. Second and perhaps more 
importantly, the assumption of an essential opposition between truth and untruth betrays implicit 
presuppositions about their nature. The latter merely describes a negative relation to the former, not 
their separation. Previous discussions about „semblance‟ and the „permeation of untruth‟ have 
already attested to the persistence of truth even in the case of concealment.
551
   
OET identifies two categories of untruth: „concealing‟ and „errancy‟. As ever, these are not 
entirely separate categories but are related by what Heidegger refers to as „the mystery‟. Whilst 
untruth as concealing ironically preserves the mystery, untruth as errancy is distinguished as a 
„turning away from the mystery‟. By means of explanation, Heidegger states the following about 
concealing: 
 
Concealment deprives aletheia of disclosure yet does not render it steresis (privation); rather, 
concealment preserves what is most proper to aletheia as its own. [...] What conserves letting-be in 
this relatedness to concealing? Nothing less than the concealing of what is concealed as a whole, of 
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being as such, i.e., the mystery; not a particular mystery regarding this or that, but rather the one 
mystery – that in general, mystery (the concealing of what is concealed) as such holds sway 
throughout man‟s Dasein.552 
 
In light of that, errancy is described in these terms: 
  
The insistent turning toward what is readily available and the ek-sistent turning away from the 
mystery belong together. They are one and the same. Yet turning toward and away from is based on 
a turning to and fro proper to Dasein. Man‟s flight from the mystery toward what is readily available, 
onward from one current thing to the next, passing the mystery by – this is erring.553 
 
We may derive two crucial points from these statements. First, concealment and erring are both 
features of truth as aletheia. In the case of the former, it inherently indicates „what is most proper to 
aletheia‟ and the latter what is „proper to Dasein‟ for whom aletheia is a fundamental concern. 
Neither concealment nor errancy in pursuit of aletheia, describe opposition to truth in the 
conventional sense. Second, both categories provide an extension of principles already accounted 
for and explicated in the course of this analysis. Mention has already been made of the relationship 
between concealing and the previously discussed phenomena of semblance and appearance. Therein 
we explain that for Heidegger, a semblance or „showing-itself-as-what-it-is-not‟ cannot conceal 
without simultaneously revealing itself as such and implying what is concealed. In the simplest 
terms, concealing cannot occur without indicating itself as a concealment and thus that something is 
concealed. Similarly, erring now designates that method of ontological enquiry which has been 
attributed to traditional discourse, instances of which we have referred to as „missing the point‟. The 
predilection for material investigations, the reduction of ontology to the enumeration of 
characteristics or the appeal to the „self-evident‟ all fit firmly in the category of an „ek-sistent 
turning away from‟ or a „turning toward what is readily available‟. In either case 
(concealing/semblance or errancy/abstraction), Heidegger‟s primary concern is the question, „what 
are beings?‟ („ηί ηò ον‟) and the necessity of determining a careful approach such that it is not lost or 
obscured. It is our further contention that „the mystery which holds sway over Dasein‟ functions as 
an ambiguous reference for the same concern. The „concealment of beings as such‟ does not 
describe an overt act but a necessary consequence of Dasein‟s ek-sistence: 
 
However, what brings into accord is not nothing but rather a concealing of being as a whole. 
Precisely because letting be always lets beings be in a particular comportment which relates to them 
and thus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a 
concealing. In the ek-sistent freedom of Dasein a concealing of being as a whole comes to pass 
[ereignet sich]. Here there is concealment [...]
554
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Phrased simply, the very means by which one arrives at particular truths simultaneously and 
necessarily has the effect of concealing the truth of being. The introduction to BT makes a similar 
claim though the key term therein is the „presupposing‟ of being: 
 
This „presupposing‟ of Being has rather the character of taking a look at it beforehand, so that in the 
light of it the entities presented to us get provisionally articulated in their Being. This guiding activity 
of taking a look at Being arises from the average understanding of Being in which we always operate 
and which in the end belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself.
555
 
  
Both texts concur that the „average understanding‟ or „the ek-sistent freedom of Dasein‟ has the 
effect of obscuring or diverting attention from the question of being. Thus „the mystery‟, in this 
sense, is not a concept added to Heidegger‟s project at the time of ET but refers to the very same 
„puzzling fact that we understand the being of beings without having an explicit concept at our 
disposal‟. As if to reinforce this continuity, Heidegger echoes the opening words of BT: 
 
Wherever the concealment of beings as a whole is conceded only as a limit that occasionally 
announces itself, concealing as a fundamental occurrence has sunk into forgottenness.
556
 
 
This, it would seem, is the very same „forgottenness‟ afflicting the restatement of the question of 
being by means of the „prejudices‟ which insist that such enquiry is „unnecessary‟.557 Nonetheless 
the ambiguity of „the mystery‟ represents a shift in language from the methodological technicalities 
of BT. What might be considered the eccentricities of Heidegger‟s language reside precisely in the 
fact that individual terms are deliberately burdened with the weight of previously explicated theory. 
Thus, „the mystery‟ is intended to accommodate the vagueness of „avoiding definitions‟ and 
„feeling our way forward‟.558 The assertion of ambiguities, in this respect and on our reading, is 
reflective of an effort to evade the predilection for disengagement in conceiving the enquiry. A 
strict definition offers, at best, accordance between statement and a presupposed understanding of 
being. As Heidegger states in „An Introduction to Metaphysics‟, 
  
We shall fail to understand the mysteriousness of the essence of being-human, thus experienced and 
poetically carried back to its ground, if we snatch at value judgments of any kind.
559
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In our view therefore, the assertion of „the mystery‟ as a necessarily ambiguous understanding is the 
culmination of an effort to disrupt such impulsive „snatching‟. Yet the question remains as to what 
„the mystery‟ and aletheia as a metaphysical space, have to do with freedom.  
The first paragraph of the section of OET entitled, „The Ground of the Possibility of 
Correctness‟ concludes with the assertion that, „The essence of truth is freedom‟.560 This is followed 
by a complex albeit brief account of freedom in the section entitled „The Essence of Freedom‟ 
before turning to truth, concealing and errancy. ET offers a far more detailed analysis but 
explanations are derived, in large part, from an interpretation of Plato‟s cave allegory. Thus 
Heidegger says the following under the title, „Light and Freedom, Freedom as the Bond to 
Illuminating‟: 
 
No less essential than what has just been discussed is the story of the prisoner‟s release from his 
shackles: the phenomenon of freedom. The allegory, i.e. the whole story as we have followed it, 
provides clues as to how freedom should be understood. [...] Comportment to what gives freedom 
(the light) is itself a becoming free.
561
 
  
OET echoes this point but without reference to the allegory: 
 
To free oneself for a binding directedness is possible only by being free for what is opened up in an 
open region. Such being free points to the heretofore uncomprehended essence of freedom. The 
openness of comportment as the inner condition of the possibility of correctness is grounded in 
freedom.
562
 
 
His account of the relationship between truth and freedom in these quotes can be reduced to two 
moves. The first poses few problems when understood appropriately. The second is far more 
problematic but strikes at the heart of Heidegger‟s view of freedom. Moreover, it forms the basis of 
our own position which has directed this enquiry from the outset.  
1. The first move can be simplified to the observation that light (a „stage‟ in the „occurrence of 
truth‟) reveals one‟s freedom. Phrased normatively, one is free to move, see and do as they wish 
precisely on condition that one can see what is before them: 
  
We speak of a „forest clearing‟ [Waldlichtung]; that means a place which is free from trees, which 
gives free access for going through and looking through. Lighting up therefore means making-free, 
giving-free. Light lights up, makes-free, provides a way through.
563
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Thus seeing phenomena as they truly are allows one to act freely. The contention that light is a 
prerequisite for freedom risks the misinterpretation that „darkness‟ obstructs freedom. It may 
therefore be worth addressing if only to avoid confusion. We interpret the distinction between light 
and dark in much the same manner as previously explicated antitheses. Just as untruth „preserves 
what is most proper to aletheia‟, so is the dark intimately related to light: 
 
Correspondingly with the dark. This is only a limit case of brightness and thus still has the character 
of a kind of brightness: a brightness that no longer lets anything through, that takes away visibility 
from things, that fails to make visible. [...] Only that can fail which also has the possibility of 
securing. The dark fails to make visible because it can also secure sight: in the dark we see the 
stars.
564
 
        
It may be interesting to note that this relationship between light and dark can be equally expressed 
by the thought that absolute light blinds just as dark „fails to make visible‟. At least in empirical 
terms, sight is possible on condition of the relationship between light and dark. OET omits 
discussion of „seeing‟ and „the light‟, referring rather to the „unconcealed‟ where what is 
„unconcealed‟ is already what is „seen‟. „Seeing‟ is also understood in a very particular manner 
here. Thus Heidegger‟s warning that, „Clearly, seeing and seeing is not the same‟.565 The latter 
refers to the process by which Dasein understands beings as they are encountered. Thereby, seeing 
is far less a matter of light particles and neurological synapses and much more, „The seeing of the 
idea, i.e. the understanding of what-being and how-being‟.566 This is the sense in which „seeing in 
the light‟ acts as a development of BT‟s „already working within an understanding of the is-ness, the 
what-being of being(s)‟. Heidegger‟s account of what he means by sight warrants attention on this 
point: 
  
With sensation too the eye is only the organ into which the faculty of sensation is built, but it is not 
this faculty itself. The eye as instrument strictly sees nothing at all; at best the sense of sight 
[Gesichtssinn] does this with the help of the eyes. The sense of sight „sees‟ colours in the manner of 
sensation [Empfinden], but never anything like a book; only through the sense of sight do we „see‟ a 
book. [...] When we say that „we see the book‟, we use „see‟ in the meaning which goes beyond 
perceiving the object by means of the sense of sight with the help of our eyes. [...] To this latter kind 
of „seeing‟ there belongs an understanding [Verstehen] of what it is that one encounters: book, door, 
house, tree. [...] What is sighted in this seeing is the ίδέα, the είδορ. [...] We never see beings with our 
bodily eyes unless we are also seeing „ideas‟.567 
 
Thus for Heidegger, „sight‟ as a term for the function of the eye, does not begin to address the 
understanding of what is seen. Nevertheless, Heidegger‟s argument seems to rely on something of a 
sleight of hand. The assertion that „the eye sees nothing at all‟ is perfectly true as far as it relates to 
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the corporeal body we call „the eye‟. Moreover, the claim that „the sense of sight can never see 
anything like a book‟, is also beyond doubt insofar as sight describes the filtration of light through a 
lens. The problem is that no one claims the corporeal eye is sufficient for object-recognition. 
Moving from there to the claim that, „we must already understand what „book‟ and „door‟ mean in 
order that they are seen‟ seems to be an attempt to slide in an argument for an as of yet, unexplained 
claim. In other words, one may concede the necessity of „understanding‟ for recognition without 
having to labour the term with a phenomenological account of its experience. Tugendhat‟s 
explanation of „understanding‟ will help address this problem: 
  
But Heidegger wants the word understanding to be grasped in such a way that it stands for the 
disclosure of one‟s own possible-being. [...] Thus, a kind of understanding is at issue for which it is 
constitutive that it is understanding in the first person.
568
 
   
Heidegger‟s argument does not depend on the understanding of any particular reference or object 
but the recognition of „thing-ness‟ as such. The point is not whether humans harbour an innate 
comprehension of „books‟ and „doors‟ but that both are experienced as „external objects‟ or „things‟ 
to which one attribute‟s a reference. Discussion of and reference to Plato‟s „ideas‟ ought to indicate 
the metaphysical inclinations of Heidegger‟s argument. This is that the inherent understanding of 
„objects‟ as „things‟ is demonstrable in the „average-everyday‟. It is in this sense that to look or 
more precisely to „see the book‟ always and already includes the understanding of being(s): 
 
We did not expect that in order to see this book, door, and so forth, we must already understand what 
„book‟ and „door‟ mean. Understanding what such things mean is nothing else but the seeing of the 
look, the ίδέα. In the idea we see what every being is and how it is, in short the being of beings [das 
Sein des Seienden].
569
 
      
We may therefore understand the first move in Heidegger‟s relationship between truth and freedom 
in the following way: „Freedom is the essence of truth‟ in that „truth‟ (aletheia) presupposes the 
freedom to disclose. Truth (aletheia) refers to the possibility of understanding in the sense of 
disclosure and specifically, „disclosure of one‟s own possible-being‟. Thus aletheia 
(„unconcealment‟) presupposes the possibility of disclosure, the freedom to disclose. On our 
interpretation, this first move points to the influence of Kant‟s argument for transcendental freedom. 
Therein transcendental freedom described reasons return to the absolute beginning of a causal 
sequence in respect of the „self-origination of a state‟.570 Similarly Heidegger‟s first move argues 
for freedom in the sense of an ontological characteristic of Dasein to return to a primordial 
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understanding which discloses being(s). In the most emphatic sense therefore, an enquiry into truth 
(aletheia) as „disclosure‟ reveals a prerequisite freedom. This may be what Heidegger means by 
„rethinking the ordinary concept of truth‟: 
 
If we translate aletheia as “unconcealment” rather than “truth,” this translation is not merely more 
literal; it contains the directive to rethink the ordinary concept of truth in the sense of the correctness 
of statements and to think it back to that still uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of 
beings.
571
 
 
Here, one already begins to point towards Heidegger‟s second move. As we have seen, the limit or 
insufficiency of Kant‟s argument in Heidegger‟s estimation is the assertion of a causally 
characterised pure will. The failure to interrogate the possibility of a primordial comportment to 
causality perpetuates the methodological misstep attributed to the rationalist tradition. Thus it will 
be necessary that Heidegger‟s account will ultimately appeal to praxis, which we interpret as that 
which gives Dasein its ontical priority, as the founding of being grounded by freedom.   
2. ET makes a distinction also omitted from OET. What we have referred to as the first move 
only offers a description of negative freedom or freedom-from. Our previous explication of 
freedom-from relieves the need for further analysis. Suffice it to say that the „two essential 
directions of the from-what‟ („World‟ and „God‟) point to enquiry into the totality without 
attempting its investigation. Similarly, „unconcealment‟ of freedom by virtue of the understanding 
of being(s) points to enquiry into „the light‟ and „the ίδέα‟ without examining the meaning and 
relationship of these terms. Heidegger states the following in continuing with his interpretation of 
the cave allegory: 
 
The second and third stages show that it is not only a matter of removing the shackles, i.e. of 
freedom from something. Such freedom is simply getting loose, and as such is something negative. 
[...] This is what genuine positive freedom offers; it is not simply freedom from but freedom for. [...] 
Genuine becoming free is a projective binding of oneself [...] such that one remains always bound in 
advance, such that every subsequent activity can first of all become free and be free.
572
 
  
The second move in the relation between truth and freedom is summed up in this „projective 
binding of oneself‟ to what „gives freedom‟, the light. An explanation is available though we will 
clarify further: 
  
Becoming free for beings, seeing-in-the-light, means to enact the projection of being [Seinsentwurf], 
so that a look (picture) of beings is projected and held up in advance, so that in viewing this look one 
can relate to beings as such.
573
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A hasty reading of this explanation will lead to what seems an obvious contradiction that ought to 
be addressed before moving forward. One may be forgiven for taking exception to the assertion of 
„projecting a look of beings in advance‟. At first sight, there seems little to distinguish a 
„preconception‟ or an „implicit presupposition‟ of being(s) from such a „projection‟. Our explication 
of that distinction will all but complete our understanding of the relationship between truth and 
freedom in Heidegger‟s writing.  
Heidegger offers three examples to clarify „how such freedom as pre-modelling projection of 
being first allows us to come closer to beings‟.574 In the interests of expediency, we will not assess 
or analyse every example. Moreover, each is intended to indicate the same characteristic so an 
overview will not do disservice to the argument as a whole. The first refers to the scientific 
„discovery of nature‟ which is accredited to the likes of Galileo, Kepler and Newton. The second 
refers to cultural history and in particular, Jacob Burckhardt. Finally, Heidegger includes Homer, 
Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare and Goethe from the fields of art and poetry. All three areas of study are 
of particular interest to Heidegger‟s thought and are recurring themes throughout the course of his 
writing. The concern herein is their similarity in regard to „binding to light‟ and the „projection of 
being‟. To that end, Heidegger explains the progress of science in the following way: 
  
What was decisive, what actually happened, is that a projection was made which delineated in 
advance what was henceforth to be understood as nature and natural process[...]
575
 
 
Burckhardt‟s developments are explained similarly: 
 
[...]his projective essential view of the fate, greatness and misery of man, of the conditions and limits 
of human action, in short, because of his anticipatory understanding of the occurrence we call 
history, of the being of these particular beings.
576
 
 
Finally, great art also owes its greatness to, 
  
[...]essential insight for the possible, for bringing out in the inner possibilities of beings, thus for 
making man see what it really is with which he so blindly busies himself.
577
 
 
Thus for Heidegger, the underlying premise of great works in general and those mentioned in 
particular, is to reveal the nature of beings anew. Regardless of the specific area of study, the point 
is to make use of one‟s expertise to shed new light on all beings as such. Thus scientific revelations 
are not restricted to their fields but eventually influence the understanding of nature and reality as a 
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whole: what are often referred to as Kuhnian paradigm shifts.
578
 As previously discussed, „essential 
insight‟ is contingent on adopting a methodology which neither abstracts nor isolates phenomena 
but sets them firmly in the context of the whole: the totality of beings. The individuals identified 
are, at least in Heidegger‟s estimation, synonymous with precisely such insight and a renewed, 
„genuine‟ investigation into being(s). The point is that their work, by its very nature, seeks to 
challenge if not revolutionise accepted principles and the contemporary understanding of the world. 
Of course it is beyond doubt that Kepler and Dante for example, will have wildly different views of 
the world. Materially at least, „The Divine Comedy‟ seems to have little or nothing to do with the 
laws of planetary motion and Copernican astronomy. Yet, for all their differences, the effort to 
affect a renewed understanding of the world is equally applicable to both. Similarly, an economic 
assessment of the previous century will certainly differ from ecological accounts though both 
describe the same period of time. The point is to determine the appropriateness of the perspectives 
presented, measurable by, 
  
[...]this individual grasping himself as being-there [Da-sein], set back into the isolation and 
thrownness of his historical past and future.
579
 
 
EHF identifies such a perspective as one which „goes-after-the-whole‟ as a „going-to-the-roots‟. 
Thus a „projection of being‟ which is set in the context of the totality must also go to the root of 
each individual‟s being-there. Taken in conjunction with what we know of Dasein (a being „always 
already in something like a world‟), „binding‟ oneself to light means perpetually grasping oneself as 
a being-there: a being thrown into the world. Thus, freedom understood in relation to truth, includes 
the directive that one grasp (understand) themselves from the particular thrownness that is, the 
hermeneutic facticity of their experience. In this respect, Heidegger‟s second move echoes the 
methodological demand of his fundamental ontology described in BT. But the goal of his 
ontological enquiry now extends beyond having „an explicit concept of being at our disposal‟ to 
being „authentically free‟: 
 
In this comportment I am able to be authentically free, i.e. I can acquire power by binding myself to 
what lets-through. Such binding is not loss of power but a taking into one‟s possession.580 
 
Beatrice Han-Pile comes to a similar conclusion regarding freedom and Dasein in her paper, 
„Freedom and the „Choice to Choose Oneself‟ in Being and Time‟. Following a quote from BT 
referring to the „possibility of being free for authentic existentiell possibilities‟, Han-Pile states the 
following: 
                                                          
578
 See, Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revelations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) 
579
 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth (New York: Continuum, 2002) p.45 
580
 Ibid., p.44 
174 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
 
Since by definition Dasein cannot but be in the world, ontological freedom is inalienable: it consists 
in having a projective understanding of oneself and of the world focused by having oneself as one‟s 
for the sake of which[...] 
 
She later adds, 
  
We knew from above that existentiell freedom lies in making the right choice. We now discover that 
such a choice is not a matter of deliberation, of weighing pros and cons, but of understanding oneself 
in the right way and being „in thrall‟ to such understanding[...]581 
 
We will refer to this condition of being „in thrall‟ to the understanding always-already present in 
Dasein‟s being-ontological as submission. The second move in Heidegger‟s relation of truth to 
freedom may therefore be understood as the necessity of submission to thrownness, the particularity 
of projected totality. 
b) Freedom as such 
Heidegger‟s investigation into the relationship between truth and freedom provides the final 
feature of the methodological framework supporting his account of freedom as such. If nothing else, 
it is quite clear that truth, freedom and understanding are deeply intertwined. It is important 
therefore that we explicate their entanglement in Heidegger‟s account. The final paragraph of OET 
refers to this point: 
 
The present undertaking takes the question of the essence of truth beyond the confines of the 
ordinary definition provided in the usual concept of essence and helps us to consider whether the 
question of the essence of truth must not be, at the same time and even first of all, the question 
concerning the truth of essence.
582
 
 
Set back in the context of BT and the primary concerns therein, the investigation into the essence of 
truth and thereby the truth of essence, exposes a necessary freedom. Heidegger states the following, 
earlier in OET: 
 
However, the proposition in question does not really mean that an unconstrained act belongs to the 
execution of the statement, to its pronouncement and reception; rather, the proposition says that 
freedom is the essence of truth itself.
583
 
 
Hans Ruin reinforces the entanglement of truth and essence, thrownness and freedom. He begins 
with an assessment of BT in attempting to identify „to what extent can the phenomenon of freedom 
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in its binary matrix be said to surface also in Heidegger‟s writings‟.584 Therein he claims the truth of 
Dasein is contingent on „practicing a stepwise critical destruction of inherited patterns of thought‟: 
  
This precarious space of meaning is at once the ground of Dasein, its essential determination, and yet 
it can become available to this Dasein only under certain circumstances, namely that it assumes 
authentically its own finite and thrown existence.
585
 
 
The „assumption of thrown existence‟ is not achieved by force of will nor described by analytic 
study. For Heidegger, being „in thrall‟ or submission, is not a frame of mind nor a perspective but 
the primordial condition of Dasein, obscured by persistent grasping at essences. In other words, the 
primordial condition of Dasein and authentic freedom are obscured by precisely the approach to 
enquiry which abstracts from the „finite‟ and „thrown existence‟ of human beings. It is in light of 
this that Heidegger insists on the possession of man by freedom and not the reverse: 
 
Man does not “possess” freedom as a property. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, 
disclosive Da-sein, possesses man – so originally that only it secures for humanity that distinctive 
relatedness to being as a whole as such which first founds all history.
586
 
 
We contend that this description of freedom issues directly from the conclusion of EHF wherein 
Kantian causality is „only possible where freedom exists‟: 587 the greater ontological primordiality of 
freedom. Of course it is unclear quite how man is „possessed‟ by freedom much less how in the 
immediate submission to the brute fact of finite present-ness, Dasein can be „possessed‟ by 
freedom. 
As we have seen, Heidegger‟s account of freedom is couched in the claim that „the openness of 
comportment as the inner condition of the possibility of correctness is grounded in [made possible 
by] freedom‟.588 He arrives at this claim by virtue of two moves. First, freedom makes possible the 
particular kind of understanding inherent to Dasein and second, the directive to begin enquiry from 
Dasein‟s thrownness: submission to the light. In much the same fashion, Kant‟s two ways to 
freedom reveal first the understanding of reason towards a metaphysical „idea‟ and second, the 
„actual willing of pure ought‟ or „willing the ought of one‟s existence‟. For both Kant and 
Heidegger, the first move refers to a metaphysical/ontological (in Heidegger‟s terms, „onto-
theological‟) observation and the second derives an ethical demand, the praxis of enquiry. For 
Heidegger, Kant makes little effort to investigate the nature of the enquirer and no effort to 
                                                          
584
 Hans Ruin, The Destiny of Freedom in Heidegger, Continental Philosophy Review, Vol. 41, (2008) p.279 
585
 Ibid., p.280 
586
 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, On the Essence of Truth (New York: Harper San Francisco, 1993, 
translated by John Sallis) p.118 
587
 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom (New York: Continuum, 2002) p.205 
588
 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, On the Essence of Truth (New York: Harper San Francisco, 1993 - org. 
1943, translated by John Sallis) p.116 
176 
 
A Phenomenological Ontology of Freedom: Obscuration and the Light 
 
problematise causality as such. Both are presupposed, resulting in an account of freedom as a kind 
of causality, analogous to natural causality. Conversely, Heidegger‟s extended analysis of Dasein 
and a fundamental approach to ontology compels him to reorient Kant‟s analysis toward the 
question of being. François Jaran makes a similar point regarding the analysis of Dasein and its 
relationship to the problem of freedom: 
  
The project of a metaphysics of Dasein thus reached its peak with the exposition of a metaphysical 
concept of freedom that Heidegger considered the origin and condition of possibility of all ontical 
freedom [...] as well as all possible relation with beings, whether it be practical, theoretical or 
aesthetic.
589
 
 
It will therefore be possible to correctly infer Heidegger‟s view of freedom from his metaphysics of 
Dasein given a sufficiently sensitive reading.  
Thus a second concern, alongside freedom‟s possession of man, arises with respect to 
distinguishing the „authentic assumption of thrownness‟. One point can be made in that regard 
without the need for further investigation. In light of the discussion of untruth (errancy and 
concealment) and negative freedom, it is clear that authenticity cannot be straightforwardly inferred 
from „inauthenticity‟.590  
1. The account of possession begins with an investigation into „striving‟ as a description for 
the „soul‟s relation to Being‟. More precisely that „striving for being‟ is what one commonly refers 
to as a soul: 
 
Being is that towards which the soul strives, not just from time to time and to any purpose, but 
essentially. The soul is this striving for being, i.e. in Platonic terms, the word „soul‟ simply means 
striving for being.
591
 
 
Though Heidegger wants to first determine how Dasein relates to its soul, our concern is what this 
striving for being means for possession, having and authenticity: 
 
The striving relationship is intrinsically a having-before-oneself, a having that is at the same time a 
not-having. We already see that everything depends on clarifying what „having‟ means here. [...] 
where having is understood as a human comportment.
592
 
 
Although it is obvious to the point of near banality that freedom cannot be „had‟ in the same sense 
that one „has‟ a pen, it is equally incredible to the point of absurdity that the nature of „having 
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freedom‟ is rarely a subject of discussion in traditional discourse. Clearly, however one defines 
freedom, it is not open to the manipulation, destruction or recreation attributable to any other object 
one may „have‟.593 Similarly, one speaks of „having a husband‟, „having the flu‟ or „having an 
emotion‟ yet none of these reflect the „having‟ usually denoted by the term including control over, 
possession of or at one‟s disposal. In regard to the latter, 
 
Such possessing can (but need not) be seen as the highest mode of having, for it is marked precisely 
by immediacy of disposition and arbitrariness of employment, thus by a kind of freedom in having.
594
 
 
But in this case: 
  
The genuine comportmental character of having becomes a self-losing of he who has. The autonomy 
of the self gives way to the contingency and arbitrariness of needs and desires to be immediately 
satisfied.
595
 
 
Thus a kind of freedom is implicit in having characterised by the „immediacy of disposition‟ but 
one that is couched in a presupposed relation of self to beings resulting in a disengaged conception. 
Ontical comportment is, for Heidegger, prioritised quite precisely by its taking issue with, that is 
engaging with beings and the relationship to being that implies. Freedom associated with the 
„immediacy of disposition‟ therefore loses all meaning in respect of establishing, that is founding, 
its „is-ness‟ insofar as it fails to acknowledge much less address its implicit presupposition. In this 
respect, when one speaks of having freedom one is compelled to orientate the discussion toward the 
totality of beings and its relationship to being-there or the brute fact of meaning-centred presence. 
In other words, to have freedom is to be engaged with beings and thus have an understanding of 
being as such manifested by „employment‟ and „disposition‟. Here the question of authenticity 
meets the possession of man by freedom.  
2. Heidegger offers a simple definition of authenticity and his sense of possession: 
 
What we understand by authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] is that mode of human existence wherein man 
(authentically) appropriates himself, i.e. wherein he comes to himself and can be himself.
 596 
 
He later adds the following in the context of „inauthentic striving‟ which, alongside „authentic 
striving‟ both „go together in the essence of authentic striving‟: 
 
This kind of striving (whose possibility alone we are now considering) does not strive to possess the 
object, but strives for it to remain as striven for, as held in the striving in order that the striver finds 
himself from that for which he strives.
597
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Read together, authenticity and striving (as a kind of having
598
), can be understood as a non-
possessive having of oneself. The aforementioned examples of seeing in the light may serve to 
clarify the point. Poets and artists cannot strive to possess their object in the usual sense if for no 
other reason than that the object is intangible. Whether one considers a Shakespearean sonnet, 
Dante‟s reflections on the damned or Homer‟s tragedies of the Trojan wars, the object is not 
possessed by either author or reader. One may of course possess the physical texts but this bears no 
relation to one‟s grasp of their content. Similar examples can be found in spiritual worship, the 
object of which is certainly not possessed. Rather God must remain as striven for and in precisely 
such a manner that the devout „find themselves from that for which they strive‟. Our analogy of 
God and worship may be more appropriate than it might seem. In attempting to account for 
Heidegger‟s complex metaphysics of Dasein, Jaran argues that, 
  
In fact, Heidegger always thought of his metaphysics of Dasein as the retrieval (Wiederholung) of an 
unsolved problem in Aristotle: that of the unity of the ontological and theological questionings.
 599
 
 
Later adding, 
  
Even clearer is the letter Heidegger wrote to Max Muller in November 1947, in which he said that 
the very title Sein und Zeit was a catastrophe, as was the whole effort of that time, as it never 
succeeded in overcoming „the onto-theological basis of metaphysics‟.600 
 
The point of course is not whether literary mastery and solemn prayer are identifiable pursuits. 
Rather what Jaran refers to as the „transcending‟ of Dasein in relation to the object, is an essential 
feature in either case. Thus when speaking of having artistic inspiration or a divine awakening, one 
certainly does not speak of these things as being at their disposal. Striving towards God is uniformly 
represented as a response to an introspective concern, neither discovered nor created but „revealed‟ 
as inherent to conscious existence. Whatever one‟s thoughts about poetry or prayer, both compel an 
introspection which must maintain a view on the totality of beings. This understanding may be what 
Heidegger refers to as what is „most primordially held in striving‟: 
  
It is being which in all circumstances is already present and there, not as a thing or any kind of 
object, but as that which is striven for in authentic striving. Whether we are aware of this or not, it is 
being that is most primordially and comprehensively held in striving.
601
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As we have seen, Dasein does not will ontological enquiry but must „take issue‟ with being at every 
turn and in every encounter. The authenticity with which being is „striven for‟ is determined by the 
extent to which one assumes their grounding in the world: the avoidance of what we have referred 
to as disengagement and unrelatedness. Dasein‟s „possession by freedom‟ therefore refers in one 
respect, to the provision of the metaphysical space necessary for precisely such primordial striving. 
c) Truth, Freedom and Dasein 
Our explication began with the claim that far from representing a turn in his thinking, EHF, 
OET and ET were intended to advance the principles of BT further into the essence of Dasein. It 
now appears this can be stated with greater certainty. Though Heidegger‟s language and style are 
markedly different from BT, the substantive content of his arguments are either wholly reliant on or 
are often indistinguishable from those made therein. One final example will serve to confirm the 
point and conclude our explication of Heidegger‟s view of freedom: 
  
Freedom was first determined as freedom for what is opened up in an open region. How is this 
essence of freedom to be thought? That which is opened up, that to which a presentative statement as 
correct corresponds, are beings opened up in an open comportment. Freedom for what is opened up 
in an open region lets beings be the beings they are. Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings 
be.
602
 
 
Two points are worthy of note here. First, there is a meaningful, if not straightforward, relationship 
between this description of freedom and the previously discussed etymologically derived definition 
of phenomenology. Second, that it does not contradict but reinforces the assertion of freedom as the 
essence of truth.  
As we have seen, Heidegger defines phenomenology as letting „that which shows itself be seen 
from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself‟.603 Taken in conjunction with what 
has been said regarding freedom‟s possession of Dasein, both the substantive continuity and 
linguistic adjustments from BT become abundantly apparent. Heidegger‟s phenomenology is 
intended as a methodology for ontological enquiry in approaching the question of being. Moreover, 
the explicit function of the analyses provided by BT is to develop a „concept of being at one‟s 
disposal‟. This effort is readily abandoned in favour of „retrieval‟. As Jaran points out, 
  
But at the end of the 1920‟s, Heidegger never spoke of overcoming, but rather of retrieving the 
fundamental questions of metaphysics.
604
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By the time of ET, the absence or lack of a concept of being is no longer the point of departure but 
an observation intended to confirm and illuminate a developed line of investigation. The „non-
conceptual‟ understanding of being no longer evidences a shortcoming in philosophical thought but 
a necessary feature of Dasein‟s thrownness. Here, on our reading, Heidegger consolidates his 
difference with Kant and thus the traditional discourse as a whole. What was referred to in the 
analysis of Kant as the only proof of practical freedom, namely praxis, is now a description of the 
understanding of being as such. Far from reason or the pure will, that which founds being is 
precisely the non-conceptual relation that permeates all comportment and discloses meaning. 
Heidegger suggests expanding his criticisms of ontological discourse to include the objective of BT 
at conclusion of OET: 
  
The decisive question (in Being and Time, 1927) of the meaning, i.e., of the project-domain, i.e., of 
the openness, i.e., of the truth of Being and not merely of beings, remains intentionally undeveloped. 
[...] The course of the questioning is intrinsically the way of a thinking which, instead of furnishing 
representations and concepts, experiences and tries itself as a transformation of its relatedness to 
Being.
605
 
 
The necessity of a non-conceptual understanding is such that Heidegger‟s own efforts must be 
expunged precisely in order to arrive at a clear and appropriate account of truth and freedom. This 
non-conceptuality is precisely what evades grasping and possesses Dasein.  
The relationship between the claims that „freedom is the essence of truth‟ and that „freedom 
reveals itself as letting beings be‟ may already be quite clear. Describing freedom in the terms 
which defined phenomenology need not cause confusion given the discussion of aletheia and the 
„disclosure of beings‟. Truth is neither a simple matter of propositions and their validity nor the 
accuracy of one‟s impressions. As Ruin explains, 
  
And at this point he writes, close to the argument in the essay on truth: that when we seek freedom as 
the ground of possibility of man, then freedom is more original than man. Man is only the keeper, 
Verwalter, of freedom. Thus freedom should no longer be thought of as the property (Eigenschaft) of 
man, but man as the possibility of freedom. For man is the being in which the understanding of being 
happens, and thus the possibility of truth.
606
 
 
The essence of truth, which must include untruth, is possible on condition that an interpretive space 
is already provided within which an encounter with beings occurs. Directly prior to declaring 
„freedom the essence of truth‟ Heidegger asks and answers the following: 
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Whence does the presentative statement receive the directive to conform to the object and to accord 
by way of correctness? Why is this accord involved in determining the essence of truth? How can 
something like the accomplishment of a pregiven directedness occur? And how can the initiation into 
an accord occur? Only if this pregiving has already entered freely into an open region for something 
opened up which prevails there and which binds every presenting.
607
 
 
This „open region‟ is simultaneously the domain of Dasein‟s being-ontological though of course not 
in the sense of possession, ownership or primacy. It is the space which makes Da-sein (being-there) 
possible quite precisely as a being inextricably entrenched in the world which cannot but engender 
and confront the question of being: 
 
Disclosedness itself is conserved in ek-sistent engagement, through which the openness of the open 
region, i.e., the “there” [“Da”], is what it is.608 
 
It is in this respect that Heidegger‟s account of freedom is derived from the account of 
phenomenology as described in BT. Freedom, in Heidegger‟s estimation, is not merely that 
ambiguous force which one may or may not attribute to action and from which one may infer moral 
responsibility. At least by the time of ET, freedom refers to that open space which grounds all 
interpretation, belief and action. It remains our contention that such an understanding of freedom 
can be readily derived from a thorough comprehension of BT. Nevertheless, the combined 
arguments of EHF, OET and ET confirm that freedom must be a constant presence underpinning 
there-being and the hermeneutics of facticity characterising the concern for being. Furthermore and 
perhaps more importantly, a compelling argument for freedom prioritising a phenomenological 
account of being, in this case at least, certainly requires challenging some fundamental, 
methodological assumptions about how one approaches the problem. As Ruin puts it, 
  
Together these passages [...] point toward a conception of philosophical work which remains guided 
by a certain understanding of freedom, not primarily as agency or independence [...] but as a kind of 
responsive openness to what is. To reach the free as an interpretive goal, as in the Schelling book, is 
obviously not to liberate oneself from the matter of the past, but to reach a point where one is able to 
encounter it.
609
 
 
It is to that end that we turn our attention to the necessary reinterpretation of freedom. Not as one 
philosophical pursuit amongst many but quite precisely as the means by which we may encounter 
philosophical thought as such.    
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Conclusion: Freedom and Being 
 
Our primary concern in the course of this analysis has been to explicate the claim that a radical 
and compelling account of human freedom is contingent on a criticism and correction of traditional 
rationalist methodological approaches to ontological enquiry as such. To that end, we have sought 
to investigate the major relevant works of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre whose projects to 
address and enquire after the meaning of being we interpret as preeminent examples of just such an 
account.  
We have shown that for both Sartre and Heidegger, a rationalist methodology which conceives 
both enquirer and agent as disengaged observers, has been read into the very conception of the 
constitution of the agent such that, to use Taylor‟s phrase, they occupy „a sort of protovariant of the 
“view from nowhere”.‟610 Consequently, philosophical enquiries into the nature of being, and 
significant phenomena of experience such as freedom, are fatally misconceived from the outset. The 
problem for both therefore will require a radical re-assessment of methodological presuppositions as 
a necessary prerequisite for any meaningful ontological enquiry. We have argued that for both 
Heidegger and Sartre, this provides the platform for an argument in favour of ontological freedom.  
Nonetheless, we have also argued that Sartre‟s project ultimately contradicts its premises 
insofar as they are based in what Heidegger refers to as fundamental ontology. The point there, as 
we have understood it, was to outline a methodological approach to enquiry which sought to evade 
if not „destroy‟ the traditional conception of the subject as disengaged by beginning from the 
assumption of an inherent and primordial relationship between Dasein and being as such. Crucially, 
this prioritisation of Dasein reflected a methodological principle to guide enquiry such that 
conceptions of the subject and its objects remain firmly rooted in interdependent relation to one 
another and being(s) in general.  
Sartre‟s argument in favour of ontological freedom, as we have understood it, contravenes this 
principle by construing all intentional objects of consciousness as inhabited by „not-being‟ as a 
necessary pre-requisite for their encounter and thus anthropocentrically. Sartrean consciousness, on 
our reading and as we have explained it, though free in respect of its „perpetually unstable 
equilibrium‟611 which will not admit of full identification with its objects but which therefore 
enshrines its ability to adopt any object as an ontological characteristic of its being, is also 
conceived in a quasi-Cartesian disengagement. Thus we have also argued that the appeal to 
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Descartes epitomised by the „pre-reflective cogito‟612 ultimately undermines the argument for an 
ontological freedom not dependent on disconnected dualist conceptions of human experience. 
A Heideggerian account of freedom, as exampled by the combined works of EHF and ET, 
extends the principles of fundamental ontology such that the possibility of an understanding of 
being is ultimately grounded by a primordial disclosure characterising all human comportment. In 
this sense, the confrontation with the question of being, the guiding concern of fundamental 
ontology and the central feature of Dasein, reveals an „open region‟613 grounding all „ek-sistent 
engagement‟.614 This „open region‟ is the site of Dasein‟s freedom as a necessary and prerequisite 
characteristic of average everyday experience. Freedom therefore is that which grounds the 
interpretive matrix of signs, values and signifiers comprising the hermeneutic facticity of engaged 
experience.  
Furthermore, we have acknowledged and attempted to address difficulties in Heidegger‟s 
account particularly with respect to Sartre‟s concern that Dasein is conceived in ethically 
ambiguous terms. Nevertheless, we have argued and continue to hold that insofar as these and other 
concerns are valid, they can be satisfied within the parameters of Heidegger‟s project which in turn 
can therefore provide fertile soil for a reinterpretation of the problem of freedom if not 
philosophical enquiry as such. A brief summary of the central points in our analysis will orient our 
conclusive thoughts.       
As we have seen, though Sartre is critical of those „dualisms which have embarrassed 
philosophy‟615 that we consider symptomatic of rationalist methodologies, he is concerned that 
neither Husserl nor Heidegger, as examples of alternatives, satisfactorily account for the 
„consciousness of consciousness‟.616 Without this, human-being is mischaracterised as a „blind in-
itself‟617 to which we cannot therefore attribute any responsibility. This is resolved, on our reading 
of Sartre, by acknowledging a pre-reflective cogito or a „non-reflective consciousness which 
renders the reflection [of consciousness to consciousness] possible‟.618 This, in turn, is couched in 
an interpretation of intentionality which modifies the „consciousness must be consciousness of 
something‟619 formulation by grounding consciousness‟ directedness to its objects (or its 
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„something‟) in a „pre-judicative comprehension of non-being‟.620 Thus being-for-itself is produced 
of an original nihilation at the heart of being-in-itself. As the hermeneutic site of the relationship 
between these „two regions of being‟,621 consciousness is therefore bound to perpetually transcend 
its objects. This attributes to it a profound and robust responsibility for the meaning of beings and 
therefore assures consciousness‟ freedom as an ontological condition of experience.   
In explicating our reading, we address a number of criticisms and counter-criticisms pertinent 
to Sartre‟s project and his argument for ontological freedom. We dismiss many of these as having 
„missed the point‟622 insofar as they underestimate the significance of fundamental ontology to the 
premises of Sartre‟s project. Of particular concern for our argument was the counter-criticism that 
Sartre‟s account of consciousness does not, as we claim, preclude the possibility of performing 
ontological enquiry and adequately. The concern derives from our defence of Sartre against the 
„threat of capriciousness‟623 which argues that Sartre‟s account of human action implies that all 
human projects (the total cumulative effect of our everyday aims towards an overarching goal) are 
ultimately indeterminate, that is, arbitrary. That argument posits that, if, as Sartre suggests, the 
values and meanings we attribute to entities and events in the world are in fact exclusively 
constituted in light of a preceding project of the for-itself then we have no means by which to 
account for the adoption of any particular project.  
In responding to this criticism, we have argued that capriciousness, far from being a threat to 
Sartre‟s project, confirms one of its central pillars. If „nothing‟ explains the adoption of a particular 
project then, for Sartre, this will be because „to begin with he [„man‟ who adopts the project] is 
nothing‟ and must be so in order that later „he will be what he makes of himself‟.624 But here we 
observe a greater concern with respect to what we might call the ultimacy of nothingness in Sartre‟s 
project. If, as we have seen, the upsurge of the for-itself is accounted for by an original nihilation at 
the „heart of being‟625 then enquiry into the nature of being can only reflect the transcendence of the 
for-itself grounded by the permanent possibility of non-being. In this respect we have argued that 
Sartre replaces fundamental ontology by an existential analytic of consciousness.  
Here the aforementioned counter-criticism intercedes with the claim that the original nihilation 
at the heart of the in-itself, supporting the upsurge of the for-itself, does not undermine the 
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adequacy of a project undertaken by a given agent to perform ontological enquiry. The internal 
logic of the point thus can be reformulated to say something like, „it is a contingent fact that Pascal 
takes up ontological enquiry but as a result of taking it up he discovered some non-contingent 
ontological truths‟ and certainly nothing is contradictory here. The problem of course is, as we have 
argued, in this instance the non-contingent ontological truth Pascal discovers is that his taking up 
ontological enquiry and in fact, the very meaning of that act and its component parts, is ultimately 
reflective of Pascal‟s project to be a certain „philosophically‟ inclined kind of person. In other 
words, the non-contingent truth is that all truths and the meanings and values ascribed to „truth‟ as 
such are contingent on for example, a project to render being(s) coherent. As for what being „is‟ 
therefore, in Sartre‟s terms and on our reading, we can say only: „Being is. Being is in itself. Being 
is what it is.‟626 We thus concluded that Sartre‟s i) replacement of fundamental ontology by an 
existential analytic of consciousness, in addition to what we have called his ii) anthropocentrism 
and iii) appeal to a Cartesian pre-reflective cogito are ultimately contradictory of the fundamental 
ontology which would ostensibly support an argument in favour of ontological freedom. We 
nonetheless attribute these shortcomings in Sartre‟s argument to his misunderstanding of Dasein.  
We have argued that the project of fundamental ontology presented in BT, provides a 
theoretical framework for a radical interpretation of freedom. Thus and as we have seen, Heidegger 
begins with the observation of a misstep in the history of traditional ontological enquiry reducible to 
what we have called the „presupposition‟627 of being. On our reading, the error refers to a 
predilection inherent to the traditional methodological principles of enquiry which overlook or 
presuppose the relationship between enquirer and the object of enquiry such that the investigation is 
possible.
628
 Heidegger‟s Dasein therefore, that designation attributable to entities of the enquirers 
nature, will be primarily characterised by a primordial „understanding‟629 of being. This 
understanding, in turn, indicates the role of Dasein in Heidegger‟s fundamental ontology, as that 
entity of „ontico-ontological‟630 priority to the question of [the meaning of] being. On our reading, 
this prioritisation of Dasein reflects a methodological directive to formulate the enquiry after being 
in terms of a proactive introspection of the enquirer‟s factical hermeneutic condition which is how 
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we interpret what Heidegger calls conceiving „going-after-the-whole‟ as a „going-to-the-roots‟.631 In 
so doing, Heidegger outlines a methodological approach intended to avoid if not „destroy‟632 the 
predilection for a disengaged conception of the approach to ontological enquiry.  
Furthermore, we argue that this methodological approach is exemplified in the combined 
accounts of EHF and ET which together and on our reading, constitute Heidegger‟s argument in 
favour of an ontological freedom. To that end, EHF first seeks to establish the claim that traditional 
accounts of freedom tend to treat exclusively of a negative relation, that is in terms of the 
independence from coercive forces, such that freedom is primarily conceived as „freedom-from‟.633 
But in line with the methodological concern to avoid presupposition, Heidegger turns to Kant for a 
positive account of freedom as „freedom-for‟ since Kant brings freedom into a „radical connection 
with the fundamental problems of metaphysics‟634 and thus provides the platform for a radical 
conception of freedom. Thus Heidegger interprets Kant‟s practical and transcendental freedom such 
that the former describes the factical evidence of freedom in the form of praxis and the latter 
grounds practical freedom in reason‟s capacity for the „self-origination of a state‟.635 The problem, 
as we have understood Heidegger, is that Kant assumes the causal character of freedom rather than, 
as fundamental ontology requires, interrogating the possibility of its primordiality. Thus Heidegger 
argues that if freedom can be conceived in respect of reason‟s return to an original cause, then it 
will follow that freedom grounds the possibility of a causal representation of being. This, we have 
claimed, points to Heidegger‟s radical conception of freedom; not as a property attributable to a 
particular agent but as the condition for the possibility of the understanding of being.   
Here, on our interpretation, Heidegger reframes Dasein‟s ontico-ontological priority in terms 
of the possibility of truth or what he refers to as unhiddenness and aletheia (αλήθεια).636 We have 
argued that Dasein‟s „being-in-the-world‟637 is anchored in the philosophical claim that ontological 
truth is possible only on condition that human experience and its objects are mutually presupposing. 
ET thus interrogates the possibility of „truth‟ such that it will ultimately ground the relationship 
between Dasein and being in „disclosure‟.638 Therein and as we have seen, Heidegger argues firstly 
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that aletheia presupposes an interpretive „open region‟639 necessary for an understanding of being(s) 
and secondly that the profundity of that understanding will depend on what we call „submission‟ to 
the hermeneutic facticity of one‟s condition principally as being-there, in-the-world. Thus for 
Heidegger and on our reading, the possibility implied by Kant‟s „insufficient radicalism‟640, namely 
that freedom can be conceived metaphysically, that is, as the ground for the possibility of a causal 
representation of being, can be reaffirmed. Therefore, Dasein‟s „ek-sistent engagement‟ with 
being(s) and its disclosure of the meaning of being(s), reflective as it is of a primordial 
understanding, is both made possible by and acts as an expression of freedom as an a priori 
necessity for experience.     
Although we argue that Sartre‟s critique of Heidegger‟s Dasein is born of a misunderstanding 
we are nevertheless sympathetic to, at least, a modified form of his concern. We have stated,
641
 that 
on our interpretation of Sartre, Dasein‟s primordial understanding of being seemingly strips human 
action of ethical responsibility. Thus, if Dasein‟s ontical distinction is grounded in a pre-ontological 
understanding of being then all human action is deterministic and absolved of responsibility; one 
would not choose their actions but would merely act out of a natural disposition. But the question of 
ethical responsibility falls out of the purview BT insofar as it is understood as a preparatory 
discussion intended solely to establish the methodological principles of fundamental ontological 
enquiry. Nonetheless, an argument can be made that the very effort to identify and distinguish 
characteristics of a being uniquely attributable to human-being invites precisely the strong sense of 
a disengaged subject that fundamental ontology sought to avoid. In other words if it is the case, as 
we have suggested, that Dasein must ultimately be grasped non-conceptually, then it seems 
counterproductive to furnish it with the complex of intricately woven concepts described in BT.
642
 
While we lack the room to explore the critique and possible responses in detail, we may suggest that 
developing Heidegger‟s conception of what he refers to as „authentic striving‟,643 which we 
understand as human comportment grounded by freedom [to disclose being(s)] and characterised by 
„submission‟, might allow for an ethical account of Dasein. Thus we may satisfy Sartre‟s critique 
within the parameters of fundamental ontology.  
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We have omitted discussion of some important features of both Sartre‟s and Heidegger‟s 
projects
644
 which may otherwise have developed our interpretation. Our concerns were twofold: 
firstly, to show that a radical and compelling account of human freedom is contingent on a criticism 
and correction of traditional rationalist methodological approaches to ontological enquiry as such. 
Secondly, to show that the major relevant works of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre are 
preeminent examples of just such an account. Though much more can of course be said and 
understood with respect to our concerns, we may state that we have, in the least, identified an 
appropriate point of departure.   
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